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ABSTRACT 
 
Individuals with OCD are found to be more likely to act to prevent harm than 
individuals without OCD only in scenarios relevant to their obsessional concerns. 
Conversely, recent moral-reasoning literature suggests that individuals with OCD are 
less likely than individuals without OCD to act to prevent harm when that action 
causes other, lesser, harm. However, this research has been criticised owing to the 
high-risk, nomothetic content of scenarios used. Therefore, this study asked 
individuals with and without OCD to consider hypothetical everyday scenarios typical 
of OCD concerns to address three aims. The first aim was to verify previous findings 
that when scenarios are described such that acting prevents harm, individuals with 
OCD were more likely than individuals without OCD to act to prevent harm, only in 
scenarios idiosyncratically rated as most-disturbing to that individual. The findings 
supported this hypothesis. Secondly, and of primary interest to this study, the research 
aimed to explore whether individuals with and without OCD differed in likelihood of 
acting to prevent harm when scenarios were described such that acting to prevent 
harm, resulted in other, lesser, harm. It was found that, when risks of acting were 
presented, individuals with OCD were again more likely than individuals without 
OCD to act to prevent harm, only in their most-disturbing scenarios. A final aim was 
to explore factors that contributed to decisions. General responsibility beliefs and 
decision-specific feelings of immorality mediated decision differences, only in 
scenarios where risks of acting were not presented; when risks of acting were 
presented, no factor explored within this study contributed to decision differences. 
Findings are discussed in the context of previous research into decision-making and 
moral reasoning in OCD. Limitations are considered and areas for future research are 
suggested.  
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder (OCD) is a mental health problem, experienced by 
approximately 1.2% of the population, that has been ranked by the World Health 
Organisation as the tenth most disabling disorder according to loss of earnings and 
diminished quality of life (OCD-UK, 2015). It is characterised by the presence of 
obsessions, compulsions or both. Obsessions are defined as recurrent and persistent 
thoughts, urges or impulses that are experienced as intrusive and unwanted, and 
which the individual attempts to ignore or suppress. Compulsions are defined as 
repetitive behaviours or mental acts aimed at preventing or reducing the anxiety 
associated with intrusions (OCD-UK, 2015). To meet diagnostic criteria, these 
obsessions and compulsions must be time consuming (taking over one hour a day) 
and cause clinically significant distress or impairment in social, occupational, or other 
important areas of functioning (American Psychiatric Association, 2013).  
 
Research has found that the intrusions experienced by those with OCD are common 
phenomena, with the majority of people in a nonclinical population reporting 
experiencing intrusions about potential harm (Rachman & De Silva, 1978). Those 
without OCD seem able to ignore these intrusions, or at least do not engage in 
compulsions that significantly interfere with their lives. However, those with OCD do 
not feel able to ignore such intrusions, and feel compelled to act in response in an 
attempt to prevent that potential harm (Rachman & De Silva, 1978). Many theories 
suggest that engaging in compulsions is critical in the development and maintenance 
of the disorder, with compulsive behaviour reinforcing beliefs, and in turn leading to 
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increased frequency of intrusions (Salkovskis & Campbell, 1994) and increased 
associated discomfort (Salkovskis, Westbrook, Davis, Jeavons, & Gledhill, 1997). It 
is suggested that intrusions raise an individual’s awareness of potential harm, 
resulting in the individual being confronted with a decision whether to act or not to 
prevent such potential harm (Forrester, Wilson & Salkovskis, 2002). Improving our 
understanding of this decision-making juncture could prove key in understanding the 
disorder. So why is it then, that individuals without OCD generally decide not to act 
in response to these intrusions, whereas individuals with OCD do not feel able to 
make this decision?  
 
This chapter will start by outlining the research into decision-making in individuals 
with OCD, and suggestions for potential explanations of decision differences. It will 
go on to introduce the relatively new and quickly developing field of moral reasoning 
as an exciting opportunity to explore potential differences in decision-making 
between individuals with and without OCD. Comment will be provided on research to 
date that has attempted to investigate this juncture between decision-making in OCD 
and moral reasoning and the necessary methodological improvements of these studies 
will be highlighted. The literature presented is hoped to enable the reader an 
understanding of the current landscape of research into decision-making in OCD and 
the areas that may progress this, thus leading to the hypotheses to be examined within 
this thesis.  
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1.1. Decision-making in OCD 
 
 
Research has suggested that OCD should be considered a disorder of decision-making 
(Sachdev & Malhi, 2005), which may explain the behavioural differences in response 
to intrusions. For example, Beech and Liddell (1974) reported that participants with 
OCD subjectively identified more decision-making difficulties than participants 
without OCD. Furthermore, several studies have indicated that individuals with 
symptoms of OCD request additional observations (Walker, 1967, as cited in Beech 
& Liddell, 1974), additional information (Foa et al., 2003), more trials (Beech & 
Liddell, 1974) and more time (Foa et al., 2003) than those without symptoms of OCD 
before reaching a decision on a variety of decision-making tasks.  Some studies have 
contested suggestions of decision-making differences, finding individuals with OCD 
requested similar (Jacobsen, Freeman & Salkovskis, 2012) or even fewer (Reese, 
McNally & Willhelm, 2011) amounts of information to make a decision than non-
clinical controls. Such differences in findings across studies may be attributable to 
study materials, comorbidities or medication (Zhang et al., 2015). Alternatively, an 
explanation for these differences is provided by Foa and colleagues (2003) who found 
that when comparing 18 individuals with OCD and 18 non-anxious controls, decision-
making differences between groups were specific to low-risk and OCD relevant 
decisions. Therefore, as both Reese and colleagues (2011), and Jacobsen and 
colleagues (2012) utilized a ‘beads task’, this was unlikely to echo obsessional 
concerns of the OCD group, and as such would not have demonstrated decision 
differences that may have been present had the scenarios been OCD-relevant.  
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Rocha, Alvarenga, Malloy-Diniz and Correa (2011) extended the above findings and 
suggested that participants with OCD also make significantly ‘worse’ decisions on a 
decision-making task, as they were found to make less advantageous decisions on the 
Iowa Gambling Task, a task thought to simulate real-life decision-making. Although 
previous studies (Nielen, Veltman, De Jong, Mulder & Den Boer, 2002) observed 
contrasting results and found participants with and without OCD to be comparable in 
a similar decision-making task, Rocha and colleagues (2011) provided a larger sample 
size and hence the sample consisted of a greater variety of OCD symptoms. It is 
worth considering, however, that Lawrence and colleagues (2006) suggested different 
OCD symptom dimensions are associated with distinct impairments in the decision-
making process. This suggestion extends Foa and colleagues’ (2003) finding that 
decision differences and difficulties are specific to low-risk, OCD-type scenarios, and 
indicates that such differences are more specific to an individual’s idiosyncratic 
obsessional concerns; this may explain previously inconsistent findings. 
 
Therefore, from the research on decision-making in OCD, it seems that when an 
individual with OCD is presented with a low-risk, OCD-relevant decision-making 
scenario, they show differences in how they reach decisions (taking more time and 
needing more information (Beech & Liddell, 1974; Foa et al., 2003)) and may also 
make less advantageous decisions (Rocha et al., 2011). There is also a suggestion that 
decision difficulties vary according to OCD subtypes (Lawrence et al., 2006).  
 
Indeed, neurobiological evidence supports the notion that individuals with OCD show 
differences when making decisions (Cavedini, Gorini & Bellodi, 2006; Olley, Malhi 
& Sachdev, 2007; Sachdev & Malhi, 2005).  Structural MRIs have consistently found 
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reduced grey matter volume in the orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) in individuals with 
OCD, a circuit that is believed to be specifically related to decision-making (Menzies 
et al., 2008). This biological evidence adds weight to the idea that those with OCD 
have difficulty in making decisions, but what processes underlie these difficulties, and 
why is it that those with OCD tend to make qualitatively different decisions (to act in 
response to intrusions) to those without OCD?  
 
Psychological models have attempted to explain the pathology of OCD, and offer 
suggestions as to the underlying factors that may cause decision-making differences 
and difficulties in those with the disorder. It is important to note at this point, that 
although the literature refers to decision-making differences and difficulties, it does 
not indicate that individuals with and without OCD engage in different processes in 
order to reach decisions. Rather, it is suggested that decision differences and 
difficulties are due to differences in the contributory factors on which decisions are 
based. Suggestions for factors on which these decision differences may rely include 
desire for control, over-estimations of threat, intolerance of uncertainty, negative 
beliefs about the consequences of anxiety, negative beliefs about capacity to cope, and 
heightened responsibility beliefs (Steketee, Frost & Cohen, 1998).  
 
1.2. Inflated responsibility beliefs as an explanation for decision-making 
differences 
 
The widely renowned cognitive model of OCD (Salkovskis, 1985, 1999; Salkovskis, 
Forrester & Richards, 1998; Figure 1) posits that responsibility is central in the 
development and maintenance of the disorder. Responsibility, in this context, can be 
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defined as “the belief that one has power which is pivotal to bring about or prevent 
subjectively crucial negative outcomes” (Salkovskis, Shafran, Rachman, & Freeston, 
1999, p. 1058) whether these are real-world or moral consequences.  
 
Figure 1. Cognitive Model of OCD (Salkovskis, Forrester & Richards, 1998) 
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According to this model, those with OCD hold heightened responsibility beliefs, and 
owing to these beliefs make different decisions as they interpret themselves as being 
responsible for their intrusions, and for preventing the contents of them (Salkovskis, 
1985). For example, following seeing broken glass on the street, many observers 
could experience an intrusion about someone hurting themselves on this glass. 
However, those with OCD may feel responsible for preventing this harm (Foa, Sacks, 
Tolin, Przeworksi, & Amir, 2002), and as such will feel compelled to act to attempt to 
reduce this potential harm.  
 
Research supports this model, suggesting that increased responsibility is linked with 
increased urges to act compulsively following intrusions and that this relationship also 
holds true within a non-clinical population (Taylor & Purdon, 2016). Adding weight 
to the relationship between these factors, Lopatka and Rachman (1995) found that 
decreasing responsibility in patients with OCD led to significant reductions in 
discomfort and urges to check whilst increasing responsibility corresponded with 
increased discomfort and urges to check, although this latter finding did not reach 
significance. Supporting these results, Shafran (1997) found that increasing perceived 
responsibility levels in 36 participants with OCD heightened discomfort and the urge 
to neutralize. Research has also suggested that individuals with symptoms of OCD are 
likely to allocate more responsibility to themselves than others, despite believing that 
others allocate responsibility equitably (Ashbaugh, Gelfand & Randomsky, 2006); 
this tendency to inflate personal responsibility was in fact found to be a better 
predictor of obsessive-compulsive symptoms than responsibility beliefs alone 
(Ashbaugh et al., 2006). Therefore, considering that individuals with OCD were 
found to be more likely to make responsibility-related appraisals of their intrusive 
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thoughts and to endorse general responsibility beliefs than their non-clinical, anxious 
or depressed counterparts (Salkovskis et al., 2000), and considering that heightened 
responsibility beliefs are associated with increased urges to carry out compulsions 
(Arntz, Voncken & Goosen, 2007; Lopatka & Rachman, 1995; Mancini, D’Olimpio 
& Cieri, 2004; Shafran, 1997), responsibility may provide an explanatory factor for 
why those with OCD make different decisions in response to their intrusions 
compared to those without OCD.  
 
Although research largely supports a key role for heightened responsibility in the 
pathogenesis of OCD, some studies have found minimal (Steketee, Frost, & Cohen, 
1998) or non-significant relationships (Fitch & Cougle, 2013; Frost, Steketee, Cohen 
& Griess, 1994; Jones and Menzies, 1997) between OCD and responsibility, thus 
contesting this notion. Furthermore, some research has suggested that the role of 
heightened responsibility may be restricted to certain subtypes of OCD (Clark, 2012): 
Wheaton, Abramowitz, Berman, Riemann and Hale (2010) found that beliefs about 
responsibility were only related to the symptom dimensions of contamination and 
responsibility for harm, whilst others proposed that inflated responsibility was 
apparent for checking compulsions, but not for cleaning (Foa, Sacks, Tolin, 
Prezworski  & Amir, 2002; Rachman & Shafran, 1998; Rachman & Hodgson, 1980). 
However, a replication of Foa, Sacks and colleagues (2002), addressing 
methodological criticisms, found individuals with non-checking OCD also identified 
greater responsibility appraisals (Cougle, Lee & Salkovskis, 2007).  
 
Despite debate around whether applicable to all OCD subtypes, responsibility beliefs 
remain a widely regarded feature in the etiology of OCD, and provide a plausible 
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factor on which decision differences may be based. However, an alternative 
explanatory factor, overestimation of potential threat, is also worthy of consideration.  
 
1.3. Overestimation of threat as an explanation for decision-making 
differences 
 
Early theorists proposed that a key difference between those with and without OCD is 
that those with OCD overestimate the probability and severity of aversive events and 
their consequences (Steketee et al., 1998). For example, following a potentially 
harmful event (broken glass on the street), this theory would suggest that individuals 
with OCD are likely to estimate a greater probability of harm and a more severe 
outcome (a child cutting themselves very severely), than individuals without OCD. 
 
However, some studies exploring overestimation of threat indicate that individuals 
with OCD do not overestimate the likelihood (Menzies, Harries, Cumming & Einstein, 
2000; Moritz & Pohl, 2009) of aversive events, but feel personally more vulnerable 
(Moritz & Pohl, 2009) to experience or cause events and overestimate the severity of 
the potentially negative consequences (Moritz & Jelinek, 2009).  
 
Hence, proponents of this model suggest that these overestimations of threat lead to 
those with OCD being more likely to decide to act in these situations. Support for this 
notion is provided by Pushkarskaya and colleagues (2015), who found that 
individuals with and without OCD made different decisions when situations had 
ambiguous outcomes; there were no differences between groups when potential risks 
were stated. This indicates that when outcomes were ambiguous, individuals with and 
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without OCD may have interpreted potential risks differently, and hence made 
different decisions. 
 
Uniting the two cognitive constructs of responsibility and overestimation of threat, 
Menzies and colleagues (2000) found that heightened responsibility led students to 
judge a potentially negative outcome to be more aversive, with greater estimates of 
cost and severity. Therefore, it seems that for those with OCD, heightened 
responsibility beliefs play a role in causing them to interpret potential outcomes as 
being more severe and costly in subjective danger calculations, and thus encourage 
them to act to avoid or reduce possible harm.  
 
1.4. Key research into the role of responsibility in decision-making in OCD 
 
 
Further exploring decision-making in OCD, and particularly the role of responsibility 
in decision-making, Wroe and Salkovskis (2000) explored a phenomenon known as 
‘omission bias’, whereby harm resulting from action (commission) is judged as less 
acceptable than harm resulting from failing to act (omission) in the general population 
(Spranca, Minsk & Baron, 1991). 
 
In this study, 42 individuals with OCD, 53 non-clinical controls and 25 anxious 
controls, were presented with eight everyday (low-risk) hypothetical scenarios and 
asked about their likelihood of acting to prevent harm in the scenarios, and their 
feelings of immorality, worry, responsibility, cause and blame for potential harm. 
Prior to reading the scenarios, participants were also given a disturbance-rating 
questionnaire, which enabled the authors to identify participants’ semi-
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idiosyncratically most-disturbing (and hence, OCD relevant) scenarios, and compare 
these to least-disturbing scenarios (Wroe & Sakovskis, 2000). 
  
It was found that individuals with OCD lacked omission bias for situations that 
concern them (relate to their obsessional problems)(Wroe & Salkovskis, 2000). That 
is, in situations rated most-disturbing (and hence relevant to their OCD), individuals 
with OCD were as likely to decide to act to try and prevent harm in a situation where 
not acting to prevent harm would be perceived as an omission, as they were in a 
situation where not acting to prevent harm would be perceived as a commission. For 
example, returning to the example of broken glass on the street, an individual without 
OCD may see broken glass on the street and have a thought that someone may hurt 
themselves on that glass, and then decide not to act to remove that glass (perceiving 
that they are not responsible for any potential harm). However, when the scenario was 
adapted to state that that individual had dropped the glass there themselves (and so 
was responsible for it being there, thus transforming the situation such that not acting 
was a commission), the individual without OCD was more likely to state that they 
would remove the broken glass than in the first scenario. In contrast, an individual 
with OCD may notice broken glass and perceive themselves to be as responsible for 
potential harm if they do not act to prevent this harm (by removing the glass) as in the 
scenario when they actually dropped the glass; the individuals with OCD decided to 
act to prevent harm (remove the broken glass), in both scenarios. The authors 
suggested that responsibility beliefs transformed the omission situation so an 
individual with OCD (and hence, heightened responsibility beliefs) perceived 
him/herself as an ‘active agent’ in the situation, such that failing to prevent harm was 
then judged as bad as, or as morally equivalent to, actively causing harm. 
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Consequently, individuals with OCD were found to be more likely to act to prevent 
harm than individuals without OCD in omission situations that were relevant to their 
OCD. Furthermore, individuals with OCD also reported higher feelings of 
responsibility, worry immorality, cause and blame in these situations, than their non-
clinical counterparts.  
 
Importantly, these differences between individuals with and without OCD were found 
only in situations related to their obsessional concerns (rated as most-disturbing), 
leading the authors to conclude that there is no difference in general decision-making 
or judgements between individuals with and without OCD, but that responsibility 
beliefs transform the decisions of those with OCD in their OCD-relevant scenarios. 
This finding echoes earlier presented suggestions of Foa and colleagues (2003) and 
Lawrence and colleagues (2006).  
 
This study by Wroe and Salkovskis (2000) therefore provides critical evidence in the 
exploration of decision-making in OCD. Owing to the finding that differences were 
specific to their most-disturbing, and hence OCD-relevant scenarios, it is suggested 
that those with OCD do not have an inferior decision-making process, but that they 
make different decisions due to a difference in the factors influencing their decisions 
in these scenarios (such as trying ‘too hard’ to ensure no harm occurs, due to inflated 
responsibility beliefs) (Wroe & Salkovskis, 2000). However, owing to the 
hypothetical scenarios used, it is difficult to say whether the same pattern of results 
would be found in real-life decision-making scenarios (Teper, Inzlicht, & Page-Gould, 
2011).  Furthermore, the researchers did not systematically investigate the role of 
responsibility in decision-making. 
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Siev, Huppert and Chambless (2010) largely supported the findings of Wroe and 
Salkovskis (2000). Although they did not investigate likelihood of acting in scenarios, 
and so findings do not indicate whether participants would make different decisions, 
they explored responsibility interpretations, and so it can be seen whether participants 
differed on the factors that may influence their decision-making. It was found that in a 
student population of 342, omission bias in OCD-relevant scenarios was inversely 
related to OCD symptoms (the more OCD symptoms reported, the less difference 
participants showed between omission and commission scenarios). When extending 
this to a clinical sample of 103 participants with OCD compared to 106 participants 
without OCD, individuals with OCD showed significantly less omission bias for 
scenarios relevant to OCD concerns than the comparison group (Siev et al., 2010). 
Therefore, consistent with findings from Wroe and Salkovskis (2000), it was 
concluded that whereas participants without OCD showed differences between how 
responsible they felt in an omission compared to commission scenario, participants 
with OCD did not show such large differences, and consequently felt more 
responsible than their non-clinical counterparts in omission scenarios. Again echoing 
the findings of Wroe and Salkovskis (2000), no evidence was found of a general 
omission bias (for scenarios unrelated to OCD concerns), and this supports the notion 
that individuals with OCD do not show differences in general decision-making. 
Contrasting Wroe and Salkovskis’ (2000) work but echoing Foa and colleagues 
(2003), the association between OCD symptoms and omission bias was found in 
OCD-type scenarios, which, although encompassing typical OCD fears (such as 
washing and checking), were not specific to participants’ idiographic concerns. 
Furthermore, exploring separately the washing and checking scenarios dependent on 
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participants’ washing and checking subscales of the OCI-R did not reveal a 
differential effect of symptom dimension on type of scenario presented. Therefore, 
this questions whether decision-making differences are only shown in idiosyncratic 
OCD-relevant situations as posited by Wroe and Salkovskis (2000), or whether they 
may also be found in more general OCD-type situations, as suggested by Siev and 
colleagues (2010). 
 
From research explored so far, it seems that those with and without OCD make 
different decisions when their obsessional concerns are activated, potentially due to 
the heightened responsibility beliefs associated with OCD. These responsibility 
beliefs seem to be associated with individuals with OCD making decisions to try and 
avoid or reduce potential harm, more so than individuals without OCD.  
 
However, it has also been suggested that in some instances, those with OCD do not 
wish to act to prevent harm as they fear acting may lead to other harm (i.e. acting 
would assume personal responsibility for other potential harm)(Wroe, personal 
communication). For example, again using the broken glass scenario to illustrate, 
individuals with OCD may decide not to act to move the glass to prevent someone 
from falling on it, as moving the glass would mean pushing it into the road, where a 
cyclist may ride over it. This notion that individuals with OCD may be less inclined to 
act due to a risk of potential other harm, despite inaction also resulting in a risk of 
potential harm, reflects the finding that decision-makers are seen as more responsible 
for outcomes when these are the result of a decision to act compared to a decision not 
to act (Spranca et al., 1991; Zeelenberg, Pligt & de Vries, 2000). The heightened 
sense of responsibility associated with OCD could therefore affect decision making in 
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one of two ways: concern around general responsibility may lead individuals with 
OCD to seek a utilitarian outcome (one with least harm); alternatively, concern 
around personal responsibility may increase the chances of individuals with OCD not 
acting, as to do so would implicitly assume responsibility for the outcome. Therefore, 
which of these is found in those with OCD: do they act to reduce harm, or would the 
unwanted fact that this brings personal responsibility override the desire to reduce 
harm? In Wroe and Salkovskis’ (2000) study, participants with OCD were more likely 
to act to reduce harm than those without OCD in their obsession-relevant scenarios. 
However, in this study, scenarios were described such that the actor was able to 
prevent all harm that they could have anticipated (Siev et al., 2010) and where acting 
to reduce harm involved no consequence other than the reduction of harm. Would this 
result still be the case if acting to reduce harm resulted in other (albeit lesser) harm?  
 
1.5. Decision-making in OCD when both acting and not acting result in 
some harm 
 
Franklin, McNally and Riemann (2009) attempted to answer exactly this question 
using hypothetical moral dilemmas in a format widely used in philosophy: the 
canonical trolley problem. In this dilemma the participant is told to imagine that they 
are a bystander, watching a runaway train with broken brakes. They are given two 
options: do nothing, in which case the runaway train will fatally injure five people 
working on the track; or do something and press a switch, which will change the path 
of the train towards and fatally injure one person working on another part of the track. 
The utilitarian option- the one resulting in least harm- is to divert the train and so if 
individuals with OCD have concerns around general responsibility and minimising 
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harm, then it was hypothesised that this would be the option chosen. However, if they 
alternatively have concerns around personal responsibility, and not wanting to be the 
active agent in causing harm to someone who otherwise would not have been harmed, 
then they would be expected to choose to ‘do nothing’. Interestingly, following 10 
moral-dilemmas of the aforementioned format, no significant difference was found 
between individuals with and without OCD in the decisions made, thereby supporting 
neither hypothesis. Further exploration of the results revealed contradicting 
suggestions: on the one hand the OCD group exhibited a slight, albeit non-significant 
trend towards utilitarian decisions (choosing to divert the trains path), potentially 
indicating a concern with general responsibility for this group; on the other hand, 
higher scores for OCD patients on the Responsibility Attitudes Scale (Salkovskis, et 
al., 2000) correlated with a preference to do nothing. As prior literature endorses that 
heightened responsibility beliefs are associated with greater severity of OCD 
symptoms (Salkovskis, et al., 2000) this potentially indicates that those with more 
severe OCD experience a concern with personal responsibility.  These conflicting 
suggestions cause difficulties when attempting to draw conclusions from this study 
about the decisions of those with OCD. Corroborating Franklin and colleague’s 
(2009) results, Harrison and colleagues (2012) also found that patients with OCD did 
not differ from a control group in their responses to similar moral dilemmas. However, 
Harrison and colleagues (2012) noted that the OCD group showed heightened 
activation in neural correlates of moral sensitivity, indicating that this factor may play 
a role in decision-making for individuals with OCD, more so than for those without. 
 
A more recent study by Mancini and Gangemi (2015) explored similar concepts using 
different terms. This research explored altruistic (for the greater good) and 
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deontological (the ‘do not play god’ principle) guilt. These two varieties of guilt can 
be equated to the two types of responsibility explored by Franklin and colleagues 
(2009): general responsibility and altruistic guilt both aim for least harm, whilst 
personal responsibility and deontological guilt both concern not ‘playing god’ or 
assuming responsibility by acting regardless of whether this is for the good of victims. 
Mancini and Gangemi (2015) compared twenty patients with OCD, twenty anxious 
controls and twenty healthy participants answering seven scenarios (four moral 
dilemmas and three control scenarios). For example, one moral dilemma used stated:  
 
“You are near a Ferris wheel. It does not work. Just under the wheel, there are five 
tourists. Suddenly, the wheel starts turning and soon a cabin will crush them to death. 
There is no way to warn them and they cannot escape in any way. The only way to 
save the five tourists is to pull a lever that can change the rotation of the wheel. 
Unfortunately, there are three people on the other side that would be killed. Should 
you pull the lever?” (Mancini & Gangemi, 2015, p.160). 
 
It was found that participants with OCD preferred inaction, and that inducing 
deontological guilt also increased inaction preference. Mancini and Gangemi (2015) 
concluded that individuals with OCD are more sensitive to deontological guilt than 
individuals without OCD, and hence are more likely to decide not to act in order to 
avoid this guilt. This finding is in direct contrast to the findings of Wroe and 
Salkovskis (2000), whose research, although not using scenarios where there was a 
stated risk of acting, posited that those with OCD were more likely to act to prevent 
harm (which would be more in line with concerns regarding altruistic guilt).  
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However, there were some key criticisms of these studies, which mean that the 
conclusions that can be drawn from them are limited.  
 
Firstly, the moral-dilemma scenarios used in Franklin and colleagues (2009), Harrison 
and colleagues (2012) and Mancini and Gangemi (2015) involved decisions between 
the lives of several people and the lives of fewer other people. These life-changing 
decisions therefore involved high risks. However, previous research on decision-
making has found that differences between those with and without OCD only appear 
in low-risk situations and that no differences are present between groups in high-risk 
scenarios (Foa et al., 2003). Therefore, as these studies utilised ‘high-risk’ scenarios, 
it is possible that this removed any differences that would have been found by using 
low risk situations, a criticism the authors noted themselves (Franklin et al., 2009). 
Furthering this notion, the life or death nature of the scenarios negated their relevance 
to everyday situations, where individuals with OCD are found to make different 
decisions, thereby rendering the results as having low ecological validity. 
 
Furthermore, studies utilised a nomothetic, non-OCD relevant approach, and did not 
distinguish between OCD subtypes. This is particularly relevant with OCD as the 
disorder encompasses a broad range of obsessional concerns and a universal set of 
stimuli is unlikely to be equally relevant to all participants (Foa et al., 2003). For 
example, Wroe and Salkovskis (2000) found that differences in those with and 
without OCD were only found when considering situations that participants found 
most-disturbing and thus, were most related to their individual obsessional difficulties. 
Although Siev and colleagues (2010) contested the need for scenarios related to 
idiosyncratic concerns, it was still found that general decision-making did not differ 
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between those with and without OCD as OCD-type scenarios were necessary to 
reveal differences. Using general nomothetic, as opposed to semi-idiosyncratically 
tailored situations may mean that Franklin and colleagues (2009), Harrison and 
colleagues (2012) and Mancini and Gangemi (2015) overlooked potential differences 
that would have been found using situations relevant to participants’ obsessional 
concerns.  
 
It is possible that these limitations explain Franklin and colleagues’ (2009) and 
Harrison and colleagues’ (2012) finding of no group differences between the OCD 
and non-clinical participants. However, the findings of Mancini and Gangemi’s 
(2015) research that individuals with OCD tend to choose inaction due to 
deontological guilt do not seem to be explained by these limitations. Alternatively, it 
may be that Franklin and colleagues (2009), Harrison and colleagues (2012) and 
Mancini and Gangemi (2015) stated risks explicitly when participants were making 
decisions, which removed the possibility of those with and without OCD interpreting 
different outcome severity (Pushkarskaya et al., 2015; Steketee, et al., 1998); this may 
explain why findings differed from those expected by Wroe and Salkovskis’ (2000), 
when risks were not quantified. However, it is of interest whether these findings 
would remain when using low-risk situations relevant to individuals’ obsessions.  
 
1.6. Dual Process Theory of Moral Judgement as an alternative 
explanation for decision differences 
 
A recent theory on moral reasoning provides an alternative explanation for the 
findings of Mancini and Gangemi (2015), and supports the notion that individuals 
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with OCD are less likely to act in moral dilemmas such as the canonical trolley 
problem. Greene and colleague’s Dual Process Theory of Moral Judgement (Greene, 
Sommerville, Nystrom, Darley & Cohen, 2001; Greene, Nystrom, Leigh, Engell, 
Darley & Cohen, 2004; Greene, 2007; Greene, Morelli, Lowenberg, Nystrom & 
Cohen, 2008) proposes that two psychological processes affect moral reasoning and 
hence decision outcomes in these scenarios: cognition and emotion.  
 
Greene (2007) suggests that cognitive processes must override an initial negative 
emotional reaction in decision-making scenarios, in order to rationally choose the best 
overall outcome. Therefore, utilitarian decisions require a level of cognitive control. 
Support for this notion has been provided by neuroanatomical evidence that has found 
utilitarian moral reasoning activates the Anterior Dorsolateral Prefrontal Cortex 
(associated with abstract reasoning and cognitive control (Koechlin, Ody & 
Kouneiher, 2003)) and the Anterior Cingulate Cortex (associated with cognitive 
conflict (Botvinick et al., 2001)). Furthermore, when exploring the relationship 
between cognitive control and moral reasoning, it was found that reducing cognitive 
control with a cognitive load manipulation selectively interfered with utilitarian 
judgements (Greene et al., 2008; Trémolière, Neys, & Bonnefon, 2012), 
 
Conversely, this theory denotes that the intense negative affective reaction induced by 
a moral reasoning task evokes a sense that action is inherently wrong, regardless of 
the consequences. Therefore, negative emotional responding is proposed to be linked 
with deontological judgements. Evidence for this link is suggested by Mendez, 
Anderson and Shapira (2005) who found that patients with Frontotemporal Dementia 
(a common feature of which is emotional bluntening) are less likely to use 
 29 
deontological moral reasoning; furthermore balancing a negative response using a 
positive mood induction task is also found to reduce deontological decisions 
(Valdesolo & Desteno, 2006).  
 
There are several implications of this theory for our understanding of decision-making 
in OCD. OCD is found to be linked with deficits of cognitive control (Griesberg & 
McKay, 2003), and heightened negative affective responses (Cougle, Timpano, 
Sarawgi, Smith & Fitch, 2013), which according to this theory would indicate a bias 
towards deontological reasoning, and hence support Mancini and Gangemi’s (2015) 
findings.  
 
Indeed, Whitton, Henry and Grisham (2014) found that individuals with OCD made 
less utilitarian decisions compared with a healthy group; and found that cognitive 
flexibility was correlated with utilitarian decisions. However, individuals with OCD 
did not differ significantly in their decisions to individuals with anxiety, which may 
suggest that difficulties with cognitive control apply to this group as well. 
Furthermore, individuals with OCD were only found to make different decisions to a 
healthy group in ‘impersonal moral dilemmas’ (for example, the runaway train 
dilemma) and not in ‘personal dilemmas’ (for example, smothering a baby to save a 
group of people being found and killed). This outcome was not expected by the 
authors, as according to this theory the personal dilemmas would have induced a 
greater negative emotional response, and thus more difficulty overriding this with 
cognitive control (Greene et al., 2008). Similarly to the criticisms of Franklin, 
McNally and Riemann (2009), Harrison and colleagues (2012) and Mancini and 
Gangemi (2015), this study, and the moral reasoning literature in general, utilises high 
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risk and non obsession-relevant scenarios. As such, relevance to the different 
decisions made by those with OCD is limited. 
 
Furthermore, a critique of the entire theory is provided by Duke and Begue (2015), 
who contested that rather than cognitive control determining utilitarian decisions, it 
may be that intact social cognition (for example, empathy) negates the ability to make 
utilitarian decisions. To distinguish these contrasting ideas, Duke and Begue (2015) 
explored the effect of alcohol on moral reasoning, again using the runaway train 
dilemma. As alcohol is known to impair both social cognition and higher order 
executive functioning, the finding that blood alcohol concentrations were positively 
correlated with utilitarian decisions suggested a stronger role for impaired social 
cognition in this decision. The authors postulated that “the evidence seems to suggest 
that decreased harm aversion may be a robust predictor of utilitarian preference” 
(Duke & Begue, 2015, p.124). Therefore, although this study did not explore 
individuals with OCD, the notion that individuals with the disorder experience 
heightened harm aversion (Steketee & Frost, 1994) may explain the non-utilitarian 
preference found by Mancini and Gangemi (2015), and Whitton, Henry and Grisham 
(2014). However, harm aversion is a concept that may be implicated by several 
factors including estimates of the probability of unfavourable outcomes (Carr, 1974), 
and aversion of potential responsibility (Menzies et al., 2000; Salkovskis, 1985; 
Steketee & Frost, 1994). 
 
Research into moral psychology has received a dramatic increase in attention in recent 
years (Greene, 2015; Priva & Austerweil, 2015). However, literature on moral 
reasoning specifically in OCD is sparse and faces fundamental methodological 
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criticisms. Nevertheless, this area provides an exciting opportunity to gain an insight 
into the decisions made by those with OCD. Of primary interest to this study are the 
decisions made by individuals with OCD when presented with an everyday, semi-
idiosyncratically tailored, obsession-relevant moral reasoning dilemma that 
differentiates between a utilitarian and a deontological decision, an area which has not 
been explored before (according to a Google Scholar and Web of Science search with 
terms “OCD” OR “Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder” AND “Decision” OR “Decision-
making” AND “Moral” OR “Moral reasoning” with no exclusion criteria). Although 
the findings of Wroe and Salkovskis (2000) suggest that, due to a lack of omission 
bias, individuals with OCD are more likely than those without OCD to act to try and 
prevent harm when risks of acting are not presented, research on moral reasoning 
suggests that the introduction of this action resulting in other lesser harm leads to 
individuals with OCD being less likely to choose to act than their non-clinical 
counterparts (Mancini & Gangemi, 2015; Whitton, Henry & Grisham, 2014). This 
study therefore aimed to explore decisions made by individuals with and without 
OCD both when risks of acting were not presented (to replicate Wroe & Salkovskis, 
(2000)), and when risks of acting were introduced (to address the methodological 
concerns of Franklin and colleagues, (2009), Harrison and colleagues, (2012), 
Mancini and Gangemi (2015) and Whitton, and colleagues (2014)).  
 
There has been continued debate within the literature regarding factors that might 
contribute to decision differences in those with and without OCD. Suggestions for 
these factors include general (Wroe & Salkovskis, 2000; Franklin et al., 2009) and 
personal responsibility (Franklin et al., 2009), altruistic and deontological guilt 
(Mancini & Gangemi, 2015), moral sensitivity (Harrison et al., 2012) lack of 
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cognitive control, heightened emotive responsiveness (Greene, 2008) and harm 
aversion (Duke & Begue, 2015). Of secondary interest to this study was an 
exploration of factors that influence decision differences. Particular consideration was 
given to whether general responsibility beliefs (as suggested by Wroe and Salkovskis, 
2000, Franklin, McNally and Riemann, 2009 and the cognitive model of OCD 
(Salkovskis, 1985, 1999; Salkovksis et al., 1998)) are a factor in decision differences, 
and whether decision-specific appraisals of responsibility, immorality and guilt, 
influence decision differences between individuals with and without OCD. 
 
1.7. Summary 
 
In summary of the literature thus far, the findings that those with OCD make different 
decisions (Rocha et al., 2011; Sachdev & Malhi, 2005) and have differences in the 
neuroanatomical networks associated with decision-making (Cavedini et al., 2006; 
Olley et al., 2007; Sachdev & Malhi, 2005), have led to suggestions that OCD should 
be considered a disorder of decision-making (Sachdev & Malhi, 2005). Research 
supports the notion proposed by the cognitive model of OCD (Salkovskis, 1985, 
1999; Salkovskis et al., 1998) that heightened responsibility beliefs contribute to these 
differences in decisions (Wroe & Salkovskis, 2000), and that due to these beliefs 
those with OCD are more likely to decide to try and reduce harm.  An alternative 
suggestion is that those with OCD overestimate the severity of the risks of harm 
(Menzies et al., 2000), and this is why they are more likely to act to reduce harm. 
However, the finding that those with OCD are more likely than those without OCD to 
act to prevent harm has been contested by Franklin and colleagues (2009), Harrison 
and colleagues (2012), Mancini and Gangemi (2015) and theories and research on 
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moral reasoning (Greene et al., 2007; Whitton, Henry and Grisham, 2014) who 
conversely suggested that in moral reasoning dilemmas where action to prevent harm 
results in other, albeit lesser harm, there were no differences between decisions of 
those with and without OCD, or that those with OCD are in fact less likely to act to 
reduce harm due to potential factors of personal responsibility, the associated guilt of 
‘playing god’, moral sensitivity, lack of cognitive control, or a heightened affective 
response. However, as decision-differences between those with and without OCD are 
suggested to only be found when considering low risk scenarios that are relevant to an 
individual’s obsessions (Foa et al., 2003; Wroe & Salkovskis, 2000), the nomothetic, 
high-risk scenarios utilised in these studies means that their relevance is debated.  
 
1.8. Aims and hypotheses 
 
 
There seems to be great disparity between two areas of research. Firstly, the area of 
decision-making in OCD, where it is evidenced that individuals with OCD are more 
likely to act to prevent harm only in low-risk, everyday (Foa et al., 2003) situations 
relevant to their OCD (Wroe & Salkovskis, 2000). Secondly, research on moral-
reasoning (where risks of acting are stated) in OCD, where scenarios utilised for 
research do not fit the aforementioned criteria, and so do not explore the core 
circumstances where such decision-making differences are documented. For brevity 
and distinction, throughout this thesis these two areas are referred to as the ‘decision-
making’ and the ‘moral reasoning’ literature respectively. 
 
In order to further our understanding of decision-making in OCD, it was firstly 
necessary to affirm the findings of the decision-making literature on which the 
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methodological criticisms of the moral reasoning studies are based. Therefore, this 
study’s first aim was to investigate whether, when using low-risk, obsession-relevant 
scenarios, decision differences in individuals with and without OCD were indeed 
specific to individuals’ semi-idiosyncratically tailored scenarios when risks of acting 
were not stated, as attested by Wroe and Salkovskis (2000). 
 
This study secondly aimed to bridge the crevice between the areas of decision-making 
and moral reasoning in OCD, by exploring whether, in low-risk scenarios when risks 
of acting were presented, there was still a difference between the decisions made by 
individuals with and without OCD and if this differed between scenarios that were 
semi-idiosyncratically tailored, and scenarios that were not. As Mancini and Gangemi 
(2015) and Whitton, Henry and Grisham (2014) used high-risk, non-tailored scenarios 
(where decision-differences are not found within the decision-making literature) and 
found that individuals with OCD were less likely to act to prevent harm than 
individuals without OCD, this suggested that a similar pattern would be shown when 
considering low-risk, non-tailored scenarios (where decision-differences are also not 
suggested to be found within the decision-making literature). However, when 
considering low-risk scenarios when risks of acting were presented and that were 
semi-idiosyncratically tailored (the juncture between the two areas where there is a 
current void of research), there were contradicting suggestions regarding what would 
be expected. According to Wroe & Salkovskis (2000), individuals with OCD 
would be more likely than individuals without OCD to act in these scenarios; however, 
according to Greene and colleague’s (2001) dual processing theory, individuals with 
OCD would be less likely than individuals without OCD to act in these scenarios, due 
to a heightened emotional response and hence greater difficulty overriding this to act 
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in a utilitarian manner. Both these theories suggest that for individuals with OCD 
there would be a difference in decisions when considering most-disturbing, compared 
to least-disturbing scenarios, although the direction of this suggested difference 
varies: Wroe and Salkovskis (2000) theorise that individuals with OCD would be 
more likely to act to prevent harm in their most-disturbing, compared to least-
disturbing scenarios due to responsibility beliefs being activated in such scenarios; 
Greene contests that individuals with OCD would be less likely to act in their most-
disturbing, compared to least-disturbing scenarios due to a heightened emotional 
response and a greater difficulty overriding this with cognitive control. 
 
Finally, this study aimed to investigate factors that influence the differences in 
decisions made by those with and without OCD. Owing to a focus on responsibility 
within the literature on decision-making in OCD, this study aimed to explore whether 
general responsibility beliefs play a role in decision outcomes. According to the 
cognitive model of OCD (Salkovskis, 1985, 1999; Salkovskis et al., 1998, Figure 1.), 
the decision differences of individuals with OCD, compared to individuals without 
OCD, are based on heightened responsibility beliefs; as such this factor was expected 
to mediate decision differences. Other decision-specific judgements were also 
explored to assess their contributions to decisions. Of particular interest were 
decision-specific judgements of responsibility (Franklin et al., 2009), immorality 
(Harrison et al., 2012) and guilt (Mancini & Gangemi, 2015) and whether judgements 
if individuals did and did not act (and the difference between these) determined 
likelihood of deciding to act to prevent harm. 
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It was hoped that by enhancing the methodological rigor of OCD research within the 
exciting moral reasoning scene, this study would enable a clarification of decision-
making in individuals with OCD. Furthermore, by exploring the factors that 
contribute to decision differences, the study aimed to progress current theoretical 
understanding of the debilitating disorder, and in turn highlight areas for clinical 
consideration.  
 
Three hypotheses were born from the presented literature, and were tested by the 
present study. It was hypothesised that: 
 
1. Findings would replicate previous research such that, when risks of acting were not 
presented, individuals with OCD, compared to individuals without OCD, would rate a 
higher likelihood of acting, only in their most-disturbing scenarios.  
 
2. When risks of acting were presented, individuals with OCD would be less likely to 
act than individuals without OCD in their least-disturbing scenarios. Owing to 
conflicting research, no prediction was made regarding how likely individuals with 
and without OCD would be to act in their most-disturbing scenarios; however it was 
predicted that individuals with and without OCD would differ in their decisions in 
most-disturbing scenarios and that individuals with OCD would show differences in 
their likelihood of acting in most-disturbing, compared to least-disturbing, scenarios. 
 
3. Individuals’ general responsibility attitudes (as rated on the Responsibility 
Attitudes Scale), and decision-specific judgements of responsibility, immorality and 
guilt, would mediate the relationship between group and likelihood of action, and thus 
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contribute to group differences. It was also hypothesised that these factors would 
mediate the relationship to varying degrees, and their mediating roles would change 
when risks of acting were and were not presented. However, due to insufficient 
research comparing potential mediating factors in such scenarios, no prediction was 
made regarding which mediators would show a greater effect, or regarding how such 
mediators would be effected when risks of acting were introduced. 
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CHAPTER 2: METHODOLOGY 
 
2.1. Overview 
 
 
This study hoped to address three primary aims by asking individuals with and 
without OCD to consider a series of hypothetical scenarios involving potential harm, 
and a possibility to act to prevent that harm. Scenarios were relevant to typical 
everyday obsessional concerns, such as contamination and checking. Firstly, the study 
intended to explore whether, when risks of acting were not stated, there were 
differences between individuals with and without OCD regarding how likely they 
would be to act to prevent harm, hypothesising that a difference would occur only 
when considering scenarios that were specific to semi-idiosyncratic concerns of each 
individual. Secondly, of key interest to this study, was whether in similar scenarios 
where risks of acting were presented (and where acting resulted in other, lesser harm), 
there were differences between the decisions of individuals with and without OCD, 
and whether this differed according to whether scenarios were tailored to individuals’ 
semi- idiosyncratic concerns. Thirdly, the study aimed to investigate the factors that 
contributed to decision differences by exploring whether general responsibility beliefs 
and decision-specific factors of responsibility, immorality and guilt mediated the 
relationship between group and likelihood of action. Of interest to this study was 
whether these factors contributed to the differences in decisions made by individuals 
with and without OCD and whether this varied when risks of acting were and were 
not presented. 
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2.2. Sample 
 
 
As the present study aimed to compare decisions made by individuals with and 
without OCD, the sample consisted of two groups, hereafter referred to as the OCD 
group and the control group.  
 
91 participants in total consented to take part in the study; however, there was a high 
dropout rate (n=36), and these participants could not be included due to the high 
extent of missing data. Furthermore, some participants (n=3) who completed 
participation were excluded from data analysis due to scoring over 21 on the 
Obsessive-Compulsive Inventory-Revised (Foa, Huppert et al., 2002), thus meeting 
exclusion criteria for the control group, whilst not meeting inclusion criteria for the 
OCD Group according to the Structured Clinical Interview for DSM-IV for Axis I 
Disorders (SCID-I; First et al., 1997). Figure 1 shows participants throughout the 
study. Potential causes and consequences of the high dropout rate will be discussed in 
Chapter 4.  
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Figure 2.Flowchart of Participants Through the Study 
2.2.1. OCD group 
 
Twenty-six participants were recruited and assessed as meeting inclusion criteria for 
the OCD Group. The mean age of participants in this group was 33.23 (SD= 10.76); 
16 (61.54%) were female and 10 (38.46%) were male; the mean OCI-R total score 
was 31.08 (SD=15.40). Inclusion criteria for the OCD group was scoring 14 or over 
on the Obsessive Compulsive Inventory-Revised (Foa, Huppert et al., 2002), to ensure 
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a sufficient level of current symptoms, and meeting criteria for a diagnosis of OCD 
according to the SCID-I (First et al., 1997).  
 
2.2.2. Control group 
 
Twenty-six participants were recruited to the control group from the general 
population. The mean age of participants in this group was 34 (SD= 16.72); 15 
(57.70%) were female and 10 (38.46%) were male (1 participant did not state their 
gender); the mean OCI-R total score was 7.95 (SD=6.54). Exclusion criteria for the 
Control Group was meeting criteria for a diagnosis of Generalised Anxiety Disorder, 
Panic Disorder, Agoraphobia, Specific Phobia or Social Phobia according to the 
SCID-I (First et al., 1997), to minimise confounding factors (Maner et al., 2007; Miu, 
Heilman & Houser, 2008). Further exclusion criteria for the Control Group was 
exceeding a score of 21 on the Obsessive Compulsive Inventory-Revised, as this is 
the recommended cut-score (Foa, Huppert, et al., 2002), with scores higher than this 
indicating a level of obsessive-compulsive symptoms.  
 
Exclusion criteria for overall participation in the study were: being aged under 18, as 
the researcher wished to ensure all participants had full capacity to consent; non-
fluency in spoken and written English, as it was not possible to translate and validate 
measures into different languages; and meeting diagnostic criteria for Schizophrenia 
according to the SCID-I (First et al., 1997), to minimise confounding factors due to 
evidence suggesting decision-making differences in individuals with Schizophrenia 
(Tlach et al., 2015). 
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2.2.3. Power calculations 
 
Power analysis calculations were based on Wroe and Salkovskis (2000), a similar 
study exploring decision-making in OCD with low-risk, OCD-relevant scenarios, with 
an effect size of 0.508, for a mixed model ANCOVA and with power set to 0.8 
(Cohen, 1988). Prospective calculations were conducted, in collaboration with the 
research supervisor, according to Clark-Carter (2009). 
Based on the first hypothesis, a sample size of 25 participants in each group was 
calculated to be sufficient to reach adequate statistical power (Cohen’s d=0.80; Cohen, 
1988), and so to be able to accurately detect effects when they exist (Field, 2009).  
 
2.2.4. Recruitment methods 
 
OCD Group  
Participants for the OCD group were recruited through several routes including two 
London Improving Access to Psychological Therapies (IAPT) sites, online OCD 
support forums, and social media sites.  
 
IAPT services. Originally launched in 2008, the IAPT programme is a large-scale 
initiative aimed at increasing availability of NICE-recommended psychological 
treatments for common mental health problems, including OCD.  
 
Lambeth Talking Therapies Service and Camden and Islington iCOPE (both IAPT 
services) agreed to take part in this study. Following appropriate Research and 
Development approval, a list of potential participants’ contact details was generated 
by each service and given to the researcher as a password protected data file on an 
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encrypted memory stick. In order to ensure upmost confidentiality, patient names 
were excluded from these lists.  The requirements for these lists were: anyone who 
had received a provisional primary diagnosis of OCD, who consented to be contacted 
by researchers and who had been seen in the service within the last year (taken from 
the date the list was generated on 30th November 2015). These requirements were 
considered necessary to ensure participants were appropriate for the study and had 
fully consented to be contacted within a recent timeframe so consent given was still 
relevant. 
 
Individuals on these lists were contacted with information about the present study, 
and directed to the study website for further information if they wished to participate.  
 
It is important to note at this point that although these participants were recruited 
through IAPT services, it is possible that these participants dropped out of treatment, 
declined the service, or were still awaiting their treatment. However, it is also possible 
that some of these participants had either completed, or were in the process of 
receiving treatment for their OCD. Therefore, although these participants were 
identified due to their primary diagnosis of OCD, it is very possible that 
circumstances had changed since this diagnosis was assigned, and so the researcher 
was mindful to ensure that OCD symptoms were current for the OCD group.  
Furthermore, it should also be considered that those contacted through this method 
were patients from Lambeth, Camden and Islington, who were seeking NHS support 
from a psychological service, and who said they would be happy to be contacted for 
research purposes. Therefore, these characteristics may have biased the sample.  
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Online OCD Forums. Two online OCD Forums were also used to advertise this 
study: OCD Action and IOCDF (International OCD Foundation).  
 
OCD Action is a national charity that was formed in 1994 by a group of volunteers 
and leading professionals. They “provide support and information to anybody affected 
by OCD” as well as raising “awareness of the disorder amongst the public and front-
line healthcare workers” (OCD Action, 2016).  
 
IOCDF (International Obsessive Compulsive Disorder Foundation) is a donor 
supported non-profit organisation that was founded in 1986. It aims “to increase 
access to effective treatment, end the stigma associated with mental health issues, and 
foster a community for those affected by OCD and the professionals who treat them” 
(IOCDF, 2016). 
 
The present study was advertised on the websites of these organisations. A link was 
given to the study website for further information.  
 
Social Media Sites. A research profile was established to advertise the study to a 
large population using social media sites such as Facebook and Twitter. OCD support 
groups on these sites also advertised the study by sharing the study information and 
website link. 
 
Again, it is important to note that all methods used to recruit for the OCD group 
targeted individuals who self-identified as experiencing OCD, and were actively 
seeking support whether this was NHS support, support sites or support groups on 
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social media. Therefore, the sample may not be representative of those experiencing 
OCD who did not identify themselves as experiencing symptoms of the disorder, or 
who were not actively seeking support.  
 
Control group 
The study’s non-clinical participants were recruited through social media and word of 
mouth.  
 
Through each recruitment route, all potential participants received the same 
information regarding the study (Appendix A).  
 
In the advertising material for the study, prospective participants were informed that 
all participants would be entered into a prize draw (with a first prize of £50 and two 
runner-up prizes of £25) following completion of the study, as an incentive to take 
part and as a token of appreciation for their time. This motivating factor may also 
have biased who participated in the study.  
 
2.2.5. Ethical considerations 
 
Participation throughout the study was voluntary and required informed and active 
consent, as individuals opted in. Full consent was required prior to beginning the first 
element of the study, the online questionnaire, and consent could be withdrawn at any 
point before, during or after participation.  
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Confidentiality was given great consideration throughout; participants were informed 
that only the Chief Investigator and Research Supervisor had access to their data, and 
that information would not affect their medical records or clinical care in any way. To 
ensure confidentiality, participants were asked to allocate themselves an anonymous 
ID code, which would be used to identify them throughout the study. Study data was 
stored on a password-protected file on an encrypted memory stick, to maximise 
physical security.   
 
The emotional wellbeing of participants was also carefully considered, and as there 
was a possibility that the moral-dilemma vignettes evoked uncomfortable feelings, 
attempts were made to ensure that participants were not affected negatively by their 
involvement in the study. For example, in the information given prior to participation, 
details of OCD support sites OCD-UK and OCD Action were given, along with 
contact details of the Samaritans, and of the researcher. Participants were encouraged 
to contact the researcher at any point if they felt distressed as a result of the study. 
Furthermore, during the telephone component of the study, all participants were asked 
how they found completing the online questionnaire and whether it caused them any 
distress or discomfort to ensure that their wellbeing was actively considered.  
 
This research study was approved by Queen Square Research Ethics Committee 
(Reference: 15/LO/1150) in September 2015 (Appendix Bi) and a subsequent 
amendment was approved in November 2015 (Appendix Bii). Approval was also 
granted by the South London and Maudsley Research and Development Committee 
for use of Lambeth IAPT as a Participant Identification Centre (Appendix C), and 
Camden and Islington Research and Development Committee, for use of Camden and 
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Islington IAPT as a Participant Identification Centre (Appendix D).  Further approval 
was granted by Royal Holloway University of London Ethics Committee (Appendix 
E).  
 
2.3. Measures 
 
2.3.1. Vignettes 
 
As the author was unable to find appropriate vignettes to address the main research 
aim (using a Google Scholar and Web of Science search with terms “Moral” OR 
“Moral reasoning” AND “Everyday” OR “Low risk” OR “OCD” OR “Obsessive-
Compulsive Disorder” OR “Decision” OR “Decision-making” with no exclusion 
criteria), with the desired format of the runaway train problem and the necessary low 
risk, OCD-relevant content, vignettes were developed and piloted to meet this need.  
 
Vignettes were based on the format of Franklin and colleagues (2009), who used the 
philosophical dilemma ‘the canonical trolley problem’ as their inspiration. This 
dilemma was presented as follows: 
“You are a bystander watching a runaway train with broken brakes. The train is 
headed toward five people working on the track. On a connecting track only one 
person is working. The train will kill whoever is in its way. 
  
You stand next to a switch that allows you to change the track the train is on. Should 
you keep the train on the track headed for five people or change it to the track headed 
for one person?” (Franklin et al., 2009, p575). 
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Franklin and colleagues (2009) designed similar vignettes, where participants were 
asked to decide between two courses of action: in the first, utilitarian option, a 
participant’s action directly kills one human being; in the second, alternative option, a 
participant’s failure to act results in more deaths than the first option. This format was 
used to assess whether participants with OCD decided to act according to utilitarian 
principles (linked to concern with global responsibility), or whether they decide to 
abstain from acting (linked to concern with personal responsibility and a desire to 
avoid assuming this through acting). Similar dilemmas were also used by Mancini and 
Gangemi (2015), and Whitton and colleagues (2014). 
 
Although this format successfully created a decision-making scenario that would 
differentiate decisions made by global responsibility/utilitarian guilt and personal 
responsibility/deontological guilt, as noted in Chapter 1 the content of the scenarios 
received criticism due to its high risk, nomothetic nature, factors which are found to 
preclude differences in decisions in individuals with and without OCD (Foa et al., 
2003; Wroe & Salkovskis, 2000).  
 
Wroe and Salkovskis (2000), although exploring a different research aim, used and 
validated vignettes that address the criticisms of Franklin’s: they used low-risk, 
everyday scenarios relevant to common concerns of individuals with OCD. For 
example, one vignette used stated: 
“You and several other people are preparing food for an office party. Peter and you 
have arrived a little early so begin the preparation. While preparing a different dish, 
you see out of the corner of your eye that Peter has dropped some crisps on the floor 
where he is standing.  He picks up the crisps and puts them back. Suddenly the 
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thought pops into your head, “What if the crisps are now contaminated and someone 
gets ill?””(Wroe & Salkovskis, 2000, p.1148).  
 
Importantly, Wroe and Salkovkis’ (2000) vignettes appealed to a range of obsessional 
concerns including OCD subtypes of contamination, checking and causing harm.   
 
Therefore, for the present study, the low-risk and OCD-relevant content of Wroe and 
Salkovskis’ (2000) vignettes were adapted to the structure and format of Franklin’s. 
Each vignette was presented twice. Firstly, it was presented with the option to reduce 
harm, without stating the risks of doing this:  
 
You and several other people are preparing food for an office party. Peter and you 
have arrived a little early so begin the preparation. While putting the food out, you 
see out of the corner of your eye that Peter has dropped some crisps on the floor 
where he is standing.  He picks up the crisps and puts them back. Suddenly the 
thought pops into your head, “ What if the crisps are now contaminated and someone 
gets ill?” You could move the crisps away from the main party area. 
 
Therefore, this first presentation was very close to the vignettes used in Wroe and 
Salkovskis’ (2000) study and was intended to address the first hypothesis and affirm 
that results were similar to those found in this previous study: that individuals with 
OCD were more likely to act to attempt to prevent harm than individuals without 
OCD only in their most-disturbing scenarios.  
 
As can be seen above, and again akin to Wroe and Salkovskis (2000), in each vignette 
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an intrusive thought was also presented. This was considered necessary in order to 
ensure that both groups were made equally aware of harm. Research suggests that 
individuals with OCD may be more likely experience intrusive thoughts in their 
obsession-relevant scenarios (Wroe, Salkovskis & Richards, 2000) and hence to have 
an increased internal awareness of harm. Therefore, in an attempt to control for such 
differences, intrusive thoughts were presented to all participants.  
 
Secondly, the risks of acting were additionally presented such that acting was the 
utilitarian option (causing other, lesser, harm): 
 
You then realise that if you move the crisps, although most people at the party will not 
eat them and so will not be at risk of becoming ill, you would have to move the crisps 
to a quieter area of the party, and would therefore risk fewer other people eating 
them and becoming ill.  
 
This second presentation was intended to address the second hypothesis and hence the 
methodological criticisms of Franklin and colleagues (2009), Mancini and Gangemi 
(2015), and Whitton and colleagues (2014) by exploring the decisions made by 
individuals with and without OCD in such low-risk, OCD-relevant moral-dilemma 
scenarios, and whether these decisions differed depending on whether these were 
semi-idiosyncratically tailored or not.  
 
2.3.2. Disturbance rank 
 
Prior to seeing the vignettes, participants were asked to rank the scenarios to be 
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presented in order from most- to least-disturbing. As the first two hypotheses focused 
on a comparison between scenarios that were and were not semi-idiosyncratically 
tailored, this disturbance rank allowed the researcher to identify participants’ semi-
idiosyncratic concerns (by using their most-disturbing ranked scenario) and compare 
these to non-idiosyncratic concerns (by using their least-disturbing ranked scenario).   
Alternative methods were considered for identifying semi-idiosyncratic OCD 
concerns, such as using subtype scores on the OCI-R, or assessing for this during the 
SCID-I. However, it was considered most pertinent to the study to ask participants to 
rank vignettes directly. In previous research, (Wroe & Salkovskis, 2000), semi-
idiosyncratic obsessional concerns were identified by asking participants to rate how 
disturbed they felt in response to each vignette on a scale from 1 to 10, and then using 
the highest and lowest scoring vignettes for comparisons during analyses. However, a 
rank rating was considered more parsimonious, and negated the risk of participants 
rating vignettes equally.  
 
2.3.3. Likelihood of acting and judgement ratings 
 
Following each vignette presentation and akin to Wroe and Salkovskis (2000), 
participants were asked about their likelihood of acting and about their associated 
feelings of responsibility, immorality and guilt if they had and had not acted. These 
decision and judgement ratings were on a likert scale from 1-10.  
 
Likelihood of acting ratings were used synonymously with Wroe and Salkovskis 
(2000) and Franklin, McNally and Riemann’s (2009) study, to assess whether 
decisions differed between groups and conditions.  
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Although Wroe and Salkovskis (2000) used judgement ratings as outcomes to explore 
how variations in vignettes affected judgements, the present study intended to use 
these judgements ratings as possible explanatory factors for decisions made. As for 
each scenario the participant was asked for their feelings of responsibility, immorality 
and guilt if they had and had not acted, the present study was interested in whether the 
difference between participants’ judgements if they had and had not acted, influenced 
decisions made. In order to do this, a new variable was created during analysis that 
computed the difference between judgement ratings if the participant had and had not 
acted in each scenario. For this variable, low values denote little difference between 
participants’ judgements if they had and had not acted; high values denote large 
differences in judgements. Positive values indicate that participants would have felt 
more responsible/immoral/guilty if they did not act, negative values indicate that 
participants would have felt more responsible if they acted.  
These judgement difference ratings were used to assess whether decision-specific 
judgements mediated the relationship between group and likelihood of action.  
2.3.4. Pilot 
 
Vignettes were piloted prior to use with five individuals (four who met criteria for the 
control group; one who met criteria for the OCD group). This was considered 
necessary in an attempt to provide some validation for the second part of the vignettes, 
to ensure that floor and ceiling effects were minimized, and to ensure sensitivity to 
individual differences. For example, it was necessary that the scenarios were pitched 
at an appropriate level to minimize floor or ceiling effects, and the stated risks of 
acting were sufficient to ensure the scenarios were akin to those within the moral-
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reasoning literature; this was found to be the case. Furthermore, it was important that 
individuals’ most- and least-disturbing scenarios showed differences in their 
responses in order to affirm that questions were sensitive enough to identify 
differences; again this was found to be the case.   
 
Following feedback obtained through this process, several changes were made: 
Originally, there were intended to be eight vignettes, two tailored to each of the OCD 
subtypes of checking, contamination, and causing harm, and two control vignettes 
(decision-making dilemmas in the same format but that were not targeted towards any 
OCD subtype). However, piloting revealed that the number of vignettes used was 
considered to be too long and time-consuming for participants. Therefore, the number 
of vignettes was reduced to five (1x contamination, 1x checking, 1x control and 2x 
causing harm). Two ‘causing harm’ vignettes were retained as, during piloting, these 
were selected as most-disturbing scenarios most frequently.  
 
In the original questionnaire, following each vignette, the intention was to ask 
participants about their likelihood of action and feelings of responsibility, immorality, 
worry, cause and blame, as these were the outcomes recorded by Wroe and 
Salkovskis (2000). However, following piloting, ‘worry’ and ‘cause’ were removed as 
judgements, as a way of reducing the questionnaire length, and as they were 
considered superfluous to the study’s aims and hypotheses. Furthermore, following 
feedback, the ‘blame’ judgement was renamed ‘guilt’, which was considered clearer 
by participants. It was also hoped that this change from ‘blame’ to ‘guilt’ would allow 
for an exploration of the altruistic/deontological guilt described by Mancini and 
Gangemi (2015), and consideration of whether these principles differed from the 
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general/personal responsibility described by Franklin and colleagues (2009).   
 
Although a pilot was conducted to gain feedback on vignettes, it was not possible to 
provide validation for such vignettes. Therefore, as the outcomes for this study 
(likelihood of acting and judgement ratings) are based on these vignettes, extreme 
caution should be taken when drawing conclusions from findings.  
 
2.3.5. OCD measures 
In order to ensure that the study was comparing the decisions of those with OCD to 
those without OCD, it was necessary to ascertain whether individuals identifying 
themselves as having OCD met threshold for the disorder, and whether those self-
identifying as not suffering from OCD indeed were below this threshold. This was 
considered particularly pertinent as OCD is often trivialised within the media 
(Pavelko & Myrick, 2015). 
 
Therefore, in order to ensure participants met criteria for, and were allocated to the 
appropriate groups (OCD or control) it was necessary to screen for symptoms of OCD. 
Despite the frequent use of self-report measures as screening tools within clinical and 
research settings, concerns have been raised about reliance on this method alone. For 
example, when using self-report measures there is the possibility for varying 
interpretations of scaled response choices, a greater chance of response bias, and for 
individuals with symptoms in one specific area, symptoms or impairment may be 
underestimated (Grabill et al., 2008).  Furthermore, the use of self-report measures 
may preclude accurate responses for individuals with language or reading difficulties. 
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Discrepancies between self-report and clinician-administered measures have been 
found for OCD (Federici et al., 2010). Therefore, it was considered that both a self-
report and a clinician-administered measure were required, to address these possible 
discrepancies.  
 
Structured Clinical Interview for DSM-IV Axis I Disorders (SCID-I) 
The SCID-I (First et al., 1997) was chosen as a clinician administered measure to 
ensure participants met diagnostic threshold for OCD, and hence inclusion criteria for 
the OCD group. The SCID-I is a semi-structured clinician-administered interview 
developed for research purposes and to diagnose Axis I disorders. The output of the 
SCID-I is the presence or absence of a disorder according to the DSM-IV criteria, 
both for current episodes and for lifetime occurrence. 
 
The SCID-I shows superior validity for determining psychiatric diagnoses when 
compared to a standard clinical interview according to the “LEAD” standard (Basco 
et al., 2000; Kranzler et al., 1996). The LEAD standard involves conducting a 
longitudinal assessment (L), by expert diagnosticians (E) using all data (AD) that are 
available regarding the client, for example family informants, medical records, and 
clinical observations (First, 2014). As such, the SCID has been used by some as the 
gold standard in determining clinical diagnoses (Shear et al., 2000; Steiner et al., 
1995). For OCD specifically, reliability studies report kappa levels of .59 (Williams et 
al., 1992), .65 (Lobbestael, Leurgans & Arntz, 2011) and .70 (Zanarini & 
Frankenburg, 2000), showing fair reliability.  
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Therefore the OCD module of the SCID-I was used in the present study to identify the 
presence of OCD according to the DSM-IV, and hence to ensure appropriate 
allocation of participants to the OCD or control group. The author was trained by the 
research supervisor to conduct the SCID-I.  
 
Obsessive Compulsive Inventory- Revised (OCI-R) 
The OCI-R (Foa, Huppert et al., 2002) was chosen as a self-report counterpart to the 
clinician-administered SCID-I. The OCI-R is a more recent development of the 
Obsessive Compulsive Inventory (OCI), a widely renowned comprehensive self-
report measure that asks the individual to rate the frequency and associated distress of 
symptoms on likert-type scales. Similarly to its predecessor, the OCI-R requires no 
technical expertise to administer and demonstrates good psychometric properties in 
clinical and normative samples. In an OCD sample the OCI-R has been found to 
show: good internal consistency (=.82 to .90) for each of the seven subscales of 
OCD it assesses, and =.81 for the total score; good two week test-retest reliability, 
and good convergent validity (rs=.53; .85) with the Y-BOCS (Goodman et al., 1989) 
and the MOCI (Hodgson & Rachman, 1977) respectively (Foa, Huppert et al., 2002). 
In a college sample the OCI-R showed good to excellent test-retest reliability for full 
scale and subscale scores (r=.54 to.77), high internal consistency (=.88) and 
moderate to excellent convergent validity with other measures of OCD (Hajcak, 
Huppert, Simons & Foa, 2004). 
 
Overall the OCI-R correlates very strongly with the OCI (rs=.98) (Foa, Huppert et al., 
2002), but also shows some advantageous developments over its predecessor. For 
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example, it has been shortened from 42 items to 18, allowing it to be less time 
consuming, only taking a couple of minutes, and thus more accessible for participants. 
Additionally, Foa, Huppert and colleagues (2002) calculated an optimal cut-off score 
for the OCI-R. Using receiver operating characteristics (ROC) analysis, it was found 
that distinguishing OCD patients and non-anxious controls by a cut-off score of 21, 
gave a sensitivity score of 65.6% and a specificity score of 63.9%. However, different 
optimal cut-scores have been reported in other studies. For example, Abramowitz and 
Deacon (2006) found a cut-score of 14 most effective for distinguishing OCD patients 
from a mixed sample of patients with anxiety disorders. Gonner, Leonhart and Ecker 
(2008) alternatively reported that cut-scores of 11, 12 and 14 showed highest 
discriminative power for patients with anxiety disorders without depressive disorders 
positing that, “An OCD patient with elevated scores exclusively on the Hoarding 
subscale, for example, might show a lower OCI-R total score than a depressive patient 
with ordering and checking symptoms below the diagnostic threshold” (p.747). 
Therefore, it is suggested that when utilizing the OCI-R as a screening tool, a lower, 
more liberal cut-score may be advantageous to reduce false negatives, provided the 
researcher is mindful of a higher risk of false-positives (Williams, Davis, Thibodeau 
& Bach, 2013).  
 
Therefore, the OCI-R, which was freely accessed online, was utilised as a short tool to 
screen participants for the OCD or control group and to ensure differences in groups. 
According to the findings of Abramowitz and Deacon (2006) and Gonner, and 
colleagues (2008) a minimum score of 14 was used as inclusion criteria for the OCD 
group in the present study. Although this cut-score is relatively low, it was considered 
appropriate, as the SCID-I would provide diagnostic value to exclude false positives. 
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A score of 21 or over on the OCI-R was used as exclusion criteria for the control 
group. 
 
2.3.6. Screening for co-morbid diagnoses 
 
The SCID-I was also used as an assessment tool to ensure that participants in the 
control group did not meet threshold for potentially confounding diagnoses of GAD, 
Social Phobia, Specific Phobia, Panic Disorder, or Agoraphobia.  For the OCD group, 
these were also assessed. Due to the high co-morbidity between OCD and other 
anxiety disorders (Ruscio, Stein, Chiu & Kessler, 2010) it was not considered 
appropriate to exclude participants from this group due to co-morbid anxiety disorders. 
However, these were assessed with this group to ensure that OCD was the primary 
diagnosis. As exclusion criterion for the study, the SCID-I was also used to ensure no 
participant met diagnostic threshold for Schizophrenia. 
  
The SCID-I shows good psychometric properties for these disorders, including 
reliability scores ranging from fair to good: for GAD,  .44 (Zanarini et al.,2000) to .95 
(Skre, Onstad, Torgersen & Kringlen, 1991); for Panic Disorder, .65 (Zanarini et al., 
2000) to .88 (Zanarini et al., 2001); for Social Phobia, .47 (Williams et al., 1992) 
to .86 (Zanarini et al., 2001); for Specific Phobia, .83 (Lobbestael et al., 2010); for 
Agoraphobia, .60 (Lobbestael et al., 2010); and for Schizophrenia .65 (Williams et al., 
1992) to .94 (Skre et al., 1991). Furthermore, the SCID I’s superior validity over 
standard clinical interviews according to the LEAD standard, also applies to these 
diagnoses (Basco et al., 2000). 
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The research version of the SCID-I (SCID-I-RV) was purchased online; this gave 
permission for as many copies to be made as necessary for educational and non-profit 
research purposes.  As advised by First (2014), the SCID-I-RV was then customised 
to include the relevant modules (OCD, GAD, Social Phobia, Specific Phobia, Panic 
Disorder, Agoraphobia and Schizophrenia) to the study. This customized SCID-I was 
conducted over the telephone to ensure convenience for the participant, and took an 
average of 5 minutes for the control group, and 20 minutes for the OCD group 
  
2.3.7. Responsibility Attitudes Scale (RAS) 
 
As the second hypothesis aimed to explore the role of general responsibility beliefs in 
decisions made, it was necessary to measure responsibility. The Responsibility 
Attitude Scale (RAS) was used for this purpose (Salkovskis et al., 2000). This 
measure is a 26-item questionnaire based on the format of the Dysfunctional Attitude 
Scale (Beck, Brown, Steer & Weissman, 1991) that assesses general beliefs about 
responsibility. For the RAS, participants are asked to state the extent to which a series 
of statements generally applies to them on a seven point scale from totally agree to 
totally disagree. Total scores range from 26 (high responsibility) to 182 (low 
responsibility). Validation studies of the RAS report a high internal consistency 
coefficient of 0.94 and test-retest reliability coefficient of 0.84 (Kabirnezhad, 
Mahmoud & Sharifi, 2010). Furthermore, the concurrent and criterion validities are 
shown to be satisfying (Salkovskis et al., 2000). The RAS was freely accessed online.  
 
The RAS scores were used to explore if general responsibility attitudes mediated the 
relationship between group and likelihood of action.  
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2.3.8. Sociodemographics 
 
There is research to suggest that participant characteristics influence moral 
judgements to some extent (Christensen & Gomila, 2012). For example, demographic 
variables including age (Wang, 1996), gender (Fumagalli, et al., 2010), culture 
(Singhapakdi, Vitell & Leelakulthanit, 1994) and educational background (Shaub, 
1994), have been linked to differences in moral decisions. Although some research 
also contradicts these findings (Hauser, 2007) it is suggested that the consideration of 
such sociodemographic variables is necessary to ensure that any differences found, 
are not attributable to these confounding factors.  
 
Therefore, all participants were asked to provide their age, gender, ethnic background 
and highest level of educational attainment, to establish that the OCD and control 
groups were comparable in these areas, and to ensure confounding factors were 
minimised, thereby increasing the probability that observed relationships were a 
consequence of the variables being investigated (Prince, 2003). Identified factors that 
significantly differed between groups would be controlled for during analyses. 
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2.4. Procedure 
 
 
Once recruited, participants were directed to the study website, where reading the 
participant information sheet and completing the consent form were pre-requisites for 
accessing the online questionnaire.  
 
2.4.1. Participant information sheet 
 
In the participant information sheet (Appendix F), participants were given an 
overview of the study’s procedure, and the exclusion criteria (being aged under 18, 
having a diagnosis of Schizophrenia, and being non-English speaking). They were 
also given the contact details for the researcher and advised to use these if they had 
any questions or if they felt distressed at any point during their participation in the 
study. Furthermore, at the end of the participant information sheet, details of online 
support forums OCD-UK and OCD Action were given with the telephone number for 
the Samaritans; it was hoped that giving these details at the outset would ensure 
participants were aware of options of support throughout the entirety of their 
participation.  
 
2.4.2. Consent form 
 
The consent form (Appendix G) then asked participants to verify that they had read 
and understood the participant information, that they agreed with the statements 
specified (for example, that they were aware they could withdraw from the study at 
any point and that they were aware they could contact the research team at any point), 
and that they were 18 years old or over and consented to taking part in the study.  
 62 
 
All participants were also asked to inform the researcher if they would prefer to 
complete the questionnaire on paper, or if they would be unable to speak on the 
telephone, as in these instances alternative arrangements could be made.  
 
2.4.3. Online questionnaire 
 
The Royal Holloway University of London Psychology Online Survey  (Select 
Survey Advanced v8.6.4) System (2009) was utilised for administration of the online 
questionnaire. Although some measures used (OCI-R and RAS) were originally 
published as paper-and-pencil questionnaires, these were recreated in online format 
for the convenience of participants and as the equivalence of OCD measures across 
administration methods (paper and online) has been documented (Coles, Cook & 
Blake, 2007). The full questionnaire can be seen in Appendices F to M; Appendix N 
shows screenshots of three pages of the online format, to demonstrate how this would 
appear to the participant.   
 
Participants were first asked to rank the upcoming vignettes from most- to least- 
disturbing (Appendix H). Following this, all five vignettes (each with two conditions: 
risks of acting not presented and risks of acting presented) were given; participants 
were asked to read each condition of the vignette and rate how likely they would be to 
act to try and prevent harm, and how responsible, immoral and guilty they would feel 
if they had and had not acted, on likert scales from 1 to 10 (Appendix I). They were 
then asked to complete the OCI-R (Appendix J), the RAS (Appendix K) and 
sociodemographic information (Appendix L).  
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Throughout the online questionnaire, participants could choose to leave questions 
blank, or to end their participation in the study by exiting the internet browser at any 
time before pressing ‘submit’ at the end of the questionnaire. 
 
At the end of the online questionnaire, participants were asked to give a telephone 
number that they would be happy to be contacted on to complete the second part of 
the study. They were also asked to specify convenient days and times for them to 
complete this telephone call, and asked if they would be happy to receive a text 
message, to confirm the date and time of this call, and a voicemail message if they 
were unavailable to answer at the time they were called. They were also asked about 
how they would like to be referred to during this telephone call, and informed that if 
they did not state otherwise, they would be addressed using their anonymous ID code 
(Appendix M).  
 
Online questionnaires took on average 30 minutes for the OCD Group and 25 minutes 
for the control group.  
 
2.4.4. Telephone call 
 
Participants were then called at a time and day that they had specified as convenient. 
If the participant consented to receive text messages, a text message was sent to 
confirm when this call would be.  
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During this telephone call, participants were thanked for their participation and the 
purpose of the call was explained: to ask how they found the questionnaire, to ask a 
few more questions to ensure that they were assigned to the correct research group, 
and to tell them a bit more about the study.  
 
All participants were then asked how they found completing the questionnaire and 
whether it caused them distress at any point.  This was used as an opportunity to 
ensure that the experience of completing the questionnaire did not negatively affect 
any participant or if it did cause distress, that they were receiving adequate support. 
 
Following this, it was explained to participants that in order to ensure that they were 
assigned to the most appropriate group for the study, it would be helpful to ask them a 
few questions about symptoms of OCD and anxiety (using the SCID-I) to see if their 
answers were in line with what would be expected from someone with OCD or 
another anxiety disorder. Participants were assured of the research study’s 
confidentiality policy: that their answers would only be used for the purposes of the 
study and that their answers would not go on their medical records or affect their 
future care in any way. They were also informed that their answers would not 
constitute a diagnosis. Participants were asked if they would like to know the outcome 
of this questionnaire once it was complete.  
 
The SCID-I was then completed, assessing for OCD, GAD, Social Phobia, Specific 
Phobia, Panic Disorder, Agoraphobia, and Schizophrenia (Appendix O).  
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Following this, if participants had asked to receive the results of the SCID-I, these 
were relayed to them in a collaborative and supportive way. For example, they were 
asked about their expectations before hand, told about why their answers may have 
met certain criteria, asked about their thoughts on the results, and then the 
implications of such results were discussed with them. If necessary, participants were 
advised to speak with their GP or refer themselves to their local IAPT service if this 
seemed appropriate, and given local support resources including OCD- UK, and OCD 
Action. If participants asked not to be told of the results of the SCID-I their wishes 
were respected.  
 
Participants were then given more information about the study’s aims (Appendix P), 
and were informed about the prize draw and the option to receive a summary of the 
results once these were collated. If participants were happy to give these, contact 
details were taken so that they could receive a summary of the results and be informed 
of the winner of the prize draw; these contact details were stored on an encrypted 
memory stick to ensure confidentiality, and were kept separately from questionnaire 
responses. They were asked if they had any questions, and were given the researcher’s 
contact details for future reference.  All participants were then thanked for their 
participation in the research study and the telephone call was ended.  
 
Telephone calls took approximately 15 minutes for the control group and 30 minutes 
for the OCD group. 
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2.4.5. Following participation 
 
In April 2016, participants who requested it received a summary of the results of the 
study (Appendix Q). This was also sent to Lambeth IAPT, Camden and Islington 
iCOPE, the R&D Departments who granted ethical approval, and was circulated via 
the social media forums used for recruitment.  
 
Also in April 2016, the raffle was drawn and the winner and two runners up were 
given their prizes.  
 
2.4.6. Extracting the data 
 
Data from the online questionnaire was exported directly to SPSS from the RHUL 
system; information from the telephone call was additionally entered by the 
researcher. 
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CHAPTER 3: RESULTS 
 
Data were analysed using IBM SPSS Statistics Software Version 21.0 (IBM Corp., 
2012) with alpha levels set at p<0.05. All p values are reported to two decimal places, 
except values less than .01, which are reported to three decimal places.  
 
For ease of reading, Table 1 describes the variables considered in this thesis, the 
scales for such variables, and the abbreviated terms for these variables that are also 
used throughout this chapter.  
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Table 1. Variables, Abbreviated Terms for Variables, and Scales of Variables. 
Abbreviated term Variable  Scale 
MD No Risk Likelihood Likelihood of acting in most-disturbing scenarios with no risks of acting presented  
 0 (definitely would not act) 
to 10 (definitely would act)  
MD Risk Likelihood Likelihood of acting in most-disturbing scenarios with risks of acting presented 
LD No Risk Likelihood Likelihood of acting in least-disturbing scenarios with no risks of acting presented 
LD Risk Likelihood Likelihood of acting in least-disturbing scenarios with risks of acting presented 
RAS Total Total score on Responsibility Attitudes Scale   26 (high responsibility) to 
182 (low responsibility) 
Responsibility Difference 
MD No Risk 
Difference between responsibility judgements if acting and not acting in most-
disturbing scenarios with no risks presented 
 -10 (would feel not at all 
responsible if did not act, and 
totally responsible if did act), 
0 (no difference between 
responsibility judgement if 
did and did not act), 10 
(would feel totally 
responsible if did not act and 
not at all responsible if did 
act)  
Responsibility Difference 
MD Risk 
Difference between responsibility judgements if acting and not acting in most-
disturbing scenarios with risks presented 
Responsibility Difference 
LD No Risk 
Difference between responsibility judgements if acting and not acting in least-
disturbing scenarios with no risks presented 
Responsibility Difference 
LD Risk 
Difference between responsibility judgements if acting and not acting in least-
disturbing scenarios with risks presented 
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Immorality Difference 
MD No Risk 
Difference between immorality judgements if acting and not acting in most-
disturbing scenarios with no risks presented 
 -10 (would feel not at all 
immoral if did not act, and 
totally immoral if did act), 0 
(no difference between 
immorality judgement if did 
and did not act), 10 (would 
feel totally immoral if did not 
act and not at all immoral if 
did act)  
Immorality Difference 
MD Risk 
Difference between immorality judgements if acting and not acting in most-
disturbing scenarios with risks presented 
Immorality Difference LD 
No Risk 
Difference between immorality judgements if acting and not acting in least-
disturbing scenarios with no risks presented 
Immorality Difference LD 
Risk 
Difference between immorality judgements if acting and not acting in least-
disturbing scenarios with risks presented 
Guilty Difference MD No 
Risk 
Difference between guilt judgements if acting and not acting in most-disturbing 
scenarios with no risks presented 
  -10 (would feel not at all 
guilty if did not act, and 
totally guilty if did act), 0 (no 
difference between guilt 
judgement if did and did not 
act), 10 (would feel totally 
guilty if did not act and not at 
all guilty if did act)  
Guilt Difference MD Risk Difference between guilt judgements if acting and not acting in most-disturbing 
scenarios with risks presented 
Guilt Difference LD No 
Risk 
Difference between guilt judgements if acting and not acting in least-disturbing 
scenarios with no risks presented 
Guilt Difference LD Risk Difference between guilt judgements if acting and not acting in least-disturbing 
scenarios with risks presented 
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3.1. Preparatory data analysis 
 
 
Prior to the main analyses, preparatory data analyses were conducted to locate and 
correct problems with the data, and to ensure that assumptions of the main analyses 
were met. As data were grouped during planned analyses, preparatory analyses were 
conducted separately according to group (OCD/control) (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2013). 
 
3.1.1. Missing data 
 
One participant did not complete the sociodemographic information, therefore 
resulting in some missing data.  Furthermore, it was not possible to obtain SCID-I 
diagnostic information for one participant, who declined to complete the measure. 
However, it was considered that, owing to this participants’ high OCI-R score, and as 
they declined to complete the measure due to anxiety associated with OCD, this 
participant could still be included in the dataset. 
 
For data items missing from psychometric questionnaires (OCI-R and RAS), an 
MCAR (Missing Completely At Random) test (Heitjan, 1997) found that data values 
were missing at random, Little’s MCAR test: χ2 (51) =36.04, p=.94. Further 
investigations regarding missing data are required when items have over 5% of their 
data missing (Schafer, 1999). As no items met this threshold, no further investigations 
were conducted and missing data were input using the EM (Expectation-
Maximisation) algorithm, to preserve relationships with other variables (McKnight, 
McKnight, Sidani & Figueredo, 2007).  
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There were no missing data items from the vignette measures (likelihood of action 
and judgements ratings in most-disturbing and least-disturbing scenarios, when risks 
of acting were and were not presented).  
 
3.1.2. Outlier analysis 
 
Outliers represent data values that deviate from other observations. It is important that 
these are identified as they can lead to inflated error rates, biased statistical estimates 
and erroneous results (Field, 2009). Outliers were assessed by exploring the 
variability of standardized z-scores: z-score values between -3.29 and 3.29 are 
considered to be within acceptable limits (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2013). No outliers 
were identified. Table 2 shows minimum and maximum z-scores, according to group. 
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Table 2. 
Minimum and Maximum Standardised Z-Scores 
 OCD Group (n=26) Control Group (n=26) 
Variable Min. Max. Min. Max. 
MD No Risk Likelihood -3.18 0.52 -2.19 1.01 
MD Risk Likelihood -3.07 0.90 -1.68 1.63 
LD No Risk Likelihood -1.55 0.93 -1.79 1.29 
LD Risk Likelihood -1.49 1.15 -1.34 1.14 
RAS Total -1.26 1.72 -2.16 1.80 
Responsibility Difference MD No Risk  -1.62 1.12 -2.15 1.26 
Responsibility Difference MD Risk -0.99 2.15 -2.02 2.22 
Responsibility Difference LD No Risk -1.50 2.18 -1.25 2.08 
Responsibility Difference LD Risk -3.11 2.43 -1.91 2.52 
Immorality Difference MD No Risk -2.20 0.96 -1.13 1.84 
Immorality Difference MD Risk -1.60 1.82 -1.54 2.07 
Immorality Difference LD No Risk -1.43 1.56 -1.45 2.25 
Immorality Difference LD Risk -1.63 2.20 -2.02 2.39 
Guilty Difference MD No Risk -1.61 1.06 -1.54 1.56 
Guilt Difference MD Risk -1.33 2.37 -1.59 2.34 
Guilt Difference LD No Risk -1.32 2.14 -1.36 2.29 
Guilt Difference LD Risk -3.17 2.54 -2.19 2.64 
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3.1.3. Normality of data 
 
Normality of data, that is, a distribution that is known to have certain properties such 
as symmetry about the mean, and a well defined shape and height (Field, 2009; 
Tabachnick & Fiddell, 2013), is a prerequisite for parametric data analysis. 
Furthermore, data that deviate from normal distributions result in less robust 
statistical inferences (Bradley, 1982).  
 
Normality of data was assessed using histograms, skewness and kurtosis z-scores, and 
the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test (see Tables 3 and 4). As can be seen from Table 3, 
several variables showed significant positive and negative skewness, and positive and 
negative kurtosis, as the z-scores exceeded 1.96 (p<.05). Furthermore, Table 4 shows 
that for the majority of variables, K-S tests were significant, indicating a significant 
deviation from the normal distribution.  
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Table 3. 
Skewness and Kurtosis Z-Scores 
Variable 
OCD group (n=26) Control Group (n=26) 
Skewness 
z-score 
Kurtosis 
z-score 
Skewness 
z-score 
Kurtosis 
z-score 
MD No Risk Likelihood -4.36*** 3.89*** -1.74 -0.72 
MD Risk Likelihood -3.68** 3.17** -0.15 -1.24 
LD No Risk Likelihood -1.43 -1.36 -1.15 -1.25 
LD Risk Likelihood -1.14 -1.45 -0.39 -2.05* 
RAS Total -1.02 -1.46 -0.79 -0.04 
Responsibility Difference MD No Risk -1.01 -1.33 -0.40 -1.00 
Responsibility Difference MD Risk 2.69** -0.01 0.74 0.08 
Responsibility Difference LD No Risk 1.18 -0.86 2.10* 0.14 
Responsibility Difference LD Risk -0.88 4.50*** 1.31 1.65 
Immorality Difference MD No Risk -1.50 -0.90 0.64 -1.50 
Immorality Difference MD Risk 1.00 -0.91 1.75 0.03 
Immorality Difference LD No Risk 0.50 -1.65 2.81** 1.12 
Immorality Difference LD Risk 2.30* 0.97 1.52 0.55 
Guilt Difference MD No Risk -1.01 -1.41 0.44 -1.52 
Guilt Difference MD Risk 2.54* 0.19 1.63 0.34 
Guilt Difference LD No Risk 1.16 -0.81 2.06* 0.56 
Guilt Difference LD Risk -1.04 5.07*** 2.16* 2.37** 
Note: ***p<.001; **p<.01; *p<.05  
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Table 4. 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov Tests of Normality 
Note: ***p<.001; **p<.01; *p<.05  
 
 
 
  
Variable 
OCD Group (n=26) Control Group (n=26) 
K-S df Sig. K-S df Sig. 
MD No Risk Likelihood 0.43 26 <.001*** 0.22 26 <.001*** 
MD Risk Likelihood 0.31 26 <.001*** 0.18 26 .03* 
LD No Risk Likelihood 0.21 26 <.001*** 0.21 26 .004** 
LD Risk Likelihood 0.19 26 .01* 0.23 26 .001** 
RAS Total 0.20 26 .009** 0.12 26 .20 
Responsibility Difference MD No Risk 0.15 26 .11 0.17 26 .06 
Responsibility Difference MD Risk 0.32 26 <.001*** 0.16 26 .11 
Responsibility Difference LD No Risk 0.20 26 .01* 0.18 26 .03* 
Responsibility Difference LD Risk 0.25 26 <.001*** 0.17 26 .06 
Immorality Difference MD No Risk 0.21 26 .006** 0.18 26 .03* 
Immorality Difference MD Risk 0.15 26 .16 0.21 26 .005** 
Immorality Difference LD No Risk 0.18 26 .04* 0.21 26 .005** 
Immorality Difference LD Risk 0.22 26 .003** 0.21 26 .006** 
Guilt Difference MD No Risk 0.21 26 .005** 0.16 26 .09 
Guilt Difference MD Risk 0.28 26 .001** 0.18 26 .03* 
Guilt Difference LD No Risk 0.15 26 .14 0.21 26 .005** 
Guilt Difference LD Risk 0.22 26 .002** 0.26 26 <.001 
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3.1.4. Homogeneity of variance 
 
Variances between groups were significantly different for some variables (Table 5). 
Therefore results reported will be corrected for unequal variances where appropriate. 
Table 5. 
Levene's Tests of Homogeneity of Variances 
Variable Levene Statistic df1 df2 Sig. 
MD No Risk Likelihood 40.28 1 50 <.001*** 
MD Risk Likelihood 4.35 1 50 .04* 
LD No Risk Likelihood 2.09 1 50 .15 
LD Risk Likelihood 0.06 1 50 .81 
RAS Total 6.17 1 50 .02* 
Responsibility Difference MD No Risk 0.96 1 50 .33 
Responsibility Difference MD Risk 0.13 1 50 .72 
Responsibility Difference LD No Risk 2.40 1 50 .13 
Responsibility Difference LD Risk 0.00 1 50 .99 
Immorality Difference MD No Risk 0.58 1 50 .45 
Immorality Difference MD Risk 0.41 1 50 .53 
Immorality Difference LD No Risk 7.14 1 50 .01* 
Immorality Difference LD Risk 0.06 1 50 .81 
Guilt Difference MD No Risk 2.98 1 50 .09 
Guilt Difference MD Risk 0.02 1 50 .89 
Guilt Difference LD No Risk 2.10 1 50 .14 
Guilt Difference LD Risk 0.02 1 50 .88 
Note: ***p<.001; *p<.05  
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3.1.5. Dealing with assumption violations 
 
The non-normal distribution of the data violated the assumptions necessary for 
parametric analyses. In order to continue exploring the study’s research questions, 
analyses were conducted using bootstrapped confidence intervals.  
 
Boostrapping (Efron & Tibshirani, 1994) is a technique utilized when parametric 
assumptions for data are in doubt. This method involves repeated resampling (with 
replacement) of the study’s dataset, thus creating phantom ‘bootstrap’ samples that 
are then used as non-parametric approximations of the study’s sampling distribution 
(approximating a normal distribution). This allows for the construction of robust 
estimates of standard errors and confidence intervals (CI) for smaller sample sizes and 
where there are non-parametric distributions. The more bootstraps that are conducted, 
the greater the probability that bootstrapped CIs represent valid results (Davidson & 
McKinnon, 2006); a minimum of 1000 bootstraps is widely advised (Efron, 1984, as 
cited in Efron & Tibshirani, 1994). Furthermore, bootstrapping also enables bias 
corrected and accelerated (BCa) CIs, which have been found to show greater accuracy 
as they adjust for underlying higher order effects (Efron & Tibshirani, 1994).  
 
Bootstrapping has shown superiority over alternative methods that correct for 
assumption violations (Berkovits, Hancock & Nevitt, 2000; Briggs, 2006; Williams & 
MacKinnon, 2008) or assume normality of the sampling distribution (Preacher & 
Hayes, 2008). Therefore, for subsequent parametric analyses in the present study, 
bootstrapping is utilized with 1000 bootstraps and bias corrected and accelerated 
confidence intervals set at 95%, unless otherwise specified (denoted by ‘BCa CI’). 
When interpreting these Confidence Intervals, a range that does not contain 0 denotes 
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that confidence at the 95th percentile is upheld.  
 
 
3.1.6. Confounding variables 
 
To ensure that groups did not significantly differ from each other on extraneous 
sociodemographic variables, an independent samples t-test was conducted for the 
continuous variable of age, and chi-square tests were conducted for categorical 
variables of gender, ethnicity and educational attainment. For tests where expected 
cell frequencies fell below 5 for over 20% of cells (Cochran, 1952), Fisher exact tests 
are also reported (Field, 2009).  
 
As can be seen in Table 6, there was no significant difference between groups for age, 
gender or educational level. There was, however, a significant difference between 
groups for ethnicity. Due to these differences, subsequent analyses will be conducted 
controlling for variation in ethnicity.  
 
Table 7 shows comparisons made between clinical variables. As expected, groups 
differed on OCI-R total score and RAS total score, confirming that groups differed on 
measures of OCD symptoms and general responsibility respectively.  
 
Comparisons were also made between group choices of most-disturbing and least-
disturbing scenarios, to ensure that any differences found were not due to the 
scenarios chosen. There was no significant difference between groups on choice of 
most- or least-disturbing scenario (Table 7).  
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Table 6. 
Group Comparisons for Sociodemographic Variables. 
Note: ***p<.001; **p<.01. For continuous variables, independent samples t-tests were conducted. 
For categorical variables, chi-square tests were conducted. Phi () values are reported for chi-
square tests where each variable had two levels (resulting in a 2x2 table). For tests where a 
variable had more than two levels, Cramer’s V is reported. Fisher’s Exact Test is also reported 
for analyses where cell frequencies fell below 5 for over 20% of cells. Bootstrapped Confidence 
Intervals are provided for parametric analyses.  
 Variable 
Group 
Analysis OCD Control  
Age, M [SD] 33.48 [10.90] 34.48 [14.89] 
t(42.46)= -.57, p=.57 
BCa CI: -9.93, 4.90 
Gender, n (%)    
χ2 (1)= .01, p=.91,  
φ=-.02, p=.91 
Male 10 (38.50) 10 (38.50) 
Female 16 (61.50) 15 (57.70) 
Missing  0 (0.00) 1 (3.80) 
Ethnicity, n (%)    
χ2 (7)=20.46, 
p=.005**,  
Cramer’s V .63; 
Fisher’s exact 
p=<.001*** 
White British 12 (46.20) 23 (88.50) 
White Other 10 (38.50) 0 (0.00) 
Pakistani 0 (0.00) 1 (3.80) 
Asian Other 1 (3.80) 0 (0.00) 
Black African 0 (0.00) 1 (3.80) 
Mixed Other  1 (3.80) 0 (0.00) 
Other 2 (7.70) 0 (0.00) 
Missing 0 (0.00) 1 (3.80) 
Educational Level, n (%)    
χ2 (5)=7.27, p=.15, 
Cramer’s V=.38; 
Fisher’s exact p=.17 
GCSE 0 (0.00) 1 (3.80) 
A Level 5 (19.20) 1 (3.80) 
Undergraduate 12 (46.20) 15 (57.70) 
Postgraduate 6 (23.10) 8 (30.80) 
Postdoctorate 2 (7.70) 0 (0.00) 
Other 1 (3.80) 0 (0.00) 
Missing 0 (0.00) 1 (3.80) 
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Table 7. 
Group Comparisons for Clinical Factors 
Note: **p<.01, ***p<.001.For continuous variables, independent samples t-tests were conducted. 
For categorical variables, chi-square tests were conducted. For tests where a variable has more 
than two levels, Cramer’s V is reported. Fisher’s Exact Test is also reported for analyses where 
cell frequencies fell below 5 for over 20% of cells. Bootstrapped Confidence Intervals are 
provided for parametric analyses.  
Variable 
Group 
Analysis 
OCD Control 
OCI-R Total,  
M [SD] 
31.08 [15.40] 7.95 [6.54] 
t(33.72)=7.05, p<.001*** 
BCa CI: 16.70, 29.95  
RAS Total,  
M [SD] 
76.76 [35.81] 132.91 [25.69] 
t(46.72)=-6.12, p=.001** 
BCa CI: -69.65, -35.67  
Most-disturbing 
Scenario, n (%)    
χ2 (4) =3.38, p=.50, 
Cramer’s V=.26; Fishers 
exact p=.60 
Contamination 3 (11.50) 1 (3.80) 
Change 2 (7.70) 2 (7.70) 
Stairs 9 (34.60) 11 (42.30) 
Locks 12 (46.20) 10 (38.50) 
Glass 0 (0.00) 2 (7.70) 
Least-disturbing 
Scenario, n (%)    
χ2 (4) = 8.50, p=.08, 
Cramer’s V= .40; Fisher’s 
exact p=.07 
Contamination 5 (19.20) 10 (38.50) 
Change 14 (53.80) 13 (50.00) 
Stairs 3 (11.50) 0 (0.00) 
Locks 0 (0.00) 2 (7.70) 
Glass 4 (15.40) 1 (3.80) 
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3.2. Hypothesis 1 
 
 
Findings would replicate previous research such that, when risks of acting were not 
presented, individuals with OCD, compared to individuals without OCD, would rate a 
higher likelihood of acting, only in their most-disturbing scenarios.  
 
To test this hypothesis a 2 (Group: OCD/control) x 2 (Disturbance: most-disturbing/ 
least-disturbing) mixed model ANCOVA (controlling for ethnicity) was planned. In 
order to uphold this hypothesis, an interaction between group and disturbance was 
expected. However, bootstrapping could not be employed for this main analysis; 
results of this analysis are still reported for the reader’s information but should be 
treated with extreme caution. Results of the non-bootstrapped ANCOVA were 
therefore supported by complimentary, bootstrapped analyses. It is advised that 
bootstrapped results are considered more reliable and hence preferential given their 
non-parametric methods.  
 
A non-bootstrapped mixed model ANCOVA indicated that there was a significant 
interaction between disturbance and group (F(1,49)=5.80, p=.02), that is, the 
difference in likelihood of acting between groups differed in most- and least-
disturbing scenarios (Figure 2).  
 
There was also found to be a significant main effect of group (F(1,49)=4.51, p=.04), 
indicating that the OCD group rated a higher likelihood of acting than the control 
group regardless of disturbance; and a significant main effect of disturbance 
(F(1,49)=16.52, p=<.001), showing that all individuals, regardless of group, were 
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more likely to act in their most-disturbing scenario than in their least-disturbing 
scenario. 
 
Comparisons between likelihood of acting in most and least-disturbing scenarios, for 
each group, and comparisons between groups in each scenario type, were analysed 
using bootstrapped univariate ANCOVAs and paired t-tests (Table 8). Such analyses 
allowed for further exploration of the above indications whilst using bootstrapping to 
account for non-normal data; throughout this thesis interpretations are made from 
these bootstrapped, and hence more reliable, results.  
Figure 3. Results of ANCOVA for Likelihood of Acting according to Group and Disturbance 
when Risks of Acting were Not Presented. 
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Table 8. 
Results of Bootstrapped Univariate ANCOVAs and Paired-Samples t-tests for 
Likelihood of Acting according to Group and Disturbance when Risks of Acting were 
Not Presented 
 
Note: ***p<.001; **p<.01. Between-group comparisons are conducted using univariate 
ANCOVAs, controlling for ethnicity. Within-group comparisons are conducted using paired-
samples t-tests; ethnicity is not controlled for in these analyses due to their within-subjects nature 
and the stability of this factor.  
 
A bootstrapped univariate ANCOVA showed that individuals with OCD were 
significantly more likely to act than individuals without OCD for most-disturbing 
scenarios. However, for least-disturbing scenarios, there was no difference between 
groups. Bootstrapped paired samples t-tests showed that the OCD group were 
significantly more likely to act in their most-disturbing scenario compared to their 
least-disturbing scenario. However, the control group showed no difference in their 
likelihood of acting between most- and least- disturbing scenarios. Therefore, 
individuals with OCD, compared to individuals without OCD, were found to rate a 
higher likelihood of action only in their most-disturbing (and hence, OCD relevant) 
scenarios; this upholds the first hypothesis.  
 
Group 
Most-disturbing scenario 
M [SD] 
Least-disturbing scenario 
M [SD] Analyses 
OCD  9.58 [.81] 6.27 [4.03] 
Paired t(25)=3.93, p=.001** 
BCa CI: 1.69, 4.94 
Control  6.85 [3.13] 5.81 [3.25] 
Paired t(25)=1.13, p=.27 
BCa CI: -.74, 2.75 
Analyses 
F(1, 49)=17.08, p<.001*** 
BCa CI: 1.43, 4.15 
F(1, 49)=.08, p=.79  
BCa CI: -2.35, 1.78 
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3.3. Hypothesis 2 
 
 
When risks of acting were presented, individuals with OCD would be less likely to act 
than individuals without OCD in their least-disturbing scenarios. Owing to 
conflicting research, no prediction was made regarding how likely individuals with 
and without OCD would be to act in most-disturbing scenarios; however it was 
predicted that individuals with and without OCD would differ in their decisions in 
most-disturbing scenarios and that individuals with OCD would show differences in 
their likelihood of acting in most-disturbing, compared to least-disturbing, scenarios. 
 
To test this hypothesis a 2 (Group: OCD/control) x 2 (Disturbance: most-disturbing/ 
least-disturbing) mixed model ANCOVA (controlling for ethnicity) was planned; in 
order to support the hypothesis an interaction was expected. As bootstrapping could 
not be employed for this main analysis, again the results of this analysis should be 
met with extreme vigilance but are presented for the reader’s interest; subsequent 
bootstrapped analyses, used to support the findings of the non-bootstrapped mixed 
model ANCOVA, are suggested to be worthy of greater consideration, and will be 
used for interpretation throughout this thesis.  
 
Firstly, exploring the results of the non-bootstrapped mixed model ANCOVA, the 
interaction between group and disturbance did not reach significance at the .05 level; 
however it was approaching significance (F(1,49)=3.70, p=.06) (Figure 3).  
 
Although traditional methods advise that a non-significant second-order interaction 
prohibits further investigation, some authors advocate ignoring omnibus results 
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(Larson-Hall, 2015; Wilcox, 2012); as the non-significant interaction was 
approaching significance and was also not supported by bootstrapped confidence 
intervals, further exploratory post-hoc tests were considered acceptable. 
 
 
Collapsing across most- and least- disturbing scenarios, individuals with OCD were 
significantly more likely to act to attempt to prevent harm than individuals without 
OCD (F(1,49)=4.85, p=.03). Furthermore, collapsing across groups, participants were 
more likely to act to attempt to prevent harm in their most-disturbing scenarios when 
compared with their least-disturbing scenarios (F(1,49)=5.06, p=.02). 
 
 
Figure 4. Results of ANCOVA for Likelihood of Acting according to Group and 
Disturbance when Risks of Acting Were Presented 
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Comparisons between likelihood of acting in most- and least-disturbing scenarios, for 
each group, and comparisons between groups in each scenario type, were analysed 
using bootstrapped univariate ANCOVAs and paired t-tests (Table 9), which are 
advised preferable due to their more robust methods.  
 
Table 9. 
Results of Bootstrapped Univariate ANCOVAs and Paired-Samples t-tests for 
Likelihood of Acting according to Group and Disturbance when Risks of Acting were 
Presented 
  
Note: **p<.01. Between-group comparisons are conducted using univariate ANCOVAs, 
controlling for ethnicity. Within-group comparisons are conducted using paired-samples t-tests; 
ethnicity is not controlled for in these analyses due to their within-subjects nature and the 
stability of this factor.  
 
Bootstrapped univariate ANCOVAs showed that for most-disturbing scenarios, there 
was a significant difference between groups with the OCD group rating a higher 
likelihood of acting than the control group. However, for least-disturbing scenarios, 
there was no difference between groups. Bootstrapped paired-samples t-tests showed 
Group 
Most-disturbing scenario 
M [SD] 
Least-disturbing scenario 
M [SD] Analyses 
OCD 7.96 [2.27] 5.65 [3.79] 
Paired t(25)=2.92, p=.007** 
 BCa CI: .81, 3.92 
Control 5.08 [3.02] 4.85 [3.63] 
Paired t(25)=.25, p=.81  
BCa CI: -1.69, 1.88 
Analyses 
F(1, 49)=12.16, p=.001** 
BCa CI: 1.16, 4.32 
F(1, 49)=.06, p=.80  
BCa CI: -2.04, 2.45 
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that individuals with OCD were significantly more likely to act in their most-
disturbing scenarios compared with their least-disturbing scenarios. However, for 
individuals without OCD, there was no significant difference between disturbance 
ranks. 
 
Therefore, bootstrapped findings suggest that when risks of acting were presented, the 
pattern shown between individuals with and without OCD in most- and least-
disturbing scenarios was similar to when risks of acting were not presented. That is, 
when risks of acting were stated there were only decision differences between groups 
in most-disturbing (and hence, OCD relevant) scenarios and in these most-disturbing 
scenarios individuals with OCD were more likely to act than individuals without 
OCD. Similarly, individuals with OCD were significantly more likely to act in their 
most-disturbing, compared to their least-disturbing scenarios, whereas individuals 
without OCD did not show such a difference; these findings mirror those found when 
risks of acting were not stated.  
 
This contradicts the hypothesised findings that when risks of acting were stated, 
individuals with OCD would be less likely to act than individuals without OCD in 
their least-disturbing scenarios. For least-disturbing scenarios, there was in fact no 
difference between groups in likelihood of acting. However, supporting the 
hypothesis, individuals with OCD differed in likelihood of acting in their most-
disturbing, compared to least-disturbing, scenarios and in most-disturbing scenarios 
individuals with and without OCD differed in their likelihood of acting.  
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3.4. Hypothesis 3 
 
 
Individuals’ general responsibility attitudes (as rated on the Responsibility Attitudes 
Scale), and decision-specific judgements of responsibility, immorality and guilt, 
would mediate the relationship between group and likelihood of action, and thus 
contribute to group differences. These factors would mediate the relationship to 
varying degrees, and their mediating roles would change when risks of acting were 
and were not presented. 
 
In order to test the third hypothesis, mediation analyses (Preacher & Hayes, 2008) 
were used to explore whether the relationship between group and likelihood of acting 
was mediated by scores on RAS, and decision-specific judgements. As this thesis was 
interested in potential mediating factors that may explain group differences, and as 
analyses showed that group differences were only found in most-disturbing scenarios, 
these scenarios were included, and least-disturbing scenarios were excluded from 
analyses. Mediatory analyses were conducted using the PROCESS macro V2.15 
(Model 4) (Hayes, 2012) for SPSS, with bootstrapping methods (with 5000 bootstraps, 
as advised by Preacher and Hayes (2008) for multiple mediation models) and 
controlling for ethnicity. PROCESS is a computational procedure for SPSS that uses a 
path analysis framework and expands on former programs of mediation and 
moderation to allow greater model complexity (Hayes, 2012). 
 
Primary analyses entered all variables (RAS total and decision-specific judgements) 
together as potential mediating factors between group and likelihood of acting. This 
multiple mediating exploration allows for different theories to be “pitted against each 
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other” (Hayes, 2009, p.415) and the inclusion of all possible mediators in the same 
model is considered more “convenient, precise and parsimonious” (Preacher & Hayes, 
2008, p.887).  Therefore this multiple mediation model was used to see the individual 
mediating roles of general responsibility and responsibility, immorality and guilt 
differences to assess their respective roles in the decision-making process. Two 
multiple mediation models were planned: first, the relationship between group and 
likelihood of acting in most-disturbing scenarios when risks of acting were not 
presented, as mediated by RAS total and decision-specific differences in 
responsibility, immorality and guilt; second, the relationship between group and 
likelihood of acting in most-disturbing scenarios when risks of acting were presented, 
as mediated by RAS total and decision-specific differences in responsibility, 
immorality and guilt.  
 
As multiple mediation models compare mediators in their unique abilities to mediate, 
above and beyond other mediators or covariates, it is advised that constructs entered 
into the model have as little conceptual overlap as possible (Hayes, 2013). High 
multicollinearity could lead to both Type I and Type II errors in this analysis and so it 
was necessary to assess multicollinearity between variables. 
 
3.4.1. Multicollinearity 
 
Multicollinearity denotes a strong correlation between two or more predictors within a 
regression model (Field, 2009); it is necessary to ensure that levels of 
multicollinearity are not too high, so that the importance of individual predictors can 
be appreciated. Multicollinearity in the predictor variables of RAS total, and 
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differences in responsibility, immorality and guilt, were assessed separately for most-
disturbing scenarios when risks of acting were not presented and most-disturbing 
scenarios when risks of acting were presented. Several guidelines were explored: 
Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) values greater than 10 indicate a concern of 
multicollinearity (Bowerman & O’Connell, 1990); an average VIF value substantially 
greater than 1 indicates potential bias (Bowerman & O’Connell, 1990), and tolerance 
levels below 0.1 indicate problems (Menard, 1995).  
 
For most-disturbing scenarios when risks of acting were not presented, all VIF values 
were below 10, and all tolerance levels were greater than 0.1. However, the average 
VIF value was 4.92, raising some concern and further exploration indicated that 
responsibility difference and guilt difference showed high variance proportions for the 
same eigenvalue (92% and 95% respectively), and hence loaded onto the same 
dimension. For most-disturbing scenarios when risks of acting were presented, again 
all VIF values were below 10 and all tolerance values over 0.1. The average VIF 
value was 3.04 and again, further exploration revealed that responsibility difference 
and guilt difference loaded onto the same factor (66% and 81% respectively).  
 
Although some advise that high multicollinearity of predictor variables should be 
reduced using mean centreing, the need to do this has been refuted (Echambi & Hess, 
2007; Shieh, 2011; Hayes, 2012). Alternatively, it is suggested to acknowledge the 
limitations that this imposes on the model, and to treat results with caution (Field, 
2009). As multicollinearity is found to be particularly problematic in multiple 
mediation models, it should be considered that when all variables are entered into the 
model together, indirect effects for responsibility difference and guilt difference may 
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be subject to type I or type II error (Hayes, 2013). Therefore comment will also be 
made regarding results when excluding one of these at a time from the multiple 
mediation analysis. Furthermore, following a multiple mediation model with all 
variables entered, individual simple mediation models were explored as 
supplementary analyses. This dual analytic approach allowed for an assessment of 
both unique contributions of mediators above and beyond other mediators, and of 
individual mediating value when mediators were considered alone. 
 
Descriptive statistics for Hypothesis 3 are shown in Table 10.  
 
Table 10. 
Descriptive Statistics for Hypothesis 3  
  Group 
 OCD Control  
M [SD] M [SD] 
MD No Risk Likelihood 9.58 [0.81] 6.85 [3.13] 
RAS Total 77.88 [35.49] 131.38 [27.04] 
Responsibility Difference MD No Risk 6.35 [3.79] 3.81 [3.36] 
Immorality Difference MD No Risk 7.96 [2.27] 5.08 [3.02] 
Guilt Difference MD No Risk 3.62 [3.51] 2.12 [3.31] 
MD Risk Likelihood 5.92 [3.65] 3.92 [3.22] 
Responsibility Difference MD Risk 6.04 [3.75] 4.46 [2.90] 
Immorality Difference MD Risk 1.85 [2.87] 0.65 [3.30] 
Guilt Difference MD Risk 1.96 [2.97] 1.27 [3.31] 
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3.4.2. Most-disturbing scenarios when risks of acting were not presented 
 
The multiple mediation model for most-disturbing scenarios when risks of acting 
were not presented, including all variables as parallel mediators between group and 
likelihood of action, is depicted in Figure 4. Figure 4 also shows regression 
coefficients from analyses.  
 
 
 
Figure 5.Visual Representation of Multiple Mediation Analysis for Most-Disturbing 
Scenarios when Risks of Acting were Not Presented, with Regression Coefficients 
Labelled. ***=p<.001, **=p<.01, *=p<.05.  
 
Table 11 shows the results for regression coefficients, standard errors and significance 
values, for the relationship between group (X) and mediators (M1-4), the relationship 
between mediators (M1-4) and likelihood of acting (Y) and the direct effect between 
group (X) and likelihood of acting (Y) for most-disturbing scenarios when risks of 
acting were not presented. It can be seen that the paths between group and RAS total, 
responsibility difference and immorality difference (paths a1-3 on Figure 4) are 
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significant, and produce significant regression models (although the model for 
responsibility difference is approaching significance). Regression coefficients for 
these significant models signify that individuals in the control group scored higher 
(indicating lower responsibility) in total on the RAS and showed on average a smaller 
difference between if they did and did not act on responsibility and immorality 
judgements. It can also be seen that the path between RAS total and likelihood of 
acting (b1) is significant, and the path between immorality difference and likelihood 
of acting (b3) is approaching significance. These indicate that on average, an increase 
in RAS corresponds to a lower likelihood of acting, and that an increase in immorality 
difference corresponds with an increase in likelihood of acting, although this latter 
finding was not significant at the .05 level. It is also important to note that there was 
not a direct effect between group and likelihood of acting (c’), when all other 
mediators were considered.
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Table 11. 
Results of Multiple Mediation Analysis for Most-Disturbing Scenarios when Risks of Acting were Not Presented 
Antecedent 
Consequent 
RAS Total (M1) 
Responsibility Difference 
MD No Risk (M2) 
Immorality Difference 
MD No Risk (M3) 
Guilt Difference MD No 
Risk (M4) 
MD No Risk Likelihood 
(Y) 
Coeff. SE p Coeff. SE p Coeff. SE p Coeff. SE p Coeff. SE p 
Group (X) 
 
61.09 8.69 <.001*** -2.36 1.01 .02* -2.92 1.04 .001** -1.77 0.99 .21 -0.67 0.87 .44 
RAS Total (M1) 
 
- - - - - - - - - - - - -0.02 0.01 .02* 
Responsibility 
Difference MD 
No Risk (M2) 
 
- - - - - - - - - - - - -0.07 0.23 .76 
Immorality 
Difference MD 
No Risk (M3) 
 
- - - - - - - - - - - - 0.22 0.11 .06 
Guilt Difference 
MD No Risk 
(M4) 
 
- - - - - - - - - - - - 0.13 0.24 .60 
Constant 4.58 14.89 .76 8.87 1.72 <.001*** 9.88 1.79 <.001*** 8.12 1.69 <.001*** 10.06 1.35 <.001*** 
Ethnicity 3.25 1.20 .01 -0.16 0.14 .26 -0.16 0.14 0.26 -0.08 0.14 0.54 0.08 0.09 .35 
Regression 
Model 
R2=.50 R2=.10 R2=.14 R2=.06 R2=.49 
F(2,49)=24.86,p<.001*** F(2,49)=2.84, p=.07 F(2,49)=3.94, p=.03* F(2,49)=1.61, p=.21 F(6,45)=7.09, p<.001*** 
Note: ***p<.001; **p<.01; *p<.05. Positive coefficient values denote positive relationships between variables; negative values denote an inverse relationship 
between variables. Group was coded as 1=OCD, 2=Control.
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Exploring indirect effects, ab denotes the measure of the amount of mediation in 
contemporary mediation analyses (Hayes, 2009), owing to the majority of analyses 
computing indirect effects as the product of paths a and b. There was a significant 
total indirect effect of all mediators together (Table 12).  
 
There was a significant indirect effect of: RAS total, with the control group being less 
likely to act as a result of the effect of group on RAS total, and RAS total on 
likelihood of acting; and immorality difference, with the control group being less 
likely to act owing to the effect of group on immorality difference and immorality 
difference on likelihood of acting. No mediator was significantly stronger than 
another (also Table 12).  
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Table 12. 
Indirect Effects of Mediators and Mediator Comparisons for Most-Disturbing 
Scenarios when Risks of Acting were Not Presented 
  
Effect SE 
BCa CI 
[LCI, UCI] 
Total (a1-4b1-4) -2.12 0.77 -3.82, -.80 
Mediator    
RAS Total (a1b1) -1.44 0.65 -2.95, -.33 
Immorality Difference MD No Risk (a3b3) -0.63 0.42 -2.00, -.10 
Guilt Difference MD No Risk (a4b4) -0.23 0.70 -2.43, .65 
Responsibility Difference MD No Risk (a2b2) 0.17 0.82 -1.39, 1.85 
Mediator Comparisons    
RAS Total and Immorality Difference MD No Risk -0.81 0.86 -2.44, 1.03 
RAS Total and Guilt Difference MD No Risk 1.21 0.91 -2.90, .69 
RAS Total and Responsibility Difference MD No Risk -1.61 1.06 -3.92, .35 
Immorality Difference MD No Risk and Guilt 
Difference MD No Risk 
-0.40 0.82 -2.28, 1.03 
Immorality Difference MD No Risk and Responsibility 
Difference MD No Risk 
-0.80 0.97 -3.09, .84 
Guilt Difference MD No Risk and Responsibility 
Difference MD No Risk 
-0.40 1.49 -4.17, 1.91 
Note: Mediator results are presented in order of effect. Group was coded as OCD=1; Control=2.  
Effect size denotes the effect of group on likelihood of acting through the mediators.  
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When responsibility difference and guilt difference were input into the model 
individually in an attempt to consider multicollinearity, this did not change previously 
specified significant and non-significant findings. 
 
Therefore, it can be said that, when controlling for ethnicity and other possible 
mediators, there was no direct effect of group on likelihood of acting. However, there 
was a significant indirect effect of group through RAS total and immorality difference. 
 
Individual mediators 
As high collinearity between variables is found to cause particular problems in 
multiple mediation models (Preacher & Hayes, 2008), each factor was also explored 
within individual simple mediation models (see Figure 5 for visual representation of 
this in most-disturbing scenarios when risks of acting were not presented), controlling 
for ethnicity but not controlling for other potential mediators. Regression coefficients 
are also shown in Figure 5. Owing to multiple testing, Bonferroni corrected results 
(with  levels set at .0125) are also reported. 
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Figure 6. Visual Representation of Individual Simple Mediation Models for Most-
Disturbing Scenarios when Risks of Acting were Not Presented, with Regression 
Coefficients Labelled. ***=p<.000, **=p<.01, *=p<.05. 
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Table 13 displays the results for individual simple mediation analyses for most-
disturbing scenarios when risks of acting were not presented. To minimise repetition, 
Table 13 does not include the relationships from group to individual mediators (a 
paths) as these can be seen in Table 11.  
 
When risks of acting were not presented, all factors except responsibility difference, 
which approached significance, individually showed significant indirect effects, and 
all factors including responsibility difference reached 95% confidence level. This 
showed that the control group was less likely to act due to the effect of group on RAS 
total, responsibility difference, immorality difference and guilt difference (when 
considered individually) and the effect of these mediators on likelihood of acting (see 
Table 13 for respective values). There was also a significant direct effect of group on 
likelihood of acting when responsibility difference, immorality difference and guilt 
difference were analysed as individual mediators for these scenarios; these significant 
findings reached the 95% bootstrapped Confidence Interval. However, there was no 
significant direct effect of group on likelihood of acting when RAS total was analysed 
as an individual mediator.  
 
When Bonferroni correction was applied, only RAS total and immorality difference 
remained significant as mediators. A direct group effect remained significant at this 
level for all judgement differences.  
 100 
 
Table 13. 
Individual Simple Mediation Analyses for Most-Disturbing Scenarios when Risks of Acting were Not Presented 
Mediator in analysis 
Relationship with Likelihood of acting 
(b pathways) 
Indirect Effect 
(ab pathways) 
Direct Effect  
(c’ pathways) 
Coeff. SE p Regression 
Model  
Coeff.           SE BCa CI 
[LCI, UCI] 
Coeff.           SE BCa CI 
[LCI, UCI] 
RAS Total -0.03 0.01 .006** R2=.38,  
F(3,48)= 9.73, 
p<.001*** 
-1.82 0.64 -3.46, -0.84     
Group -0.97 0.89 .28       -0.97 0.89 -2.77, 0.82 
Constant 12.60 1.08 <.001***           
Ethnicity 0.07 0.09 .76           
Responsibility Difference MD No 
Risk 0.18 0.09 .06 R2=.32, 
F(3,48)=7.65, 
p<.001*** 
-0.42 0.32 -1.43, -0.01         
Group -2.37 0.69 .001**       -2.37 0.69 -3.77, -0.97 
Constant 10.88 1.40 <.001***           
Ethnicity 0.00 0.09 .98           
Immorality Difference MD No 
Risk 0.29 0.08 .001** R2=.42, 
F(3,48)=11.73, 
p<.001*** 
-.86 0.45 -2.01, -0.22     
Group -1.93 0.65 .004**       -1.93 0.65 -3.24, -0.62 
Constant 9.55 1.33 <.001***           
Ethnicity 0.02 0.08 .80           
Guilt Difference MD No Risk 0.20 0.09 .04* R2=.34, 
F(3,48)=8.11, 
p<.001*** 
-0.36 0.31 -1.31, -0.01     
Group -2.43 0.67 .001**       -2.43 0.07 -3.78, -1.08 
Constant 10.81 1.35 <.001***           
Ethnicity -0.01 0.09 .92           
Note: ***p<.001; **p<.01; *p<.05. Positive coefficient values denote positive relationships between variables; negative values denote an inverse relationship 
between variables. Group was coded as 1=OCD, 2=Control.
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3.4.3. Most-disturbing scenarios when risks of acting were presented 
 
The multiple mediation model for most-disturbing scenarios when risks of acting 
were presented, including all variables as parallel mediators between group and 
likelihood of acting, is depicted in Figure 6. Regression coefficients are also shown in 
Figure 6.  
 
 
Figure 7.Visual Representation of Multiple Mediation Analysis for Most-Disturbing 
Scenarios when Risks of Acting were Presented, with Regression Coefficients 
Labelled. ***=p<.001.  
 
Table 14 shows the results for regression coefficients, standard errors and significance 
values for the relationship between group (X) and mediators (M1-4), the relationship 
between mediators and likelihood of acting (Y) and the direct effect between group 
(X) and likelihood of acting (Y) for most-disturbing scenarios when risks of acting 
were presented. It can be seen that only the path between group and RAS total, (path 
a1 in Figure 6) is significant. It can also be seen that no paths between mediators and 
likelihood of acting are significant. The direct effect between group and likelihood of 
acting is approaching significance, although does not reach the p<.05 level.
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Table 14. 
Results of Multiple Mediation Analysis for Most-Disturbing Scenarios when Risks of Acting were Presented 
Antecedent 
Consequent 
RAS Total (M1) 
Responsibility 
Difference MD Risk 
(M2) 
Immorality Difference 
MD Risk (M3) 
Guilt Difference MD 
Risk (M4) 
MD Risk Likelihood (Y) 
Coeff. SE p Coeff. SE p Coeff. SE p Coeff. SE p Coeff. SE p 
Group (X) 
 
61.09 8.69 <.001*** -0.63 0.88 .47 -0.98 0.98 .32 -0.03 0.88 .97 -1.81 1.05 .09 
RAS Total (M1) 
 
            -0.01 0.01 .24 
Responsibility 
Difference MD 
Risk (M2) 
 
            -0.35 0.22 .12 
Immorality 
Difference MD 
Risk (M3) 
 
            0.24 0.15 .11 
Guilt Difference 
MD Risk (M4) 
 
            0.35 0.25 .16 
Constant 4.58 14.89 .76 1.57 1.50 .30 3.76 1.68 .03* 0.92 1.51 .55 9.86 1.35 <.001*** 
Ethnicity 3.25 1.20 .01* 0.24 0.12 .05 0.23 0.14 .10 0.29 0.12 .02* 0.04 0.12 .74 
Regression Model R2=.50 R2=.11 R2=.10 R2=.11 R2=.40 
F(2,49)=24.86, p<.001*** F(2,49)=3.04, p=.06 F(2,49)=2.69, p=.08 F(2,49)=3.18, p=.05 F(6,45)=5.03, p<.001*** 
Note: ***p<.001; **p<.01; *p<.05. Positive coefficient values denote positive relationships between variables; negative values denote an inverse relationship 
between variables. Group was coded as 1=OCD, 2=Control.
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The total indirect effect of group on likelihood of acting through potential mediators 
was not significant. However, Preacher and Hayes (2008) argue that specific indirect 
effects should still be examined in the presence of a non-significant total indirect 
effect due to potential suppression effects obscuring the impact of individual 
mediators (MacKinnon, Krull, & Lockwood, 2000).  
 
Exploring these, there were no significant indirect effects of mediators between group 
and likelihood of acting in most-disturbing scenarios when risks of acting were 
presented when controlling for ethnicity and other potential mediators. Moreover 
there were no significant differences between mediators (see Table 15 for indirect 
effects and mediator comparisons).   
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Table 15. 
Indirect Effects of Mediators and Mediator Comparisons for Most-Disturbing 
Scenarios when Risks of Acting were Presented 
  
Effect SE 
BCa CI 
[LCI, UCI] 
Total (a1-4b1-4) -0.94 1.10 -3.05, 1.26 
Mediator    
RAS Total (a1b1) -0.91 1.01 -2.86, 1.07 
Immorality Difference MD Risk (a3b3) -0.24 0.32 -1.17, .16 
Guilt Difference MD Risk (a4b4) -0.01 0.41 -1.11, .62 
Responsibility Difference MD Risk (a2b2) 0.22 0.43 -.38, 1.52 
Mediator Comparisons    
RAS Total and Immorality Difference MD Risk -0.67 1.06 -2.68, 1.45 
RAS Total and Guilt Difference MD Risk -0.90 1.04 -2.95, 1.13 
RAS Total and Responsibility Difference MD Risk -1.13 1.13 -3.40, .94 
Immorality Difference MD Risk and Guilt Difference 
MD Risk 
-0.23 0.42 -1.01, .65 
Immorality Difference MD Risk and Responsibility 
Difference MD Risk 
-0.46 0.62 -2.00, .48 
Guilt Difference MD Risk and Responsibility 
Difference MD Risk 
-0.23 0.80 -2.64, .86 
Note: For ease of comparison, variables are presented in the same order as Table 12. Group was 
coded as follows: OCD=1; Control=2. Indirect effect size denotes the effect of group on likelihood 
of acting through mediators.  
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Therefore, in most-disturbing scenarios when risks of acting were presented, and 
when controlling for ethnicity and other potential mediators, there were no indirect 
effects of RAS total, or judgement differences on likelihood of acting. A direct effect 
between group and likelihood of acting approached significance but did not reach the 
p<.05 level. Findings reported were upheld when omitting responsibility difference 
and guilt difference separately except the direct effect of group on likelihood of acting, 
which was non-significant when removing guilt difference from the model (when 
removing responsibility difference, the direct effect of group on likelihood of acting 
was again approaching significance).  
 
 
Individual mediators 
Again, supplementary individual simple mediation models were explored to consider 
mediating factors alone, and thus remove the possibility of errors due to 
multicollinearity (Figure 7). When risks of acting were presented, there were no 
indirect effects that reached 95% confidence intervals (Table 16). There was, however, 
a significant direct effect of group when responsibility difference, immorality 
difference and guilt difference were analysed, but not when RAS total was examined. 
The significant direct effect of group for these analyses remained when Bonferroni 
correction was applied.  
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Figure 8. Visual Representation of Individual Simple Mediation Analyses for Most-
Disturbing Scenarios when Risks of Acting were Presented, with Regression 
Coefficients Labelled, ***=p<.001, **=p<.01, *=p<.05.  
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Table 16. 
Individual Simple Mediation Analyses for Most-Disturbing Scenarios when Risks of Acting were Presented 
 
 Relationship with MD Risks Likelihood (b 
paths) 
Indirect Effect (ab) Direct Effect (c’) 
 Coeff. SE p Regression Model Coeff. SE BCa CI 
[LCI, UCI] 
Coeff. SE BCa CI 
[LCI, UCI] Mediator in Analysis 
RAS Total -0.02 0.01 .09 
R2=.28, F(3, 48)= 
6.24, p=.001** 
-1.31 0.98 -3.40, 0.35    
       Group -1.42 1.09 .20      -1.42 1.09 -3.63, 0.77 
       Constant 10.57 1.32 <.001***         
       Ethnicity 0.13 0.11 .25         
Responsibility Difference MD 
Risk 0.15 0.12 .24 
R2=.26, F(3, 48)= 
5.60, p=.002** 
-0.10 0.18 -0.72, 0.11     
  
  
       Group -2.65 0.79 .001**      -2.65 0.79 -4.23, -1.06 
       Constant 10.24 1.36 <.001***         
       Ethnicity 0.02 0.11 .83         
Immorality Difference MD 
Risk 0.31 0.11 .005** 
R2=.35, F(3,48)= 
8.67, p<.001*** 
-0.30 0.34 -1.21, 0.19    
       Group -2.44 0.74 .002**      -2.44 0.74 -3.93, -0.95 
       Constant 9.31 1.31 <.001***         
       Ethnicity -0.01 0.1 .94         
Guilt Difference MD Risk 0.28 0.12 .03* 
R2=.31, F(3,48)= 
7.29, p<.001*** 
-0.01 0.27 -0.55, 0.54    
       Group -2.74 0.75 <.001***      -2.74 0.75 -4.25, -1.31 
       Constant 10.22 1.30 <.001***         
       Ethnicity -0.02 0.11 .86         
Note: ***p<.001; **p<.01; *p<.05. Positive coefficient values denote positive relationships between variables; negative values denote inverse relationships. 
Group was coded as follows: OCD=1; Control=2.
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Therefore, pulling analyses together, it can be said that in most-disturbing scenarios 
when risks of acting were not presented, when analysed using a multiple mediation 
model, only RAS total and immorality difference showed significant indirect effects, 
indicating that these factors uniquely contributed to decision differences. That is, the 
control group was less likely to act due to the effect of group on these mediators and 
the effect of these mediators on likelihood of acting. Neither mediator was found to 
contribute significantly more than the other. It is important to note that responsibility 
difference and guilt difference, the two factors that were not found to uniquely 
contribute in the multiple mediation model, were also the two factors found to show 
high multicollinearity. However, these mediators were still not found to be significant 
when one of the two was excluded from the multiple mediation model at a time. 
When assessed individually, RAS total, responsibility difference, immorality 
difference and guilt difference were all found to show significant indirect effects and 
play mediating roles between group and likelihood of acting. However, the significant 
indirect effects of responsibility difference and guilt difference were removed when 
Bonferroni correction was applied.  
 
In most-disturbing scenarios when risks of acting were presented, a multiple 
mediation analysis found no significant indirect effects of any mediator. Furthermore 
the direct effect of group on likelihood of acting, although approaching significance, 
was not significant at the .05 level. Individual analyses found that group had a 
significant direct effect when responsibility difference, immorality difference and 
guilt difference were analysed individually as mediators, but not when RAS total was 
assessed. Throughout all analyses for scenarios when risks of acting were presented, 
no significant indirect effects were found. 
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It was hypothesised that these four potential mediators would mediate the relationship 
between group and likelihood of acting to different extents and that this would change 
when risks of acting were and were not presented. Indeed, this was partially the case 
as RAS total and differences in immorality judgements were found to be significant 
mediators when risks of acting were not presented, but this changed such that these 
were no longer significant when risks of acting were presented.   
 
Findings shall be discussed and critiqued in the following chapter. 
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CHAPTER 4: DISCUSSION 
 
In this concluding chapter, the main findings of the study are summarised and 
discussed within the context of the current literature. The study is critiqued regarding 
its strengths and limitations, and clinical implications of the findings are outlined. 
Suggestions are also provided for potential areas of future research.  
 
4.1. Summary and discussion of findings 
 
 
The juncture between decision-making and moral reasoning in OCD provided an 
exciting opportunity to explore decisions made by individuals with and without OCD, 
and the potential factors that contribute to decision differences. This study aimed to 
examine the decisions made by those with and without OCD in hypothetical scenarios, 
which involved potential harm. In all scenarios, a potential risk was presented, which 
could be prevented through an action. The scenario was first presented such that a risk 
of acting was not presented (i.e. it was not stated that acting to prevent harm would 
cause any other harm). These vignettes were used to replicate the previous findings of 
Wroe and Salkovskis (2000), that individuals with OCD were more likely to act to 
prevent harm, only in their most-disturbing scenarios. In the second presentation of 
vignettes, a risk of acting was presented such that acting would cause other, albeit 
lesser, harm. Novel to this research was the exploration of decisions by individuals 
with OCD in moral-reasoning scenarios when risks of acting were presented that used 
low-risk, OCD-relevant, semi-idiosyncratically tailored content.  It was hoped that by 
addressing the criticisms of former studies on moral reasoning in OCD (Franklin et al., 
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2009; Harrison et al., 2012; Mancini & Gangemi, 2015; Whitton et al., 2014), a 
clearer picture would emerge regarding decisions of individuals with OCD in these 
scenarios, and the factors that may explain decision differences, findings which would 
contribute to a wider understanding of decision-making in OCD.  
 
Three hypotheses were proposed; these shall henceforth be summarised and discussed. 
 
4.1.1. Hypothesis 1 
 
Findings would replicate previous research such that, when risks of acting were not 
presented, individuals with OCD, compared to individuals without OCD, would rate a 
higher likelihood of acting, only in their most-disturbing scenarios.  
 
 
Considering scenarios where risks of acting were not presented, individuals with 
OCD in the current study reported a greater likelihood of acting to attempt to prevent 
harm than individuals without OCD, only in their most-disturbing scenarios. There 
was no difference between groups in least-disturbing scenarios. This finding upholds 
the first hypothesis. 
 
Furthermore, these results support the previous suggestion of Wroe and Salkovskis 
(2000) that individuals with OCD do not show general decision differences when 
compared with their non-clinical counterparts; rather, decisions differences are only 
shown in an individual’s OCD-relevant scenarios.  
 
 112 
Moreover, these findings support the criticisms of research into moral-reasoning in 
OCD, where scenarios used are not idiosyncratically tailored, and thus are not 
scenarios where decision differences would be expected.  
 
4.1.2. Hypothesis 2 
 
When risks of acting were presented, individuals with OCD would be less likely to act 
than individuals without OCD in their least-disturbing scenarios. Owing to 
conflicting research, no prediction was made regarding how likely individuals with 
and without OCD would be to act in most-disturbing scenarios; however it was 
predicted that individuals with and without OCD would differ in their decisions in 
most-disturbing scenarios and that individuals with OCD would show differences in 
their likelihood of acting in most-disturbing, compared to least-disturbing, scenarios. 
 
Individuals with and without OCD did not differ in their likelihood of acting in least-
disturbing scenarios. This contradicted the hypothesis that, based on previous findings 
(Mancini & Gangemi, 2015; Whitton et al., 2014), suggested individuals with OCD 
would be less likely to act than individuals without OCD in their least-disturbing 
scenarios. This finding does, however, support the findings of Franklin and colleagues 
(2009) and Harrison and colleagues (2012) who found no difference when comparing 
decisions of individuals with and without OCD using non-OCD relevant scenarios. 
 
In line with the hypothesis, individuals with OCD showed differences in their 
likelihood of acting in most-disturbing, compared to least-disturbing scenarios as 
individuals with OCD were more likely to act in their most-disturbing, compared to 
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least-disturbing scenarios. This supports the suggestion of Wroe and Salkovskis 
(2000), that in scenarios semi-idiosyncratically tailored to an individuals’ obsessional 
beliefs, individuals with OCD would be more likely to act than in non-tailored 
scenarios, potentially due to responsibility beliefs being activated in such scenarios. 
At the same time, this contests the inferences that can be drawn from Greene’s (2001) 
theory, that in most-disturbing scenarios, individuals with OCD would be less likely 
to act than in their least-disturbing scenarios due to an increased emotional response 
and greater difficulty overriding this with cognitive control.  
 
Further in line with the hypothesis, in most-disturbing scenarios, individuals with and 
without OCD showed differences in their likelihood of acting; in such scenarios 
individuals with OCD were more likely to act than individuals without OCD. That is, 
individuals with OCD were still more likely than individuals without OCD to act 
according to utilitarian principles only in their most-disturbing (and hence, obsession-
relevant) scenarios, regardless of that action risking other lesser harm. This finding 
supports the suggestion of Wroe and Salkovskis (2000), that when using everyday 
scenarios, semi-idiosyncratically tailored to individuals’ obsessional beliefs, 
individuals with OCD are more likely to try and prevent harm than individuals 
without OCD. Importantly, findings suggest that this relationship holds regardless of 
risks of acting being presented. At the same time, this contradicts the inferences that 
can be drawn from Greene and colleague’s (2001) theory, that the presentation of 
risks of acting would result in individuals with OCD being less likely to act to attempt 
to prevent harm than individuals without OCD in their most-disturbing scenarios due 
to a heightened affective response and difficulties with cognitive control.  
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Moral-reasoning research and theories to date suggested that presenting risks of acting 
would result in individuals with OCD being less likely to act to prevent harm than 
individuals without OCD (Greene et al., 2008; Mancini & Gangemi, 2015; Whitton et 
al., 2014). For example, Mancini and Gangemi (2015) and Whitton and colleagues 
(2014) both found individuals with OCD were less likely to act to prevent harm when 
that harm caused other, lesser harm, than individuals without OCD. Furthermore, 
Greene’s (2008) theory stated that heightened emotive responses, and difficulties with 
cognitive control are more likely to lead to deontological choices (not acting) in 
moral-reasoning scenarios. As individuals with OCD are more likely than individuals 
without OCD to exhibit these traits (Cougle, et al., 2013; Griesberg & McKay, 2003), 
this implies that individuals with OCD would be less likely to act than individuals 
without. However, these assertions were not supported by the current research when 
considering obsession-relevant (semi-idiosyncratically most-disturbing) scenarios. 
Conversely, this study found that the use of low-risk, OCD relevant scenarios, as 
advocated by Foa and colleagues (2003) and Wroe and Salkovskis (2000), produced 
similar findings to when risks of acting were not presented, where individuals with 
OCD were found to be more likely to act only in low-risk, obsession-relevant 
scenarios whereas no differences were found in non-relevant scenarios (Reese, 
McNally & Willhelm, 2011; Jacobsen, Freeman & Salkovskis, 2012). As the 
methodological improvements made by this study produced such contrasting findings 
to former studies on moral-reasoning in OCD, it is suggested that the findings of 
Franklin and colleagues (2009), Harrison and colleagues (2012) Mancini and 
Gangemi (2015) and Whitton and colleagues (2014), may be due to the high risk and 
nomothetic content used.  
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It is possible that discrepancies in findings were due to variations in the exact 
question being asked of the participant. For example, this study asked participants 
what they would do, whereas Mancini and Gangemi (2015) asked participants what 
they should do in such scenarios and Franklin and colleagues (2009) asked both what 
participants ‘should do’ and also asked “what do you do?”. There is evidence to 
suggest that ‘should’ judgements differ from individual’s decisions in such scenarios 
(Krebs, Denton & Wark, 1997) and so these variations may explain differences in 
findings. However, Whitton and colleagues (2014) asked, similarly to this study, what 
participants would do and produced results that echoed Mancini & Gangemi (2015), 
which contests the notion that such wording variations are responsible for differing 
findings. 
 
It is also possible that, as for this study scenarios when risks of acting were presented 
followed the same scenarios when risks of acting were not presented, participants’ 
responses may have been influenced by their former decision. However, presenting 
scenarios in the converse order was not possible as participants would then be aware 
of potential risks for both conditions. Nevertheless such potential order effects should 
be considered.  
 
The results of this study suggest that the contrasting findings of previous studies do 
not accurately reflect potential decision differences that would be revealed using low-
risk, idiosyncratically tailored scenarios. The current research highlights the 
importance, when considering decision-making in OCD, of being mindful that 
differences in decision-making are specific to scenarios that are relevant to 
individuals’ obsessions. 
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4.1.3. Hypothesis 3 
 
Individuals’ general responsibility attitudes (as rated on the Responsibility Attitudes 
Scale), and decision-specific judgements of responsibility, immorality and guilt, 
would mediate the relationship between group and likelihood of action, and thus 
contribute to group differences. These factors would mediate the relationship to 
varying degrees, and their mediating roles would change when risks of acting were 
and were not presented. 
 
As decision differences between groups were found in most-disturbing scenarios 
when risks of acting were not and were presented, these scenarios were analysed to 
explore factors that may have contributed to such differences. When exploring 
scenarios where risks of acting were not presented using a multiple mediation model 
to “pit competing theories against each other” (Preacher & Hayes, 2008, p.881) by 
considering all potential factors, there was no direct effect of group and only general 
responsibility beliefs and differences in immorality judgements showed specific 
indirect effects on likelihood of action. That is, when risks of acting were not 
presented, the OCD group were more likely to act as this group held greater general 
responsibility beliefs (shown by lower RAS scores), and greater responsibility beliefs 
were associated with a greater likelihood of an individual acting to try and prevent 
harm. Furthermore, it seemed that all participants made assessments regarding how 
immoral they would feel if they did and did not act, and the OCD group were again 
more likely to act to prevent harm as this group showed greater differences between 
feelings of immorality if they did and did not act, and as greater differences was 
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associated with a greater likelihood of acting. For example, if a participant rated they 
would feel 10 responsible if they did not act, and 4 responsible if they did act, then 
this difference (6) meant that they would be more likely to act to prevent harm than a 
participant who felt 10 responsible if they did not act and 9 responsible if they did act 
(difference of 1). Therefore, as the OCD group reported greater general responsibility 
beliefs, and greater differences between feelings of immorality if they did and did not 
act (they would feel more immoral if they did not act and less immoral if they did act), 
and as these factors predicted likelihood of acting, it is concluded that these factors 
may in part explain why this group was more likely to act to attempt to prevent harm 
when risks of acting were not stated.  
 
However, this finding must be interpreted with caution as variables of responsibility 
difference and guilt difference were found to show high multicollinearity and as such, 
the multiple mediation model, due to its methods of analysing mediators ‘above and 
beyond’ other mediators, would be susceptible to a Type II error with these variables. 
In an attempt to address this criticism, this analysis was repeated with one of these 
two variables at a time; this made no difference to findings. Potential mediators 
between group and decision were also explored individually to further address such 
concerns. These analyses found that for most-disturbing scenarios when risks of 
acting were not presented, all potential mediators (general responsibility beliefs, and 
decision-specific differences in responsibility, immorality and guilt judgements) 
showed significant mediating roles. For each analysis except that for general 
responsibility beliefs, group also significantly directly predicted likelihood of action. 
Therefore, these results indicate that when explored separately, general responsibility 
beliefs and decision specific judgements all played a mediating role in determining 
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the different decisions of those with and without OCD. However, as these individual 
analyses only considered one factor at a time, it is possible that these separate models 
suffered from the omitted variable problem, which can lead to potential biased 
parameter estimates (Judd & Kenny, 1981). Furthermore, when a more stringent  
value, according to Bonferroni correction, was applied to account for multiple testing, 
only general responsibility beliefs and immorality judgements remained significant; 
significant direct effects of group remained in all analyses.  Therefore, it seems to be 
that the findings of this study indicate that general responsibility beliefs and decision-
specific feelings of immorality played a mediating role between group and decision 
when risks of acting were not presented; although there is an indication from 
individual mediating models that decision-specific judgements of responsibility and 
guilt also played a role, the results of this study are not strong enough to justify this 
conclusion. Thus, returning to the broken glass example, the results of this study 
indicate that an individual with OCD who is likely to move this broken glass (if this is 
a scenario that is relevant to their OCD) would do so owing to their heightened 
general responsibility beliefs, and as they would feel less immoral if they moved it 
and more immoral if they did not.  
 
The notion that general responsibility beliefs played a role in the decisions made by 
those with and without OCD was expected from the prior literature (Salkovskis 1985; 
Wroe & Salkovskis, 2000), and the findings of this study lend support to the notion 
that responsibility beliefs mediate the difference in decisions between groups when 
risks of acting were not presented (Arntz et al., 2007; Lopatka & Rachman, 1995; 
Manciniet al., 2004; Shafran, 1997). The finding that decision-specific feelings of 
immorality mediate decisions above and beyond feelings of responsibility and guilt 
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was not expected, especially as the significance of general responsibility as a mediator 
may have indicated that decision-specific responsibility judgements might play a role. 
However, decision-specific factors that determine decision outcomes have not been 
widely explored, and as such, this hypothesis was largely speculative. Indeed, feelings 
of morality have been implicated in the wider literature (Krettenauer, et al., 2014; 
Rubaltelli, Lotto, Ritov & Rumiati, 2015) as well as within the field of OCD research 
(Harrison et al., 2012).  
 
The high multicollinearity between the decision-specific judgements of responsibility 
and guilt is a finding of interest. The notion that decision-specific responsibility and 
guilt were rated similarly by participants echoes previous findings that responsibility 
and guilt are “inextricably linked” (Tallis, 1994, p.143), and develop from similar 
learning experiences (Tallis, 1994). This finding has further implications for theories 
of personal responsibility/deontological guilt and general responsibility/altruistic guilt, 
as it indicates that these may not be conceptually distinct from one another.  
 
For most-disturbing scenarios when risks of acting were presented, the multiple 
mediation model, inputting all potential mediators, found no significant specific 
indirect effects and found that the direct effect of group, although approaching 
significance, did not reach p<.05. Exploring potential mediators individually showed 
no significant indirect effects. For the individual analyses of judgement differences, a 
significant direct effect of group was found; however, this was not found to be 
significant when general responsibility was assessed as a mediator. The result that the 
introduction of risks removed the mediating role of general responsibility and 
immorality judgements (both in individual simple mediation and multiple mediation 
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models), was not anticipated, and is of great interest. As this study found no 
significant mediating factor, this indicates that an alternative mechanism for the 
differences in groups is at play when risks of acting are presented. Therefore, the 
notion that the introduction of risks completely removed mediating factors that were 
previously significant indicates decisions for moral reasoning scenarios may be based 
on different factors compared to decisions for scenarios when risks of acting are not 
presented.  
 
The findings of this study upheld the hypothesis only in relation to scenarios when 
risks of acting were not presented and only in relation to two factors; in these 
scenarios it seems as though general responsibility and feelings of immorality drove 
decisions and explained the differences in decisions made by those with and without 
OCD. Considering scenarios when risks of acting were presented, the findings of this 
study differ from the hypothesis as no factors were found to mediate the relationship 
between OCD and likelihood of acting. Therefore, this suggests that the factors 
explored within this study may only be responsible for decision differences when 
risks were not presented; as none of the factors explored here were found to play a 
significant mediating role when risks of acting were presented, an alternative 
mediating factor may be at play. This provides an interesting area of potential future 
research.  
 
4.2. Limitations 
 
 
There were several limitations of the present study that are worthy of consideration. 
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4.2.1. Sample issues 
 
Firstly, although the study exceeded its aim of recruiting 25 participants for each 
group, the sample size used was small; a greater sample size would have enabled a 
more powerful analysis. Furthermore, the power analysis was conducted for the first 
hypothesis, and as mediation models (and particularly multiple mediation models) 
often require a much larger sample size than a mixed model ANCOVA, analyses for 
the second hypothesis are likely to be underpowered. 
 
The small sample size was, in part, due to a high drop out rate (36 dropped out from 
91 participants in total), which showed that although recruitment efforts were 
successful in generating initial interest in the study, these efforts did not translate to 
successful completion and hence usable data. It can be seen from Figure 1 in Chapter 
2 that the majority of participants who dropped out (26) did so during the vignettes 
section of the online questionnaire, and that 14 of these dropped out when the first 
scenario was presented for the second time (with risks of acting). It is possible that at 
this point, participants did not see the risk addition to the vignette, and assumed the 
system was faulty. For example, it could be seen that one participant (who went on to 
drop out at a later stage of the vignettes) answered only the scenarios when risks of 
acting were not presented, and skipped the pages where risks of acting were presented. 
Although it is possible that this was due to a greater difficulty answering the scenarios 
when risks of acting were presented, it is suggested that this is more likely to be due 
to the participant not seeing the manipulation of the vignette, and hence believing that 
they had already completed it. If this research were to be conducted again, it would be 
worth attempting to prevent this by including a statement bringing participants’ 
awareness to the similarity of vignettes. Participants also dropped out at later stages of 
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the vignettes, and it is assumed that for these participants, the length of the study 
exceeded their expectations. All participants who completed the vignettes went on to 
complete the study, thus if replicating this research, improvements to participant 
retention should focus on the vignette section.  
 
The characteristics of the sample should also be considered. Recruitment methods for 
the OCD group meant that those participating were those who identified with an OCD 
diagnosis, and were actively seeking support from social media, online forums or 
local IAPT services. Therefore, it is possible that this skewed the sample in favour of 
individuals who had good insight into the disorder and the decisions that are made as 
a result of OCD, and who may have also been actively attempting to alter these. In 
addition, as this was a self-selected sample, it is possible that the opt-in nature of the 
study biased the sample recruited (Hewison & Haines, 2006). Therefore, a sample of 
individuals with OCD who were not actively seeking support or treatment, or who did 
not opt-in to this research, may have generated different results. However, this 
population are likely to be difficult to identify and access and would potentially 
require recruitment methods that could jeopardise ethical integrity.  
 
Furthermore, owing to recruitment methods of online forums and social media, some 
participants were from overseas (including America, Canada, Australia, and Egypt), 
which only became apparent at the telephone call stage of the research. All of the 
participants in the control group lived in the UK. This difference was not anticipated 
but was considered to be acceptable for the current study. However, as a result, the 
ethnicity of the groups varied, largely due to one category: “White Other”. No 
participants in the control group considered themselves to be “White Other”, instead 
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opting for “White British”. However, “White Other” was a popular choice for the 
OCD Group, likely due to several of these participants living outside of the UK. 
Although it was possible that these two groups could be considered comparable, it 
was important not to minimise potential distinctions in ethnicity, and hence culture, 
factors that are found to influence decision-making (Christensen & Gomila, 2012; 
Singhapakdi et al., 1994). Therefore, these differences were managed by controlling 
for ethnicity (and by implication, culture) throughout analyses. However, stating 
inclusion criteria for the study as living in the UK, would have minimised the chance 
of these differences.  
 
No ‘anxious control’ group was used for comparison throughout this study. This was 
considered acceptable as it has previously been found that individuals with anxiety 
did not differ from control participants in response to similar decisions (Wroe & 
Salkovskis, 2000). However, as some studies have found that individuals with OCD 
and individuals with anxiety disorders did not significantly differ in their moral-
reasoning decisions (Whitton et al., 2014), a comparison group of individuals with 
anxiety disorders may have allowed an insight into whether the findings of this study 
were specific to individuals with OCD.  
 
4.2.2. Measurement issues 
 
As the only non-validated measure used, but also the measure most central to the 
study aims, the vignettes forgave the opportunity for issues to arise.  
The first issue identified was that, as only five vignettes were used, focussing on four 
different obsessional concerns (with one control vignette), this did not allow a wide 
range of options to which participants could be semi-idiosyncratically matched. 
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Indeed, vignettes were shortened from eight to five due to feedback during the 
piloting process, and all participants individually rated their most-and least-disturbing 
scenarios, and so these were matched to a degree. However, some participants may 
not have felt that the vignettes used aligned to their specific obsessions.  
 
Secondly, some subtypes of OCD were not accommodated by the vignettes used. For 
example, some forms of OCD feature no outward compulsive manifestations, but 
instead show symptoms of avoidance and covert compulsions (OCD-UK, 2016). Such 
subtypes of OCD were not reflected by the vignettes, as vignettes were based on those 
used by Wroe and Salkovskis (2000) who considered subtypes of checking, 
contamination and harm. As vignettes explored decisions to act similarly to 
compulsive behaviours, developing a decision-making vignette for subtypes that show 
few observable behavioural compulsions would likely prove a challenge. However, 
future research should aspire to include all OCD subtypes.  
 
Similarly, only three potentially mediating judgements (responsibility, immorality and 
guilt) were explored in the present study, despite many more being proposed within 
the decision-making literature. Three were chosen due to feedback received from 
piloting, limitations of the scope of the study, and as these three seemed most relevant 
to the study aims. However, exploring more may have given a more comprehensive 
understanding of the interplay between such variables.  
 
Vignettes presented an intrusive thought in an attempt to ensure both groups were 
equally aware of the potential for harm. However, owing to the idiosyncratic nature of 
OCD, it is possible that such intrusions did not accurately reflect the thoughts that 
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would have naturally occurred for individuals in the OCD group. Furthermore, 
although this was an attempt to control for differences in participants’ awareness of 
harm, it is possible that participants may have had other intrusive thoughts that the 
researcher was unaware of, and that may have influenced their decisions and 
judgements.  
 
It is imperative to note that the vignettes on which this study’s findings and 
conclusions are based, were not validated. Given that previous research into moral 
reasoning utilized similar vignettes, and as it was necessary to custom-design 
vignettes to address the aims of this study, it was considered acceptable to use such 
vignettes for the purposes of this thesis. However, when interpreting such findings it 
is necessary to acknowledge that the vignettes on which these are based may not 
accurately measure what they aim to. Further exploration of the content validity, 
criterion-related validity, and construct validity of the vignettes and the related 
questionnaire, would be necessary to increase the rigor of this research.  
 
There are also several limitations associated with using the disturbance rank as a 
means of semi-idiosyncratically tailoring vignettes to individuals’ obsessional 
concerns. For example, as participants were asked to rank the vignettes in order, this 
negated the potential for participants to rank vignettes equally, or to express if none of 
the vignettes felt relevant to them. Therefore, although the researcher deduced 
participants’ most-disturbing, and least-disturbing scenarios from these ranks, and 
inferred that these rankings corresponded to OCD-relevant and non-OCD-relevant 
scenarios, this may not have been the case.  
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Furthermore, although this study identified least-disturbing scenarios from 
participants’ individual rankings, these scenarios were still from a pool of low-risk 
scenarios, of which all but the control vignette were considered OCD-typical. 
Therefore, when comparing the least-disturbing results of this study to results of 
previous studies of moral-reasoning, it is important to be mindful that this study used 
low-risk scenarios, whereas former studies utilised high-risk scenarios. Similarly, for 
this study, 46.2% of the OCD group chose OCD-type scenarios as their least-
disturbing scenario, whereas vignettes used in former studies were not intended to be 
OCD-typical, and it has been previously suggested that individuals with and without 
OCD respond differently to OCD-type scenarios (Siev, Huppert & Chambless, 2010). 
However this suggestion was not substantiated by the present study, as no difference 
was found between groups despite approximately half of the OCD group choosing 
OCD-type content. It was still considered appropriate to compare the low-risk, OCD-
type content of the least-disturbing scenarios of this study to the high-risk, non-OCD 
relevant scenarios of former studies as both of these scenarios are found to be those in 
which no differences are found between groups (as they are not idiosyncratically 
tailored) (Wroe & Salkovskis, 2000). The findings of this study, in which no 
differences were found between groups for least-disturbing scenarios, affirms this 
comparison, although such differences in vignettes should still be noted.  
 
It is also important to consider the possibility that the decisions made by individuals 
in response to hypothetical dilemmas, such as the vignettes used, did not necessarily 
reflect decisions that would have been made in real-life decision-making scenarios 
(Teper et al., 2011). In fact, real-life moral decisions have been shown to contradict 
choices in hypothetical situations, and that this differs to a greater degree when there 
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is less contextual information (Feldman Hall et al., 2012). Therefore, as the vignettes 
used were relatively decontextualised hypothetical situations, this may have 
jeopardised ecological validity. 
 
4.2.3. Analysis issues 
 
During analysis several issues arose which deserve attention.  
Firstly, the data were not normally distributed which seemed to arise due to the data 
of the OCD group being clustered around the higher end of the scale, and the control 
group being clustered at the lower end. This pattern of data is theoretically 
comprehensible, although nevertheless precluded non-adjusted parametric analyses. 
Regarding this non-normal distribution, although the piloting of vignettes aimed to 
reduce the possibility of floor and ceiling effects, it is worth considering how to 
improve this for future research in this area. It may be that having a larger scale (for 
example, 1 to 100) would help to reduce these effects; however, owing to the 
seemingly strong desires of the OCD group to act, and the seeming lack of a desire of 
the control group to act, such effects are likely to prove difficult to eradicate.  
 
Bootstrapping was employed as a robust non-parametric method to account for non-
normality. However, for both mixed model ANCOVA analyses (Hypotheses 1 and 2), 
SPSS v.21 did not have the facility to employ bootstrapping (Field, 2013). Alternative 
methods for conducting a bootstrapped mixed model ANCOVA were explored 
(Wilcox, 2013), however these were considered beyond the remit of this study. 
Therefore, it is important to note that, although results were presented for the reader’s 
interest, these analyses violated the assumptions of a mixed model ANCOVA. In an 
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attempt to mitigate this violation, alternative bootstrapped analyses were presented 
and used for interpretation. However, a bootstrapped mixed model ANCOVA would 
have enabled an interaction between group and disturbance to be robustly analysed 
and would have been of interest.  
 
Furthermore, regarding the analysis for the third hypothesis, the simple mediation 
models, used to account for the potential oversight of highly correlated variables, may 
raise concerns regarding multiple testing. Bonferroni corrections were used to control 
for overall Type I errors. However, this correction can sometimes result in Type II 
errors, and so this should be considered (Field, 2013). As the multiple mediation 
model faced suspicion due to the high multicollinearity of two variables, and as the 
simple mediation models used to protect the correlated variables may have been 
subject to the omitted variable problem (Judd & Kenny, 1981) and then Type II errors 
when Bonferroni correction was used, these results should be treated with caution.  
 
4.3. Strengths 
 
 
Potentially the greatest strength of this thesis is that the study addresses criticisms of 
former research and is the first of its kind to provide an exploration of decision-
making in OCD using methodologically sound moral-reasoning scenarios (where 
risks of acting are presented). This study has successfully addressed a key gap within 
the literature and provides results that both affirm criticisms of previous studies and 
contest their findings.  
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Furthermore, this study managed to recruit a number of participants that exceeded the 
suggested number recommended by a priori power calculations; this indicates that the 
study is sufficiently powered to detect effects that were present, whilst minimising the 
likelihood of a Type II error. Furthermore, the number recruited for this study 
competes with previous studies in the area; Franklin and colleagues (2009), Mancini 
and Gangemi (2015) and Whitton, and colleagues (2014) all had fewer participants in 
their OCD and control groups. 
 
A further robust strength of the current research was the supplementary use of the 
SCID-I as a clinician-administered measure to confirm the presence or absence of 
OCD, in adjunct to the screening provided by the self-report OCI-R. As documented 
in Chapter 2 (p.51-52), there are several reasons why self-report measures alone are 
unreliable. Therefore, as this study verified the results of the OCI-R with the SCID-I, 
this provides a great advantage.  
 
4.4. Clinical and theoretical implications 
 
 
To the author’s knowledge, no previous study has been conducted exploring decision-
making in OCD in moral-dilemma scenarios where risks of acting are presented with 
low-risk, semi-idiosyncratic content. Furthermore, debate has proved rife regarding 
contributory factors to such decision differences. Therefore the findings of this study 
provide a fresh contribution to current clinical and theoretical positions.  
 
This study supported the well-founded research regarding decision differences 
between individuals with and without OCD (Cavedini et al., 2006; Foa et al., 2003; 
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Rocha et al., 2011; Sachdev & Malhi, 2005; Wroe & Salkovskis, 2000). Further, as 
this study found that differences in decisions between those with and without OCD 
were specific to their most-disturbing, and hence OCD relevant, scenarios, this result 
supports the assertions of Wroe and Salkovskis (2000), that OCD-sufferers do not 
show general decision-making differences. This is an important distinction, and it is 
imperative that future research exploring decision differences is mindful of these 
findings in order to use appropriate scenarios.  
 
The findings of this study potentially indicate that results of previous research into 
moral-reasoning in OCD are due to the high risk, nomothetic scenarios used, rather 
than due to an accurate reflection of decision differences between individuals with 
and without OCD. That is, although not considered by previous authors, the scenarios 
used in these studies in fact constituted scenarios where, owing to their lack of 
individual relevance and high-risk nature, decision differences are not usually found 
between individuals with and without OCD. The present study offers a unique 
contribution that, when using content where decision differences are typically found, 
despite the presentation of risks of acting, individuals with OCD were still more likely 
than individuals without OCD to act to attempt to prevent harm. This echoes the 
pattern of decision-making found when risks were not presented, where individuals 
with OCD were more likely than individuals without OCD to act to prevent harm only 
in their most-disturbing scenarios. Although this study produced findings which 
appear to be a novel and contrasting contribution to the current literature, there were 
several fundamental limitations of this study (for example, a small sample size, an 
unvalidated measure, and analysis issues due to variables that were not normally 
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distributed), which mean that caution must be applied when making comparisons 
between presented findings and previous research.  
 
The finding that individuals with OCD were more likely to act to prevent harm than 
individuals without OCD when risks of acting were presented, opposes the 
suggestions of Greene’s Dual Processing Theory (2008). This theory’s key principles 
propose that individuals are less likely to act to attempt to prevent harm if they 
experience a heightened negative affective response to a scenario, and if they show 
difficulties in cognitive control. Although Greene (2008) does not assert about how 
this theory applies to individuals with OCD directly, this group would be expected to 
exhibit both a heightened negative affective response (Cougle, et al., 2013) and more 
difficulties in cognitive control (Griesberg & McKay, 2003) than the control group; 
thus this theory implies that individuals with OCD would be less likely than 
individuals without, to act to prevent harm in their most-disturbing scenarios. As the 
converse was found, these results contest the inferences that can be drawn from this 
theory regarding individuals with OCD.  
 
The finding that there was still a significant difference between groups in most-
disturbing scenarios when risks of acting were stated also contests the theory that 
individuals with OCD make different decisions (and hence engage in compulsions) 
due to individuals with OCD overestimating associated risks (Steketee et al., 1998). 
As in these scenarios, risks of acting were made explicit, thereby minimising the 
possibility for differing interpretations, if the difference in decisions of those with and 
without OCD was due to different interpretations of risks alone, it would be expected 
that there would be no difference between groups (Pushkarskaya et al., 2015). As 
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differences were found for most-disturbing scenarios both when risks of acting were 
and were not presented, this contests this premise. However, it is possible that as the 
risks stated specified “some people” and “fewer, other people”, rather than 
quantifying exactly how many, this left some room for interpretation.  
 
The findings of this study also have several potential implications for the cognitive 
model of OCD (Salkovskis, 1985, 1999; Salkovksis et al., 1998; Figure 1). Firstly, 
when risk of acting were not presented, the finding that general responsibility beliefs 
mediated decision differences of individuals with and without OCD supports the 
cognitive model’s suggestion that responsibility beliefs are key in the disorder. 
However, this study found that this was only the case for general responsibility beliefs 
(as measured on RAS), as opposed to decision-specific responsibility appraisals. The 
cognitive model suggests that heightened general responsibility beliefs lead to 
individuals with OCD feeling more responsible following an intrusion, and that this 
leads them to be more likely to act to attempt to prevent harm. Although this study 
supports that heightened general responsibility beliefs lead to individuals with OCD 
being more likely to act to prevent harm, this study did not find that decision-specific 
feelings of responsibility played a specific role in decision differences. Furthermore, 
the cognitive model of OCD does not explicitly acknowledge a role for decision-
specific feelings of immorality, a factor which this study indicates may influence the 
decision differences of those with and without OCD. Finally, although the findings of 
this study support that general responsibility beliefs play a role in decision differences 
when risks of acting are not presented, when risks of acting are presented, the 
findings of this study indicate that general responsibility beliefs no longer play a 
mediating role. Therefore, this potentially indicates that the cognitive model had less 
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relevance when considering moral-reasoning scenarios where acting to prevent harm 
causes other, lesser, harm.  
 
Furthermore, previous studies on moral-reasoning have proposed explanatory factors 
to justify findings that individuals with OCD are less likely to act than individuals 
without OCD. For example, it has been proposed that individuals with OCD are more 
likely to make decisions according to deontological guilt (Mancini & Gangemi, 2015) 
or personal responsibility (Franklin et al., 2009). Whilst these previous findings may 
be applicable to non-OCD-relevant scenarios, this study demonstrated that, when 
considering everyday low-risk scenarios, the OCD group were more likely to act to 
prevent harm in their OCD-relevant scenarios. As such, suggestions that these factors 
are generalised to decision-making in OCD is not condoned by this study. Instead, by 
implication, the converses of these factors (such as altruistic guilt and general 
responsibility, both of which aim for least harm) are advocated by this study for 
individuals with OCD in moral-reasoning scenarios relevant to their OCD. However, 
these factors were not explored directly and so further comment cannot be made.  
 
It may also be of clinical interest that the current study found individuals with OCD to 
be more likely to act to attempt to prevent harm when risks of acting were not 
presented due to beliefs around general responsibility, and due to decision-specific 
feelings of immorality. 
 
Responsibility beliefs are already widely used as a focus in therapeutic work 
(Salkovskis, 2007), and this study affirms the benefits of this approach.  For example, 
the findings of this study supports the theory that inflated responsibility beliefs are 
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associated with decision-making differences (Salkovskis, 1985) and further that 
heightened general responsibility beliefs mediate the decision differences of those 
with and without OCD (Arntz et al., 2007; Lopatka & Rachman, 1995; Mancini et al., 
2004; Shafran, 1997).  As this study did not distinguish between subtypes of OCD in 
analysis, further comment regarding whether responsibility is more strongly 
associated with some subtypes than others (Clark, 2012) cannot be provided. 
However, there does seem to be a distinction between general responsibility beliefs 
and decision-specific responsibility judgements, the latter of which was not 
significantly associated with decisions in this study. Previous research suggests that 
general responsibility beliefs and intrusion-related responsibility interpretations are 
correlated (Salkovskis et al., 2000) and that both are associated with OCD; the finding 
of this study, that decision-specific responsibility judgements did not mediate 
decisions, therefore is not in keeping with this suggestion and requires further 
investigation to understand. However, the support that this study provides theories 
regarding heightened general responsibility beliefs in OCD in turn has implications 
for treatment, and emphasises that these beliefs may be used for early identification 
and intervention for those at risk of developing the disorder (Salkovskis et al., 1999; 
Lawrence & Williams, 2011).  
 
Findings also provide a fresh proposal that a focus on feelings of immorality when 
facing compulsions may be beneficial to clients. It is not suggested that an explicit 
focus on these areas is necessary to see clinical improvements, as exclusively 
behavioural approaches to OCD treatment have been found to significantly change 
beliefs, despite not being specifically focussed on (Emmelkamp, van Oppen & van 
Balkom, 2002); as such, feelings of immorality may shift through behavioural work 
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alone. However, if therapy intends to focus on cognitions, immorality could be 
considered alongside responsibility, as a potentially influential factor.  
 
Another important consideration is that for all participants the introduction of risks of 
acting, renders the potential explanatory factors of general responsibility and immoral 
judgements seemingly obsolete. For these decision differences, it appears that some 
other factor is at play; and this opens the possibility of an exploration of alternative 
factors. 
 
4.5. Future directions 
 
 
The present study provides the first of its kind to investigate decision-making in OCD 
when risks of acting were presented with low risk, semi-idiosyncratic scenarios; it is 
hoped that the methodological improvements noted here allow for a broader 
investigation into decision-making in OCD within this framework.  
 
It would be interesting to assess whether a replication of this study, with the 
methodological improvements noted within the limitations section of this chapter, 
would produce similar results. Particular improvements would include: more 
vignettes targeted towards a wider range of OCD subtypes; a larger sample size 
recruited through more varying means; contextualising scenarios to increase 
ecological validity or using real scenarios as opposed to hypothetical ones; using an 
anxious comparison group; and potentially using more robust methods of analysis 
(such as a bootstrapped Mixed Model ANCOVA, which can be conducted through 
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‘R’). Although these were beyond the remit of the present thesis, it would be of 
interest whether these improvements would alter the results found.  
 
It would also be of interest to explore the concept of immorality further, and 
especially the role this plays in decision-making in OCD. In comparison to 
responsibility beliefs in OCD, there is substantially less literature regarding feelings 
of immorality. As this study indicates that immorality judgements may play a role in 
the decisions, and hence potentially the behavioural compulsions, of individuals with 
OCD, this deserves further investigation.  
 
To progress our understanding of OCD further, it also seems necessary to explore 
factors that contribute to decision differences when risks of acting are presented. 
Owing to the number of suggested factors within the literature that contribute to both 
decision making in OCD, and moral-reasoning in the wider context, and the relatively 
novel field of conjoining these two areas, it may be appropriate to investigate this on 
an exploratory, potentially qualitative, basis. Alternative explanatory factors worthy 
of consideration include factors suggested to affect decision-making in OCD: desire 
for control, intolerance of uncertainty, negative beliefs about consequences of anxiety, 
negative beliefs about capacity to cope (Steketee, Frost & Cohen, 1998); and theories 
around moral-reasoning: the Dual Process Hypothesis of Moral Judgement (Greene et 
al., 2008); the Motivational Approach (Moll, Oliveira-Souza, Zahn, 2008); and the 
Five Foundations Account (Haidt & Graham, 2007).  
 
The decision-making juncture of whether to act to prevent harm or not, provides a key 
opportunity for an increased theoretical understanding of what drives compulsions in 
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individuals with OCD. If able to understand the factors that drive the decision to 
engage in compulsions, clinicians would be better armed to help clients understand 
and battle against this key maintenance cycle in the disorder.  
 
 
4.6. Conclusion 
 
 
This study provides a successful attempt to address some of the criticisms within the 
moral-reasoning literature in order to present the first known study to document how 
OCD and non-clinical participants compare on decisions made when risks of acting 
are presented, and when scenarios used the low-risk, semi-idiosyncratic content that 
individuals with and without OCD are found to differ on. Furthermore, it provides an 
exploratory insight into the factors that may contribute to decision differences, an area 
where debate remains rife. The results of this research add weight to current literature 
suggesting individuals with OCD are more likely to act than individuals without OCD, 
only in scenarios about which they are most concerned (Wroe & Salkovskis, 2000). 
Findings also contradict previous suggestions that the introduction of risks of acting 
result in individuals with OCD being less likely to act than their non-clinical 
counterparts (Mancini & Gangemi, 2015; Whitton, et al., 2014); instead, it was found 
that when risks of acting were presented, results echo those found when risks were not 
presented, in that individuals with OCD were more likely to act only in their most-
disturbing scenarios. When risks of acting were not stated, differences between 
groups were attributable to mediating effects of general responsibility beliefs and 
decision-specific judgements of immorality. However, when risks of acting were 
presented, these factors no longer mediated between group and decision. Limitations 
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of the study, mainly regarding the sample, vignettes used and analytical methods 
mean that caution must be applied when interpreting results. However, despite such 
limitations, several conclusions can be drawn which include supporting and novel 
contributions to the literature, implications for clinical practice, and exciting new 
areas for future research.  
 
The juncture between decision-making differences in OCD and moral-reasoning 
dilemmas remains an exciting landscape for exploration. It is hoped that this thesis 
has a role in paving the way for further routes of investigation: into replicating this 
research to justify its conclusions; into the role of immorality in decision-making in 
OCD; or into the factors that contribute to decision differences when risks of acting 
are presented. These avenues may hold exciting discoveries regarding decision-
making in OCD, which in turn may further our theoretical understanding of the 
debilitating disorder, and contribute to clinical improvements.   
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APPENDICES 
A. Advertising information 
Decision Making and Judgements in OCD 
Research by Zoe Kindynis and Dr Abigail Wroe, Royal Holloway University of London 
 
A study looking into how those experiencing OCD make decisions in 
everyday scenarios when there are risks of doing something and doing 
nothing. 
 
I am a Trainee Clinical Psychologist at Royal Holloway University working alongside 
Dr Abigail Wroe. We are looking for people who are currently experiencing 
symptoms of Obsessive Compulsive Disorder (OCD) and would like to take part in 
this study. 
 
What is the purpose of the study? 
We know that people with OCD tend to make different decisions to people without 
OCD in everyday scenarios that trigger their OCD. This study intends to explore how 
people with and without OCD make decisions in these scenarios. We are particularly 
interested in how people make decisions when both options (to do something or do 
nothing) result in some harm.  
 
What would taking part involve? 
If you agree to take part, you will be asked to complete a number of questionnaires. 
Some of these will be about symptoms of OCD, and some questions will give you a 
scenario and ask what you would do and how you would feel. The questionnaires will 
take about 30-40 minutes in total, and can be completed online or if you prefer, I can 
send you a paper copy and a freepost return envelope. Following this, I will arrange to 
have a short telephone call with you (at a time which is convenient for you), where I 
will ask you another questionnaire. This telephone call will take about 15-20 minutes.  
 
As a token of my appreciation for taking part in this study, you will be entered into a 
prize draw, which will be drawn once the research is complete. The winner will 
receive £50 and two runners up will receive £25 each.  
 
How do I take part in this research? 
If you are interested in taking part in this study, and to find out more information, 
please contact Zoe on 01784 414012 (and ask to speak to Zoe Kindynis), or on 
zoe.kindynis.2013@live.rhul.ac.uk. 
 
Or visit: STUDY WEBSITE 
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F. Participant information sheet 
 
 
 
Department of Psychology 
Royal Holloway, University of London, Egham, Surrey TW20 0EX, UK 
 
Information for Potential Participants 
Decisions and Judgements in Everyday Scenarios: when both acting and not 
acting result in harm. 
 
My name is Zoe Kindynis and I am a Trainee Clinical Psychologist at Royal 
Holloway, University of London.  I am carrying out a study, supervised by Dr. 
Abigail Wroe, on Decisions and Judgements in Everyday Scenarios.  
 
What Is The Purpose Of The Study?  
Different people make different decisions. We are looking to find out more 
information about the decisions people make in everyday scenarios when there are 
potential risks of harm involved. We are particularly interested in decisions made by 
people with OCD, and how this may compare to decisions made by people without 
OCD.  
 
Why Have I Been Asked To Take Part? 
We are looking for people who are over 18. You may have been asked to take part 
because you identify yourself as someone with symptoms of OCD, or you may have 
been asked because you do not. We are also asking people without symptoms of OCD 
to complete the questionnaires. 
Unfortunately, we cannot include you in the study if you: 
 Are under 18 
 Have a diagnosis of Schizophrenia 
 Are unable to communicate in English 
 
We wish to study around 50 people in total. 
 
What Will The Study Involve? 
If, once you have read this information sheet, you would like to take part, please 
complete the consent form. Once you have given your consent you will be taken to an 
online questionnaire. Alternatively, if you would rather complete the questionnaire on 
paper, I can send you a paper questionnaire with a Freepost return envelope. The 
questionnaire will ask some questions about you; it will then give you several 
scenarios and ask you questions about what decisions you would make, and how you 
would feel about them. This is expected to take about 30-40 minutes in total. This 
questionnaire will be anonymous, and you will be able to choose an anonymous code 
to identify yourself.  
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After you have completed the questionnaire, you will be asked to specify times and 
days when it would be convenient for me to call you. At this point you will be asked 
to give your telephone number, although this will only be paired to your chosen 
anonymous code (so as to maintain anonymity), and records of your telephone 
number will be destroyed as soon as the research is complete. I will call you at a 
convenient time for you.  
During the telephone call, I will be asking you to complete a short questionnaire that 
will show me if your answers are consistent with what I would expect from someone 
who meets criteria for a disorder (such as anxiety or OCD). This will NOT mean that 
you are given a diagnosis, and this will not go on your medical records or be shared 
with anyone outside of the research team. At the beginning of the telephone call, I 
will ask you if you wish to know what this questionnaire shows. If you ask to be 
informed of the findings of the questionnaire, I will discuss this with you at the end of 
the telephone call, and I can advise you of where you can seek support, if this is 
appropriate. If you wish not to be told the findings of the questionnaire, your wishes 
will be respected.  
This telephone call is expected to take about 15-20 minutes. At the end of the call, I 
will be able to give you a bit more information about the study, and you will have the 
opportunity to ask me any questions you have. I will also ask you if you are happy for 
me to keep your phone number or email address (again, stored separately from the 
questionnaire responses) for entry into the prize draw (see below). 
As this telephone call is an essential part of the research, if you are unable to speak 
over the telephone for any reason (for example, if you have hearing difficulties, or do 
not own a telephone), please contact me using the details provided before starting the 
research and we will do our best to accommodate your needs.  
If you have any questions or concerns you would like to discuss at any time, 
before, during, or after completing the questionnaire, please do not hesitate to 
contact me on 01784 414012 (and ask to speak to Zoe Kindynis), or on 
zoe.kindynis.2013@live.rhul.ac.uk. If answering the questionnaire makes you 
feel uncomfortable in any way, please get in touch.  
 
Who is organising this study? 
This study is being sponsored by Royal Holloway University of London. 
 
What are the benefits to taking part in this study? 
Taking part in this research will contribute to a greater understanding of how we 
make decisions, and particularly our understanding of the differences in decision and 
judgements between people with and without OCD. It is hoped that the results of this 
research will improve our understanding and treatment of those suffering from OCD.  
 
Furthermore, everyone who participates in this research will be entered into a prize 
draw, which will be drawn once the research is complete (around March 2016). The 
winner will receive £50, and two runners up will receive £25 each. So that I can make 
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sure the winner receives their prize, when I speak to you on the telephone, I will ask if 
you are happy for me to keep a record of your telephone number or email address. If 
so, this will no longer be paired with your questionnaire responses, but will be stored 
securely only for the purpose of being entered into the prize draw when the research is 
complete. I will then contact the winner using their chosen contact method, to 
organize the delivery of their prize! 
 
Any risks to taking part? 
Taking part in this study will require your time. Furthermore, it may be that you find 
some questions difficult to answer, or feel uncomfortable about making decisions in 
certain scenarios. It is also possible that the answers you give me are in keeping with 
what would be expected from someone with a disorder such as anxiety or OCD. If 
you wish to be informed of this, we will have the opportunity to discuss this and 
consider possible routes of support.  
 
What will happen with the results? 
Your files/responses to questions will be seen only by the immediate study team, who 
will only know you as the anonymous code you have chosen, unless you wish for 
them to know you by first name. Everything you say/report is confidential unless you 
tell us something that indicates that you or someone else is at risk of harm. We would 
discuss this with you before telling anyone else. You can decide not to answer some 
questions if you wish. 
 
The study will be written up and published in a scientific journal; If you would like to 
receive a summary of the results when they have been collected, I will take your 
contact details so that I can make sure I send them to you. (These will be stored 
separately from the questionnaire responses). You will also be kept informed as to 
where and when this is published and how to access it. Your information will not be 
identifiable to you when published. Any data arising from the study will only be used 
for the purposes of the current study. Data from this study will be retained for 10 
years and subsequently disposed of securely. 
 
Do I Have To Take Part? 
You do not have to take part in this study if you don’t want to. If you decide to take 
part you may withdraw at any time without having to give a reason and your data will 
be destroyed. You can also decide to leave some questions out, if you would rather 
not answer them. Taking part, or choosing not to take part in this study, will not affect 
your access to services now or in the future. 
 
What Should I Do If I Would Like To Find Out More?  
Please call 01784 414012 (and ask to speak to Zoe Kindynis) or email 
zoe.kindynis.2013@live.rhul.ac.uk if you have any questions regarding this study. 
Alternatively, if you would like to participate, please complete the consent form on 
the following page. You will then be taken to the questionnaire.   
 
What If There Is A Problem? 
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If you have a concern about any aspect of this study, you should ask to speak to Zoe 
Kindynis on 01784 414012 and I will do my best to answer your questions. If you 
remain unhappy and wish to speak to someone outside of the research team, please 
contact Carol Blackman at the Psychology Department, Royal Holloway, University 
of London on 01784 443528. 
You can print this part of the sheet for your reference. Please feel free to ask any 
questions before you complete the consent form.  
 
Who has reviewed the study? 
This study has been reviewed and approved by the Psychology Department internal 
ethical procedure at Royal Holloway, University of London, and by Queen Square 
Research Ethics Service. 
 
Please remember 
If completing this research leads you to feel concerned or distressed in any way, 
please see below contact details for support and advice: 
The researcher: Zoe Kindynis, 01784 414012, zoe.kindynis.2013@live.rhul.ac.uk 
Online support forums: www.ocduk.org 
    www.ocdaction.org.uk 
Out of hours telephone support: Samaritans (24hrs) 08457 90 90 90 
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G. Consent form 
 
Consent form 
 
ID code (please choose your anonymous ID code, and try to remember it for future reference- 
this could be a nickname, a favourite colour, or anything you choose- but please try to remember 
it!) : ………..………………. 
 
Decisions and Judgements in Everyday Scenarios: when both acting and not 
acting result in harm. 
 
You have been asked to participate in a study about decision-making in everyday 
scenarios, which is being carried out by Zoe Kindynis.  
 
Have you (please tick yes or no): 
 
 Read and understood the information sheet about the study? yes   no 
   
 
 Had an opportunity to ask questions? yes   no 
 
 
 
 Got satisfactory answers to your questions? yes   no n/a 
 
 
 Understood that participation is voluntary and that you’re free to withdraw 
from the study(at any time, without giving a reason and without it affecting 
your care)? yes   no  
 
 Understood that you are welcome to call the research team if at any point you 
have any concerns about the questionnaire, or the questionnaire makes you 
feel uncomfortable in any way? 
 yes   no  
 
 
Do you consent to take part in the study?    
Yes- I am over 18 and I consent to participate in the study described above  
No- I do not consent to participate in the study described above 
    
 
Would you rather complete the questionnaire online or on paper? 
Online        Paper 
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H. Disturbance rank 
 
I am interested in how people would react in different situations. In this questionnaire 
several situations are described and I would like you to rate what you would do, and 
how you would feel under certain circumstances.  
 
Before this however, please rank each of the situations below in the order of how 
much they worry or disturb you. There are no right or wrong answers. 
 
Please rank how disturbed you are by the following situations. Please try to ensure 
that each item has a different rank: 
1= most disturbing 5= least disturbing   Rank the items below, using numeric values 
starting with 1. 
        
  
Causing contamination through people eating food that you previously  
dropped on the floor    
 
Someone not getting the right change in a shop   
   
Accidentally causing someone to fall down the stairs and hurt 
themselves  
A burglary because you have not locked up properly 
 
Someone injuring themselves on some broke glass that you have seen in 
the street.   
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I. Vignettes 
1. You and several other people are preparing food for an office party. Peter and you have 
arrived a little early so begin the preparation. While putting the food out, you see out of 
the corner of your eye that Peter has dropped some crisps on the floor where he is 
standing.  He picks up the crisps and puts them back. Suddenly the thought pops into your 
head, “ What if the crisps are now contaminated and someone gets ill?” You could move 
the crisps away from the main party area. 
 
How likely is it that you would move the crisps? 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
I would definitely        I would definitely 
NOT move the crisps       move the crisps 
 
Imagine you chose NOT to move the crisps: 
 
How immoral would you feel? 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
not at all immoral        totally immoral 
 
How responsible would you feel for any harm that may occur? 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
not at all responsible        totally responsible 
 
How guilty would you feel for any harm that may occur? 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
not at all guilty        totally guilty 
 
 
Imagine you chose to move the crisps: 
 
How immoral would you feel? 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
not at all immoral        totally immoral 
 
How responsible would you feel for any harm that may occur? 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
not at all responsible        totally responsible 
 
How guilty would you feel for any harm that may occur? 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
not at all guilty        totally guilty 
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You and several other people are preparing food for an office party. Peter and you have 
arrived a little early so begin the preparation. While putting the food out, you see out of 
the corner of your eye that Peter has dropped some crisps on the floor where he is 
standing.  He picks up the crisps and puts them back. Suddenly the thought pops into your 
head, “ What if the crisps are now contaminated and someone gets ill?” You could move 
the crisps away from the main party area. 
You then realise that if you move the crisps, although most people at the party will 
not eat them and so will not be at risk of becoming ill, you would have to move the 
crisps to a quieter area of the party, and would therefore risk fewer other people 
eating them and becoming ill.  
 
How likely is it that you would move the crisps? 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
I would definitely        I would definitely 
NOT move the crisps       move the crisps 
 
Imagine you chose NOT to move the crisps: 
 
How immoral would you feel? 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
not at all immoral        totally immoral 
 
How responsible would you feel for any harm that may occur? 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
not at all responsible        totally responsible 
 
How guilty would you feel for any harm that may occur? 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
not at all guilty        totally guilty 
 
Imagine you chose to move the crisps: 
 
How immoral would you feel? 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
not at all immoral        totally immoral 
 
How responsible would you feel for any harm that may occur? 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
not at all responsible        totally responsible 
 
How guilty would you feel for any harm that may occur? 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
not at all guilty        totally guilty 
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2. You are visiting your friend Sarah and have been helping her to sort out her garden. 
Just before the shops shut, you remember that you both urgently need to go to the shops. 
Sarah runs ahead so you are the last to leave the house. The shops will be closed if you do 
not hurry. You remember that earlier in the day the garage door was open, and that Sarah 
keeps lots of valuable items in her garage. Suddenly the thought pops into your head, 
“What if the garage door is unlocked and someone steals Sarah’s valuable items?” You 
could lock the garage with a padlock.  
 
How likely is it that you would lock the garage door with a padlock? 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
I would definitely        I would definitely 
NOT lock the garage door        lock the garage 
with a padlock        with a padlock 
 
Imagine you chose NOT to lock the garage door with a padlock: 
 
How immoral would you feel? 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
not at all immoral        totally immoral 
 
How responsible would you feel for any harm that may occur? 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
not at all responsible        totally responsible 
 
How guilty would you feel for any harm that may occur? 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
not at all guilty        totally guilty 
 
 
Imagine you chose to lock the door with a padlock: 
 
How immoral would you feel? 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
not at all immoral        totally immoral 
 
How responsible would you feel for any harm that may occur? 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
not at all responsible        totally responsible 
 
How guilty would you feel for any harm that may occur? 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
not at all guilty        totally guilty 
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You are visiting your friend Sarah and have been helping her to sort out her garden. Just 
before the shops shut, you remember that you both urgently need to go to the shops. Sarah 
runs ahead so you are the last to leave the house. The shops will be closed if you do not hurry. 
You remember that earlier in the day the garage door was open, and that Sarah keeps lots of 
valuable items in her garage. Suddenly the thought pops into your head, “What if the garage 
door is unlocked and someone steals Sarah’s valuable items?” You could lock the garage with 
a padlock.  
You then realise that if you lock the garage door with a padlock, although the valuable 
items in her garage would not be at risk of being stolen, you would have to move the 
padlock from her shed door and would therefore risk fewer other less-valuable items 
being stolen. 
 
How likely is it that you would lock the garage door with a padlock? 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
I would definitely        I would definitely 
NOT lock the garage door        lock the garage 
with a padlock       door with a padlock 
 
Imagine you chose NOT to lock the garage door with a padlock: 
How immoral would you feel? 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
not at all immoral        totally immoral 
 
How responsible would you feel for any harm that may occur? 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
not at all responsible        totally responsible 
 
How guilty would you feel for any harm that may occur? 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
not at all guilty        totally guilty 
 
Imagine you chose to lock the door with a padlock: 
How immoral would you feel? 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
not at all immoral        totally immoral 
 
How responsible would you feel for any harm that may occur? 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
not at all responsible        totally responsible 
 
How guilty would you feel for any harm that may occur? 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
not at all guilty        totally guilty 
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3. As you are walking up some busy stairs at a train station, you are brushing past people who 
are running down the stairs to catch their train. You notice that you are walking up the left 
side of the stairs and there is a sign that says to ‘keep right’. You see that you have a long way 
to go on the stairs. The thought pops into your head, “What if I cause someone to fall down 
the stairs and hurt themselves?” You could move over to the right side of the stairs.  
 
How likely is it that you would move to the right side of the stairs? 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
I would definitely        I would definitely 
NOT move to the right        move to the right 
side of the stairs        side of the stairs 
 
Imagine you chose NOT to move to the right side of the stairs: 
 
How immoral would you feel? 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
not at all immoral        totally immoral 
 
How responsible would you feel for any harm that may occur? 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
not at all responsible        totally responsible 
 
How guilty would you feel for any harm that may occur? 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
not at all guilty        totally guilty 
 
 
Imagine you chose to move to the right side of the stairs: 
 
How immoral would you feel? 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
not at all immoral        totally immoral 
 
How responsible would you feel for any harm that may occur? 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
not at all responsible        totally responsible 
 
How guilty would you feel for any harm that may occur? 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
not at all guilty        totally guilty 
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As you are walking up some busy stairs at a train station, you are brushing past people 
who are running down the stairs to catch their train. You notice that you are walking up 
the left side of the stairs and there is a sign which says to ‘keep right’. You see that you 
have a long way to go on the stairs. The thought pops into your head, “What if I cause 
someone to fall down the stairs and hurt themselves?” You could move over to the right 
side of the stairs.  
You then realise that if you move over to the right side of the stairs, although you 
will not brush past many more people and so will not risk them falling down the 
stairs and hurting themselves, you would have to cross the flow of people to get to 
the right hand side and therefore risk fewer other people falling and hurting 
themselves.  
 
How likely is it that you would move to the right side of the stairs? 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
I would definitely        I would definitely 
NOT move to the right        move to the right 
side of the stairs        side of the stairs 
 
Imagine you chose NOT to move to the right side of the stairs: 
How immoral would you feel? 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
not at all immoral        totally immoral 
 
How responsible would you feel for any harm that may occur? 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
not at all responsible        totally responsible 
 
How guilty would you feel for any harm that may occur? 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
not at all guilty        totally guilty 
 
Imagine you chose to move to the right side of the stairs: 
How immoral would you feel? 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
not at all immoral        totally immoral 
 
How responsible would you feel for any harm that may occur? 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
not at all responsible        totally responsible 
 
How guilty would you feel for any harm that may occur? 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
not at all guilty        totally guilty 
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4. As you hurry along a street, you see some broken glass in the middle of the pavement. 
You know that the local school closes in half an hour and most of the children walk along 
this pavement. Suddenly the thought pops into your head, “What if one of the children 
steps or falls on this glass and hurts themselves?” You could move the glass off the 
pavement.  
 
How likely is it that you would move the broken glass? 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
I would definitely        I would definitely 
NOT move the broken glass      move the broken 
glass 
 
Imagine you chose NOT to move the broken glass: 
 
How immoral would you feel? 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
not at all immoral        totally immoral 
 
How responsible would you feel for any harm that may occur? 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
not at all responsible        totally responsible 
 
How guilty would you feel for any harm that may occur? 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
not at all guilty        totally guilty 
 
 
 
Imagine you chose to move the broken glass.  
 
How immoral would you feel? 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
not at all immoral        totally immoral 
 
How responsible would you feel for any harm that may occur? 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
not at all responsible        totally responsible 
 
How guilty would you feel for any harm that may occur? 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
not at all guilty        totally guilty 
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As you hurry along a street, you see some broken glass in the middle of the pavement. 
You know that the local school closes in half an hour and most of the children walk along 
this pavement. Suddenly the thought pops into your head, “What if one of the children 
steps or falls on this glass and hurts themselves?” You could move the glass off the 
pavement.  
You then realise that if you move the glass off the pavement, although most of the 
children will not risk stepping or falling on it and hurting themselves, you would 
have to move the glass onto the grass verge, and therefore risk fewer other children 
who walk along this verge stepping or falling on it and hurting themselves.   
 
How likely is it that you would move the broken glass? 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
I would definitely        I would definitely 
NOT move the broken glass      move the broken 
glass 
 
Imagine you chose NOT to move the broken glass: 
 
How immoral would you feel? 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
not at all immoral        totally immoral 
 
How responsible would you feel for any harm that may occur? 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
not at all responsible        totally responsible 
 
How guilty would you feel for any harm that may occur? 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
not at all guilty        totally guilty 
 
Imagine you chose to move the broken glass.  
 
How immoral would you feel? 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
not at all immoral        totally immoral 
 
How responsible would you feel for any harm that may occur? 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
not at all responsible        totally responsible 
 
How guilty would you feel for any harm that may occur? 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
not at all guilty        totally guilty 
 179 
5. You are at the check out and see the person in front pay, you think with a £20 note. He 
is given £4.23 change from a bill of £5.77 (instead of £14.23 as he should have received). 
The customer announces that he gave the shopkeeper a £20 note and that he has not got 
enough change. The cashier doubts whose mistake it was. Suddenly the thought pops into 
your head, “What if the customer loses vital money?” You could say that you thought the 
customer paid with a £20 note.  
 
How likely is it that you would say that you thought the customer paid with a £20? 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
I would definitely        I would definitely 
NOT say I thought the         say I thought the  
customer paid with a £20      customer paid with a £20 
 
Imagine you chose NOT to say you thought the customer paid with a £20: 
 
How immoral would you feel? 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
not at all immoral        totally immoral 
 
How responsible would you feel for any harm that may occur? 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
not at all responsible        totally responsible 
 
How guilty would you feel for any harm that may occur? 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
not at all guilty        totally guilty 
 
 
Imagine you chose to say you thought the customer paid with a £20.  
 
How immoral would you feel? 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
not at all immoral        totally immoral 
 
How responsible would you feel for any harm that may occur? 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
not at all responsible        totally responsible 
 
How guilty would you feel for any harm that may occur? 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
not at all guilty        totally guilty 
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You are at the check out and see the person in front pay, you think with a £20 note. He is 
given £4.23 change from a bill of £5.77 (instead of £14.23 as he should have received). 
The customer announces that he gave the shopkeeper a £20 note and that he has not got 
enough change. The cashier doubts whose mistake it was. Suddenly the thought pops into 
your head, “What if the customer loses vital money?” You could say that you thought the 
customer paid with a £20 note.  
You then realise that if you say you thought the customer paid with a £20 note, 
although the customer will not be at risk of losing vital money, this means the 
shopkeeper may have to give back more money than necessary, and therefore risks 
the shop losing money, although you believe that this may be less of a loss to a whole 
shop.  
 
How likely is it that you would say that you thought the customer paid with a £20? 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
I would definitely        I would definitely 
NOT say I thought the         say I thought the  
Customer paid with a £20      customer paid with a £20 
 
Imagine you chose NOT to say you thought the customer paid with a £20: 
How immoral would you feel? 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
not at all immoral        totally immoral 
 
How responsible would you feel for any harm that may occur? 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
not at all responsible        totally responsible 
 
How guilty would you feel for any harm that may occur? 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
not at all guilty        totally guilty 
 
Imagine you chose to say you thought the customer paid with a £20.  
How immoral would you feel? 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
not at all immoral        totally immoral 
 
How responsible would you feel for any harm that may occur? 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
not at all responsible        totally responsible 
 
How guilty would you feel for any harm that may occur? 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
not at all guilty        totally guilty 
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J. OCI-R 
OCI-R 
 
The following statements refer to experiences that many people have in their 
everyday lives. Circle the number that best describes HOW MUCH that experience 
has DISTRESSED or BOTHERED you during the PAST MONTH. The numbers 
refer to the following verbal labels:  
 
0 
Not at all 
1 
A little 
2 
Moderately 
3 
A lot 
4 
Extremely 
1 I have saved up so many things that they get in the way.  0 1 2 3 4  
2 I check things more often than necessary. 0 1 2 3 4  
3 I get upset if objects are not arranged properly. 0 1 2 3 4  
4 I feel compelled to count while I am doing things. 0 1 2 3 4  
5 I find it difficult to touch an object when I know it has been 
touched by strangers or certain people. 
0 1 2 3 4  
6 I find it difficult to control my own thoughts. 0 1 2 3 4  
7 I collect things I don’t need.  0 1 2 3 4  
8 I repeatedly check doors, windows, drawers etc. 0 1 2 3 4  
9 I get upset if others change the way I have arranged things. 0 1 2 3 4  
10 I feel I have to repeat certain numbers. 0 1 2 3 4  
11 I sometimes have to wash or clean myself simply because I 
feel contaminated. 
0 1 2 3 4  
12 I am upset by unpleasant thoughts that come into my mind 
against my will.  
0 1 2 3 4  
13 I avoid throwing things away because I am afraid I might 
need them later 
0 1 2 3 4  
14 I repeatedly check gas and water taps and light switches 
after turning them off.  
0 1 2 3 4  
15 I need things to be arranged in a particular way.  0 1 2 3 4  
16 I feel that there are good and bad numbers. 0 1 2 3 4  
17 I wash my hands more often and longer than necessary. 0 1 2 3 4  
18 I frequently get nasty thoughts and have difficulty getting 
rid of them. 
0 1 2 3 4  
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K. RAS 
RAS 
 
This questionnaire lists different attitudes or beliefs which people sometimes hold.  
Read each statement carefully and decide how much you agree or disagree with it.  
For each of the attitudes, show your answer by putting a circle round the words which 
BEST DESCRIBE HOW YOU THINK.  Be sure to choose only one answer for each 
attitude.  Because people are different, there is no right answer or wrong answer to 
these statements.   
To decide whether a given attitude is typical of your way of looking at things, simply 
keep in mind what you are like MOST OF THE TIME. 
 
1. I often feel responsible for things which go wrong. 
 
TOTALLY        AGREE    AGREE           NEUTRAL DISAGREE         DISAGREE         TOTALLY 
AGREE             VERY MUCH    SLIGHTLY  SLIGHTLY         VERY MUCH          DISAGREE 
 
2. If I don’t act when I can foresee danger, then I am to blame for any consequences if it 
happens. 
 
TOTALLY        AGREE    AGREE           NEUTRAL DISAGREE         DISAGREE         TOTALLY 
AGREE             VERY MUCH    SLIGHTLY  SLIGHTLY         VERY MUCH          DISAGREE 
 
3.  I am too sensitive to feeling responsible for things going wrong. 
 
TOTALLY        AGREE    AGREE           NEUTRAL DISAGREE         DISAGREE         TOTALLY 
AGREE             VERY MUCH    SLIGHTLY  SLIGHTLY         VERY MUCH          DISAGREE 
 
4. If I think bad things, this is as bad as doing bad things. 
 
TOTALLY        AGREE    AGREE           NEUTRAL DISAGREE         DISAGREE         TOTALLY 
AGREE             VERY MUCH    SLIGHTLY  SLIGHTLY         VERY MUCH          DISAGREE 
 
5.  I worry a great deal about the effects of things which I do or don’t do. 
 
TOTALLY        AGREE    AGREE           NEUTRAL DISAGREE         DISAGREE         TOTALLY 
AGREE             VERY MUCH    SLIGHTLY  SLIGHTLY         VERY MUCH          DISAGREE 
 
6. To me, not acting to prevent danger is as bad as making disaster happen. 
 
TOTALLY        AGREE    AGREE           NEUTRAL DISAGREE         DISAGREE         TOTALLY 
AGREE             VERY MUCH    SLIGHTLY  SLIGHTLY         VERY MUCH          DISAGREE 
 
7.  If I know that harm is possible, I should always try to prevent it, however unlikely it 
seems. 
 
TOTALLY        AGREE    AGREE           NEUTRAL DISAGREE         DISAGREE         TOTALLY 
AGREE             VERY MUCH    SLIGHTLY  SLIGHTLY         VERY MUCH          DISAGREE 
 
8.  I must always think through the consequences of even the smallest actions. 
 
TOTALLY        AGREE    AGREE           NEUTRAL DISAGREE         DISAGREE         TOTALLY 
AGREE             VERY MUCH    SLIGHTLY  SLIGHTLY         VERY MUCH          DISAGREE 
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9.  I often take responsibility for things which other people don’t think are my fault. 
 
TOTALLY        AGREE    AGREE           NEUTRAL DISAGREE         DISAGREE         TOTALLY 
AGREE             VERY MUCH    SLIGHTLY  SLIGHTLY         VERY MUCH          DISAGREE 
 
10.  Everything I do can cause serious problems. 
 
TOTALLY        AGREE    AGREE           NEUTRAL DISAGREE         DISAGREE         TOTALLY 
AGREE             VERY MUCH    SLIGHTLY  SLIGHTLY         VERY MUCH          DISAGREE 
 
11.  I am often close to causing harm. 
 
TOTALLY        AGREE    AGREE           NEUTRAL DISAGREE         DISAGREE         TOTALLY 
AGREE             VERY MUCH    SLIGHTLY  SLIGHTLY         VERY MUCH          DISAGREE 
 
12. I must protect others from harm. 
 
TOTALLY        AGREE    AGREE           NEUTRAL DISAGREE         DISAGREE         TOTALLY 
AGREE             VERY MUCH    SLIGHTLY  SLIGHTLY         VERY MUCH          DISAGREE 
 
13.  I should never cause even the slightest harm to others. 
 
TOTALLY        AGREE    AGREE           NEUTRAL DISAGREE         DISAGREE         TOTALLY 
AGREE             VERY MUCH    SLIGHTLY  SLIGHTLY         VERY MUCH          DISAGREE 
 
14. I will be condemned for my actions. 
 
TOTALLY        AGREE    AGREE           NEUTRAL DISAGREE         DISAGREE         TOTALLY 
AGREE             VERY MUCH    SLIGHTLY  SLIGHTLY         VERY MUCH          DISAGREE 
 
15.  If I can have even a slight influence on things going wrong, then I must act to prevent it. 
 
TOTALLY        AGREE    AGREE           NEUTRAL DISAGREE         DISAGREE         TOTALLY 
AGREE             VERY MUCH    SLIGHTLY  SLIGHTLY         VERY MUCH          DISAGREE 
 
16.  To me, not acting where disaster is a slight possibility is as bad as making that disaster 
happen. 
 
TOTALLY        AGREE    AGREE           NEUTRAL DISAGREE         DISAGREE         TOTALLY 
AGREE             VERY MUCH    SLIGHTLY  SLIGHTLY         VERY MUCH          DISAGREE 
 
17. For me, even slight carelessness is inexcusable when it might affect other people. 
 
TOTALLY        AGREE    AGREE           NEUTRAL DISAGREE         DISAGREE         TOTALLY 
AGREE             VERY MUCH    SLIGHTLY  SLIGHTLY         VERY MUCH          DISAGREE 
 
18.  In all kinds of daily situations, my inactivity can cause as much harm as deliberate bad 
intentions. 
 
TOTALLY        AGREE    AGREE           NEUTRAL DISAGREE         DISAGREE         TOTALLY 
AGREE             VERY MUCH    SLIGHTLY  SLIGHTLY         VERY MUCH          DISAGREE 
 
19.  Even if harm is a very unlikely possibility, I should always try to prevent it at any cost. 
 
TOTALLY        AGREE    AGREE           NEUTRAL DISAGREE         DISAGREE         TOTALLY 
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AGREE             VERY MUCH    SLIGHTLY  SLIGHTLY         VERY MUCH          DISAGREE 
20.  Once I think it is possible that I have caused harm, I can’t forgive myself. 
 
TOTALLY        AGREE    AGREE           NEUTRAL DISAGREE         DISAGREE         TOTALLY 
AGREE             VERY MUCH    SLIGHTLY  SLIGHTLY         VERY MUCH          DISAGREE 
 
21.  Many of my past actions have been intended to prevent harm to others.# 
 
TOTALLY        AGREE    AGREE           NEUTRAL DISAGREE         DISAGREE         TOTALLY 
AGREE             VERY MUCH    SLIGHTLY  SLIGHTLY         VERY MUCH          DISAGREE 
 
22.  I have to make sure other people are protected from all of the consequences of things I 
do. 
 
TOTALLY        AGREE    AGREE           NEUTRAL DISAGREE         DISAGREE         TOTALLY 
AGREE             VERY MUCH    SLIGHTLY  SLIGHTLY         VERY MUCH          DISAGREE 
 
23.  Other people should not rely on my judgement. 
 
TOTALLY        AGREE    AGREE           NEUTRAL DISAGREE         DISAGREE         TOTALLY 
AGREE             VERY MUCH    SLIGHTLY  SLIGHTLY         VERY MUCH          DISAGREE 
 
24. If I cannot be certain I am blameless, I feel that I am to blame. 
 
TOTALLY        AGREE    AGREE           NEUTRAL DISAGREE         DISAGREE         TOTALLY 
AGREE             VERY MUCH    SLIGHTLY  SLIGHTLY         VERY MUCH          DISAGREE 
 
25.  If I take sufficient care then I can prevent harmful accidents. 
 
TOTALLY        AGREE    AGREE           NEUTRAL DISAGREE         DISAGREE         TOTALLY 
AGREE             VERY MUCH    SLIGHTLY  SLIGHTLY         VERY MUCH          DISAGREE 
 
26.  I often think that bad things will happen if I am not careful enough. 
 
TOTALLY        AGREE    AGREE           NEUTRAL DISAGREE         DISAGREE         TOTALLY 
AGREE             VERY MUCH    SLIGHTLY  SLIGHTLY         VERY MUCH          DISAGREE 
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L. Sociodemographics 
 
Before we finish, it would be really helpful to get to know a little bit about you. 
 
How old are you?_______ 
 
How would you describe your gender? 
Male 
Female 
 
How would you describe your ethnicity? 
White British 
White Irish 
White Other 
Indian 
Pakistani 
Bangladeshi 
Chinese 
Asian Other 
Black African 
Black Caribbean 
Black Other 
Mixed White and Black African 
Mixed White and Black Caribbean 
Mixed White and Asian 
Mixed Other 
Other, please specify___________ 
 
What is your current highest obtained educational level? 
GCSES (or equivalent) 
A Level (or equivalent) 
Undergraduate Degree (or equivalent) 
Postgraduate Degree (or equivalent) 
Postdoctoral Degree (or equivalent) 
None of the above 
Other, please specify__________ 
 
Are you currently seeing a therapist/counsellor/psychologist/psychotherapist 
(you can choose not to answer this question)? 
Yes 
No 
 
Do you consider yourself to be someone who suffers from symptoms of OCD 
(again, you do not have to answer this question)? 
Yes 
No 
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M. Arrangements for telephone call 
 
Thank you very much for completing this questionnaire! 
 
To complete your participation in this study, we will now have a short telephone 
conversation which should last a maximum of 20 minutes. During this call, I will ask 
you to complete a very short questionnaire that will show me if your answers are 
consistent with what I would expect from someone who meets criteria for a disorder 
(such as anxiety or OCD). This will NOT mean that you are given a diagnosis, and 
this will not go on your medical records or be shared with anyone outside of the 
research team. At the beginning of the telephone call, I will ask you if you wish to 
know what this questionnaire shows. If you ask to be informed of the findings of the 
questionnaire, I will discuss this with you at the end of the telephone call, and I can 
advise you of where you can seek support, if this is appropriate. If you wish not to be 
told the findings of the questionnaire, your wishes will be respected.  
 
At the end of the call, I will be able to give you a bit more information about the study, 
and you will have the opportunity to ask me any questions you have. I will also ask 
you if you are happy for me to keep your phone number or email address (stored 
separately from the questionnaire responses) for entry into the prize draw. 
 
What telephone number would you prefer to be called on?Please note: this telephone 
number will only be paired to your chosen anonymous code (so as to maintain anonymity), and records 
of your telephone number will be destroyed as soon as the research is complete. 
_____________________ 
 
Please state below the dates and times when you would be available to take this 
telephone call.I will try my best to ensure that you are called at your preferred times, but this will be 
easier if you are able to specify a few times. 
_____________________________________________________________________
____________________ 
 
Are you happy to be contacted by text to arrange/confirm your telephone call 
date/time? 
Yes 
No 
 
Are you happy for answer phone messages to be left on your chosen number? 
Yes 
No 
 
Please also note: During this telephone call I will refer to you as the anonymous code 
that you specified at the beginning of this questionnaire. If you would rather me 
address you differently, please let me know below what you would prefer to be called. 
If you are happy for me to use your anonymous ID code, please leave this box blank. 
To maintain anonymity, please do NOT give your first name AND surname. 
_____________________ 
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N. Screenshots of first three pages of online questionnaire 
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O. SCID 
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P. Debrief information 
Department of Psychology 
Royal Holloway, University of London, Egham, Surrey TW20 0EX, UK 
 
Debriefing Information  
Decisions and Judgements in Everyday Scenarios: when both acting and not 
acting result in harm. 
 
Thank you very much for completing my study on decisions and judgements in 
everyday scenarios.  
 
I can now tell you a little more information about what the study is about… 
 
Previous research has found that people with Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder (OCD) 
are more likely to decide to prevent potential harm than people without OCD in 
situations relevant to their OCD.  For example, some people with OCD may be more 
likely to remove broken glass from the street if they think there may be potential harm 
to others; others may be more likely to wash their hands if they are worried about 
germs.  
 
However, what we don’t know yet is what people decide to do when they are told that 
their act to try and prevent harm will result in other harm (for example, if you move 
the broken glass, some other people will hurt themselves on the glass). We are 
particularly interested in whether people with and without OCD make different 
decisions in these scenarios.  
 
We hope that the results of the study will help us to find out how some thinking styles 
might be related to decisions to act to try and prevent harm (the compulsion part of 
OCD). It is hoped that by understanding this, we will be able to improve the treatment 
offered to those with OCD.  
 
A written copy of this ‘Debriefing Information’ can be sent to you (by email or post); 
if you would like this, please let me know.  
 
What Next? 
You have now finished your participation in the study. Thank you! As a token of my 
appreciation, you will be entered into a prize draw, which will be drawn once the 
research is complete (around April 2016). The winner will receive £50, and two 
runners up will receive £25 each. Are you happy for me to keep a record of your 
telephone number or email address? If so, this will no longer be paired with your 
questionnaire responses and will be securely stored only for the purpose of being 
entered into the prize draw when the research is complete. I will contact the winner 
using their chosen contact method, to organize the delivery of their prize! 
Would you like to receive a summary of the results when they have been collected? If 
so, please may I take your contact details so that I can make sure I send them to you? 
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(These will again be stored separately from the questionnaire responses, and will only 
be used for this purpose). 
 
What Should I Do If I Would Like To Find Out More?  
Please call 01784 414012 (and ask to speak to Zoe Kindynis) or email 
zoe.kindynis.2013@live.rhul.ac.uk if you have any questions regarding this study or 
would like any further information.  
 
 
What If There Is A Problem? 
If you have a concern about any aspect of this study, you should ask to speak to the 
Zoe Kindynis on 01784 414012 and I will do my best to answer your questions. If you 
remain unhappy and wish to speak to someone outside of the research team, please 
contact Carol Blackman at the Psychology Department, Royal Holloway, University 
of London on 01784 443528. 
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Summary of Research Study 
Thank you for taking part in my research study on Decisions and Judgements in OCD! 
You are being contacted because you noted that you would like to be informed of the 
main results of the study. These are presented below.  
 
What the literature tells us so far:  
1. Individuals with OCD, compared to individuals without OCD, are more likely to act 
to prevent potential harm, but only in everyday situations (Foa et al., 2003) that are 
relevant to their obsessional concerns (Wroe and Salkovskis, 2000).  
 
2. Moral reasoning is often researched using scenarios where there is potential harm and 
where there are 2 options: option 1, to do nothing (not to act to prevent harm); or option 
2, to act to prevent that potential harm, but by doing so causing other, albeit less, harm.  
For example, a commonly used scenario to explore moral reasoning is the runaway train 
dilemma. This dilemma says that there is a runaway train headed towards 5 people on a 
track. The reader has the option to pull a lever that will change the train’s path towards 1 
person on another track.  
Research suggests that individuals with OCD are less likely to try and prevent harm in 
these scenarios when compared to individuals without OCD (Mancini & Gangemi, 
2015; Whitton, Henry & Grisham, 2014) i.e. participants with OCD would be less likely 
to pull the lever to change the train’s track. 
Whilst interesting, these studies are criticised because they used non-everyday, non-
OCD relevant situations, which is unsupported by the above research in which decision 
differences between those with and without OCD are specific to everyday, OCD-
relevant situations.  
 
3. Many factors have been suggested to explain decision differences between those with 
and without OCD. These include: responsibility (Franklin et al, 2009; Wroe & 
Salkovskis, 2000); guilt (Mancini & Gangemi, 2015); and moral sensitivity (Harrison et 
al., 2012). However, little is known about these factors and about their relative 
contributions to decision differences.  
 
Therefore this study aimed to: 
1. Provide support for the notion that individuals with and without OCD only make 
different decisions in everyday scenarios that are relevant to OCD; in these situations 
where there is potential harm it was expected that individuals with OCD would be more 
likely to say that they would act to try and prevent that harm. 
 
2. Explore what happened to the decisions made by people with and without OCD when 
the scenarios are described such that acting to prevent some harm, may result in other, 
albeit less, potential harm. We wanted to test whether the previous findings on moral 
judgement also apply when scenarios describe everyday situations that are more relevant 
to OCD.  
 
3. Explore whether beliefs and judgements around responsibility, guilt and immorality, 
contributed to decision differences between individuals with and without OCD.  
 
What we did:  
1. We asked individuals with and without OCD to complete a questionnaire about 
decisions and judgements in different hypothetical scenarios. We also asked everyone to 
Q. Research summary 
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rank the scenarios beforehand in terms of how distressing they were so that we could 
compare individuals’ responses when considering scenarios that were most- and least-
distressing to them. It was hoped that this would mean we could explore individuals’ 
most distressing (and hence, likely to be OCD relevant) scenarios to their least 
distressing.  
 
2. All scenarios were presented twice. In the first presentation, the potential risk of 
acting was not stated. In the second presentation, a potential risk of acting was also 
presented. This second presentation therefore mirrored the train dilemma (where acting 
would result in other, lesser harm). However, as this study used low-risk, everyday 
scenarios, and identified individuals most-distressing scenarios, this addressed the 
criticisms of previous studies.  
 
3. All participants were also asked to rate their general beliefs about responsibility and 
their feelings of responsibility, immorality and guilt if they did and didn’t act in 
scenarios.  
 
What we found:  
1. When risks of acting were not presented, individuals with OCD were found to be 
more likely to say that they would try and act to prevent harm than individuals without 
OCD. However, this was only found to be the case in their most-distressing scenarios. 
Therefore, people with OCD do not generally make different decisions to people without 
OCD; this is only found to be the case in scenarios related to their individual obsessional 
concerns. This supports the findings of Wroe and Salkovskis (2000).   
 
2. When risks of acting were presented, individuals with OCD were still more likely 
than individuals without OCD to act to try and prevent harm only in their obsession-
relevant scenarios. This contradicts the findings of Mancini and Gangemi (2015) and 
Whitton, Henry and Grisham (2014) who suggested individuals with OCD are less likely 
than individuals without OCD to act to prevent harm when this harm causes other, less 
harm. Therefore, when presented with everyday scenarios that are more relevant to their 
OCD, individuals with OCD are still likely to act in a way that reduces overall harm, 
when risks of acting are presented. 
 
3. From this study, it seemed that the reason individuals with OCD were more likely to 
act to prevent harm in their most-distressing scenarios was because they felt generally 
more responsible, and they would have felt more immoral if they didn’t act in the 
specific situation. However, this was only for scenarios when risks of acting were not 
presented. When risks of acting were presented, general responsibility and feelings of 
immorality, responsibility and guilt, did not explain differences in decisions, suggesting 
that when risks of acting were presented, some other factor may have been at play.  
 
These findings are important in improving our understanding of OCD, and developing 
psychological work that may help people with OCD. However, more research is 
required to improve our understanding of factors that influence such decisions.  
 
I hope you have found these results interesting. Please do get in touch if you have any 
questions! Thank you again for taking part in this research. 
 
Zoe Kindynis 
